KV-2/907-Rensburg-SA

A National-Socialist and admirer of Hitler in the 1930s, in 1941 van Rensburg became Commandant General of Ossewa-Brandwag

AOB: In my perception intriguing, are the frequent, more than 24 years lasting British internal Services, considerations.

The June 1993 consideration may be noticed as 'the weeding through' all the to be released British Secret Service Files up to about the early 1950s.

Since about 2015 these became (peu à peu) also available as 'filmed files', luckily for us, by the way. May I guess - that the 'National Lottery' provided the funds for this elaborated project?

(AOB: I like these kind of sheets - as they provide quite some interesting matters, which after these files had been, I suppose, thus after their PF numbers the newly created the KV 2/xxxx serials, some references had been destroyed, somewhere in the 1950s and 1960s. Likely followed by a 'post weeding process' towards the end of the last century. Thus we encounter references which might, sometimes, being destroyed. However, in some file series this is clearly noticed.

11.11.41. Extract fro Report on the Afrikaner Broederbond. 1X (AOB: quite curious is using capitals as 99.99% are using 1x or 1a and that like)

17.12.41. Extract from S.I.S. (AOB: Secret Intelligence Service, which became later M.I.6; dealing with Foreign Countries) Re arrangements in S. Africa for Hans Von Kotze (= Double agent Springbok) (KV 2/1134 ... KV 2/1136: PF 63201), referring to Van Rensburg. 1A (1a).

17.12.41. Copy of Telegram to Chief of General Staff, Pretoria referring to Van Rensburg 2A (2a).

1.1.42. Copy of Minute from B.1.b. (= M.I.5 at St. James Street in London) to B.1.a (thus an internal letter from one desk to another desk) referring to extract from Overseas Bulletin of December 1941. 3A (3a).

22.1.43. Extract from South Africa House Report on the Ossewa-Brandwag and Kindred Activities. 4A (4a).

undated From R.S.S. (Radio Security Service) Interim Report of Felix (Lothar Sittig / Nils Passche) (British code-name Shrapnel) 6A (6a).

15.3.43. Note by Major Luke on the Trompke (= German Ambassador in Lourenco Marques) Organisation. 7A (7a).

16.3.43. Extract from S.I.S. on German Espionage in the Union (= South Africa) (and P.E.A. (= Portuguese East Africa)

18.3.43. Copy of Minute from B.1.b. to A.D.B.1 (= D.G. White of M.I.5?) relating to Van Rensburg. 9A (9a).

31.3.43. Copy of letter from Dominions Office to Colonel Vivian (= S.I.S. / M.I.6) regarding Van Rensburg. 11A (11a).

17.7.43. Scramble of B.J. (= blue jacket; this was a particular folder - that only was accessible by special authorised personnel) 119809 regarding sent by Felix (= Settig) 23A (23a).

14.8.43. Extract from PF 65657 Trompke (= German Ambassador in Lourenco Marques in Portuguese East Africa) re S.I.S. Cover name for van Rensburg. 24A (24a).

1.9.43 Extract from S.I.S. Report - Addendum to Axis espionage in the Union (S.A.) and P.E.A. (= Portuguese East Africa) April - July 1943. 25A (25a).

20.10.43. Extract from S.I.S. Report - Second Addendum on Axis Espionage in the Union (S.A.) and P.E.A. - 15th October 1943. 26A (26a).

21.10.43. Note on Axis (AOB: = actually incorporating: Germany, the remaining Mussolini Italy and formally also Japan) in the Union of South Africa. 27A (27a).

26.10.43. Copy of paraphrase version of telegram from Pretoria, forwarded by S.I.S. 28A (28a).

2.11.43. Copy of Telegram from Major Ryde (AOB: whom was, by the way entirely in vain, DFing on the W/T signals sent from Rensburg's farm and other hiding places towards Germany), Pretoria, regarding information to be given to Field Marshal Smuts (the latter was the South African President). 29A (29a).

2.11.43. From S.I.S. to B.1.b. (= an office at M.I.5 in London) forwarding information received from Pretoria, regarding van Rensburg Deputy, H.J.H. Andresen. 30A (30a).

4.11.43. Minute from D.G. (= Dick Goldschmith White at M.I.5) to D.D.B. (AOB: quite curious - as sometimes D.D.B. is also pointing at Dick G. White; maybe in another function) regarding an interview with Field Marshal Smuts (AOB: The South African President and his visit to England. The background was that South African's stand was sometimes opposing British imaginations. Smuts being a 'Boer' versus their former enemy Britain; some decades earlier) 32A (32a).

4.11.43. Copy of telegram to Major Ryde, giving information re meeting with Field Marshal Smuts. 32B (32b).

4.11.43. From D.D.B. (likely Dick G. White, M.I.5.) to S.I.S. regarding the results of the meeting with Field Marshal Smuts. 33A (33a).

5.11.43. From S.I.S. to B.1.b. (section of M.I.5) re Masser (KV 2/942 .. KV 2/944;PF106140) 34A (34a).

5.11.43. Minute from D.B. (maybe Dick White?) to B.1.b. (= section of M.I.5) regarding German Espionage in the (South African) Union. 35A (35a).

6.11.43. Note from B.1.b. regarding on van Rensburg and Leibrandt. (KV 2/924 .. KV 2/925; PF 63905) 37A (37a).

7.11.43. Extract from Minute to B.1.b. regarding re Elfrink's contacts in the Union and PEA (= Portuguese East Africa) 38z.

28.11.43 Extract from S.I.S. letter CX/(typically S.I.S. practice making their file numbers unreadable) Andresen's contacts 39A (39a).,

16.12.43. Letter from S.I.S. to B.1.b. relating to Union escapes, their whereabouts and contacts. 40A (40a).

4.1.44. Copy of letter from Major Ryde, Pretoria regarding arrangements for D. Fing. 43B (43b).

5.1.44. Copy of Telegram from Major Ryde, Pretoria regarding Paasche's (Niels Olaf) (S.I.S code-name Pedant) W/T operations. 44A (44a).

9.1.44. From S.I.S. to B.1.b. regarding (Herbert) Wild (probably killed in conjunction with Rooseboom), van Rensburg etc. 46a.

12.1.44. From B.1.b. to S.I.S. regarding information received from Major Ryde, regarding location of Paasche's W/T set etc: 47a.

14.1.44. Copy of telegram from Major Ryde, Pretoria referring to his interview with (AOB: name kept invisible a typical practice of S.I.S.) 48a.

25.1.44. From Pretoria, Extract from letter dated 4th Jan (1944) : re the case of name deleted mentioning ~~von Rendsburg~~ van Rensburg. 50a.

13.3.44. From Pretoria giving information re Vacuum's farm (= van Rensburg). 51a

Copy of Minute in 399 in PF 65657 Trompke Paul (AOB: = The German Ambassador in Lourenco Marques, in Portuguese East Africa now known as Mozambique) Minute 52↓

I think we should be aware of being too jubilant however about disclosures for they have yet to be proved accurate, though we have a certain amount of WW material to corroborate statements in paras 1a, 1b

The vital fact that Sittig is on van Rensburg's farm is, of course, new. Smut's (South African President) decision not to arrest him as long as he is there seems a surprisingly weak one, but is no doubt due to political considerations of which he must be allowed to be the best judge.

The present position seems to me very precarious- has partially confessed but remains a large-nearly all the principal conspirators appear to be aware that the Government has knowledge of their activities ?? de Villiers seems incapable of conducting a secure investigation.

I suggest, if you agree, that we reply to Ryde saying that as so much has now come out, the faster the whole matter can be brought to a climax the better & reminding him that, if Paasche & Sittig are successfully arrested, we should like to take custody of the bodies as previously arranged with Forsyth. (AOB: they weren't aware - that Britain's interest was not similar to South African 'Boer' animosities)

As regards paras 2.3 & 4 of 396a (??), presumably S.I.S. will now have consulted, though obviously Ryde cannot leave until the present emergency has passed.

17.3.44. From Major Ryde Pretoria, Telegram mentioning ~~Rendsburg~~ Rensburg. 54a

18.3.44. Copy of Letter to S.I.S. re the following developments in the Felix (= Sittig) case. 55a.

27.3.44. From Pretoria re memorandum of visit by member of American Consulate to van ~~Rendsburg~~ Rensburg. 56a.

3.4.44. Photostat of report from Major Ryde, Pretoria attaching statement of Roosenboom (= KV 2/941; PF66179). 58a.

14.4.44. Extract from a report on the Afrikaner Broeder Bond mentioning van Rensburg. 60a.

4.5.44. Cable from S.O.I. Capetown requesting information re Pirow (= KV 2/908; PF66920) (Dr. Oswald Pirow, also Minister of Justice of SA) & Rensburg. 60b.

25.5.44. Extract re van Rensburg from Third Report on German Espionage in the Union (S.A.) 61a.

15.8.44. Report on van Rensburg interview with U.S. Observer in South Africa forwarded by N.I.D. 62a.

11?9.44. Copy of information from BJ (= Blue jacket, a special folder, only accessible for special authorised servants) 135893. 64a.

19.5.45. To S.I.S. re possibility of obtaining information re Rensburg and other from Trompke* was the German Ambassador in Lourenco Marques, Werz acted as a kind of deputy) 67a.

4.9.45. Minute from O.C. to B.1.b. (an office at M.I.5 in London) Mr. Noble re letter at 69a.

10.9.45. Extract from Camp 020 Progress report on Kraizizek (KV 2/2638 - KV 2/2639; PF 66174) re Rensburg. 72a.

* AOB: Trompke, had been interrogated in Germany after the end of the war, and gave an address somewhere in Germany. It proved however, that he disappeared. In my perception, he returned to Asia or Latin America, where he had been formerly stationed before the war started. Lourenco Marques, actually, was a position not his choice but was due to the wartime circumstances.

Final in File No: SF 96/Brit/29(2) (these file types do often no-longer exist) ..... Receipt Date 16.7.1948

Extract from internal letter from Frederick S. Annadale, 69 Fourth Street, Baksburg-North, Transvaal, South Africa, to Sir Oswald Mosley (AOB: the British B.U.F. (British Union of Fascist) leader in England; whom was, together with 'Lady' Mosley interned, thus kept in captivity during the wartime days.) (KV 2/884 ... KV 2/896; PF 48909), mentioning van Rensburg.

I am just a young South African who have been studying the Jew and all his activities, as a Greyshirt who is trying his best for this country I am writing this letter to you.

Our Leader Mr. Weighardt whent to Mr. Pirow (once Justice Minister of the South African Union (KV 2/908; PF 66920) and to Dr. van Rensburg, the leader of the "Ossewa-Branchuag (?) (Brandwag)" to ask them to come together as to form a block of National Socialist in the (South African) Union.

Dr. van Rensburg's reply was, that he would not even consider such a step before the Greyshirts have done away with a sertain (certain) Pamphlet dealing with the "O.B."

KV 2/907-1, page 14 (minute 78a) AOB: please notice that the KV 2/xxx serials, nearly always, are running in an inversed order; thus with up-going PDF page numbers you are going backwards in time.

Extract from International (incepted by British censorship) letter from Ray K. Rudman, Posbus (mailbox) 497, Pietermaritzburg S.A. to A.S. Leese, Esq. M.R.C.V.S., 20 Pewley Hill, Guildford, Surrey, mentioning von (van) Rensburg.

re Shapirow (Pirow?), He is now connected with OB-v.Rensburg in a newspaper-printing business-one at Pretoria and the other at Pietersburg.Tvl. (Transvaal?). van Rensburg's Supreme Council has now admitted that they are not Anti-Jew and Nationalists ! Pirow is "sq" and so is van Rensburg and both are BB (Ossewa-Brandwag) as well ... nuf sed. (?) The "Axis" (?) of HNP (?), Afrikander Pty (Party?) (Havenga) O.B. & Pirowhites are therefore now in the Government actually, for Havenga brought in the Afrikaner Pty (Party?), O.B. whilst the HNP brought in the "S.A. Workers Party" (Weichardites)!

(AOB: Some is for me personally 'abracadabra'; sad is, however, that they do not provide when these letters actually had been intercepted)

Original in File Fike No. PF 603076 Loos (file no longer existing) Dated: 30.1.46.

Original from: USFET, CI Interrogation Report on Loos. Ref: CI-FIR/72 dd. 22.1.46

Leibrandt's (= KV 2/924 - KV 2/925; PF 63905) activities (Abwehr II in South Africa) soon became notorious (AOB: after his coming ashore brought by the Kyloe in April 1941) that a price of 10,000 (SA pounds?) was placed on his head. Eluding the authorities for a long time with the aid of some Boer policemen, he was finally turned in by a German national, ~~von~~ van Rensburg (AOB: baloney! van Rensburg was South Afriaans), who collected the reward. Van Rensburg, apparently a double agent, was said to be in touch with the German Foreign Service and also worked for the South African Government. (1942).(AOB: do we encounter here a qualified British Crown Servant?)

Languages: German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Afrikaans (slight).

Finacée: Maria de Lourdes da Sousa Costa (Swiss born Portuguese, divorced from a Swiss), living at Rua Mastro des Sinair 6, Lourenco Marques.

AOB: Werz was the spill of German Espionage on the South African Continent, and most contacts with South Africans went via Werz. When we notice Lourenco Marques, think then mainly of the German Consul Werz being implicated.

Luitpold Werz, aged 38, of German nationality, was arrested by the American Army on 18th July, 1945. (AOB: in Bavaria, which was occupied by US troops?)

9.9.1907. Borne in Berne (Bern), Switzerland. Father, Luitpold Werz, deceased in 1941, belonged to staff of Bavarian Legation in Berne (Bern).

Werz attended preparatory schools and finished his studies at St. Gall (Sankt Gallen), where his father had been transferred as Chancellor of the German Consulate.

1927 Studies law and economics at Geneva with the intention of entering the Diplomatic Service.

1928-1932 Studied law and economics at Berlin University. Went to Munich (München) to take his examinations. Entered Bavarian Justice and Administration Service whilst working for financial examinations. Worked at different tribunals in Munich (München) and Neurnberg - at the Police and City Council. In 1932 he obtained Degree of Doctor of Law at Erlangen University, Bavaria. Afterwards he joined the Auswärtiges Amt and worked on South African affairs.

1934 Transferred to Consulate General (General-Konsulat) in Barcelona. Joined, in Barcelona, the Nazi Party, a step necessary to the furtherance of his career. He belonged to the Rechtverwahrer Bund, which he left in 1936, and the N.S.V. (? Studenten Verein?); but not the S.A. or S.S.

1935 Returned to Berlin for further study in politics, history and economics, afterwards passing final diplomatic examination. Following this, Werz want to Sidney, Australia, and later was transferred to Pretoria, South Africa.

On the outbreak of war, Werz, together with the staff from Pretoria, was provided with a safe conduct to return to Europe on a Dutch boat (The Netherlands was by then still neutral). On his reaching Lourenco Marques, the German Minister Leitner, received a telegram from Berlin ordering both Werz and the Secretary Pasche (Paasche), Ernst, to remain there, as they were short of staff. Werz was vet anxious to return to Germany and suggested that a certain Stiller, who wished to remain in Lourenco Marques, should take his place.

At first the Portuguese Governor-General, Nunes de Oliveira, categorically refused to give his account to Werz staying: but was persuaded to change his mind by the German Minister, Werz was thereupon appointed Legation Secretary, taking up his appointment almost immediately. Trompke was in charge, and was? later given the title of Consul General (the Consulate having been changed into a Consulate General to put it on equal terms with the British, South African Consulates) and Werz was then made Consul.

Werz states that there was not much to do at the Consulate, where he attended for about three hours a day, occupying himself mainly with South African affairs,, reporting on political and economic news. About this time the Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) in Berlin asked for any news which could be obtained on South Africa; the Germans had started a broadcast in Afrikaans and were anxious to obtain material. Werz thereupon studied most of the Union papers such as the "Star", "Cape Argue", "Cape Times" and "Rand Daily Mail", etc., including opposition papers. From these he made reports, which were sent by telegram to the Foreign Office. In addition, the Foreign Office requested information on shipping movements (these requests were sent by telegram) asking for the number of ships coming into the port, their names whenever possible, their cargo, tonnage, destination and any other information which might be considered of interest.

In the course of time Werz was obliged to call in assistance, especially in listening to broadcasts from the (South African) Union. Werz claims, as he does throughout, that he is unable to give any dates; but the following helped him, in this order:-

2. Xuellner? Alois - Took over from Paasche (info likely in Sittig's file alias Felix (KV 2/939; PF 66173)

3. Tiele-Winkler von - Some time later (probably 1942, He listened in to English and American broadcasts.

4. Mutius von - Tried to listen to communications from the German High Command, It had been agreed with the Italian Minister that it would be good propaganda to publish these in

Werz listened in as often as he could. This he did at his home, and he afterwards sent his own comments and suggestions to the Foreign Office.

Sittig (KV 2/939; PF 66173) (https://www.cdvandt.org/felix-sittig-tx-sa.htm), a farmer by trade, by changing his name and noting as a lift-boy in Cape Town on the outbreak of war, had managed to get out of the Union together with Paasche, with the intention of getting back to Germany. On arrival at Lourenco Marques, however, they found that there was no possibility of doing so. As stated above, Paasche was at first used for listening to the broadcasts in Afrikaans, whilst Sittig did nothing. Shortly after their arrival a man named Andresen, who claimed that he had been a Major in the Ossewa-Brandwag Stormjagers de (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ossewabrandwag) en (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ossewabrandwag), also arrived in Lourenco Marques, and asked the Consulate for permission to return to South Africa and set up a W/T station, from which he hoped to transmit news to Germany or Lourenco Marques.

Andresen claimed that he had many contacts in South Africa, including van Rensburg. Another reason why Andresen wished to return to South Africa was that he wished to get back to a woman friend of his, who had accompanied him to Lourenco Marques, but had been sent back by the Portuguese authorities because of her Union nationality. Werz did not consider Andresen a suitable person to send to the Union, even had he considered the scheme. He therefore refused, but forwarded some ??composed by Andresen, which he thought might forwarded some music composed by Andresen, which he thought might be be useful for broadcasts, as the Germans were short of material for their propaganda programme. This music was actually broadcast.

So keen was Andresen, however, on this scheme, that he started discussing it with Sittig, and the two men presented their plans once more to Werz. With the restraining influence of Sittig, the whole idea sounded more reasonable, but Werz again refused as he believed that, after a majority had voted for war against Germany, no amount of propaganda or infiltration of agents would do any good.

Following this, Andresen resigned himself to the situation, and confined attention to his compositions. After Stalingrad, he carried out a volte-fact? and composed some music for the Americans, by whom he was well-paid.

Sittig, however, was not so easily out off, and continued his attempts to persuade Werz to send him to South Africa. He quarrelled with Andresen, and suggested he should work in conjunction with Paasche. Werz persisted with his refusals until orders came through from Berlin (AOB: van Rensburg had already contact with Berlin by means of another communication channel), demanding more information on the Union (South Africa). At this juncture Werz thought he was perhaps wrong in stopping an undertaking which might be of use? to Germany. He therefore asked Berlin (AOB: Werz himself communicated with Germany by means of Portuguese channels, which were 'read' by G.C.& H.Q.') for instructions, and was told that it was in order to sent Sittig to the Union.

Sittig's route to the Union (the ?? as that later given to Paasche) was to breach? off to the left from the main Lourenco Marques road and enter the bush? for a short time, until the river forming the boundary between Portuguese East Africa and South Africa was reached. On the other side of the river he was to make his own way and attempt to contact van Rensburg. In South Africa, Sittig was to to act solely in the capacity of a reporter, and met to get mixed up with any groups or parties. Moreover, he would have to make his own contacts to obtain a transmitter and crystals. (https://www.cdvandt.org/felix-sittig-tx-sa.htm)

If possible, he was to join forces with van Rensburg, but if this failed, to get assistance from elsewhere, e.g. from the Greyshirts or other Nationalist movements. It proved eventually, however, that Sittig did not get involved with the Ossewa-Brandwag.

Until such time as Sittig could get a strong enough transmitter to broadcast to Berlin, he was to contact Lourenco Marques. From there, Werz was to cable the information to Berlin through official (Portuguese controlled; which were read by British G.C.& H.Q.) channels. Sittig was told that all orders to him would come direct from Berlin. For this purpose, it was pre-arranged that Sittig was to listen in at fixed times to German broadcast, at the end of which times Berlin would send him information, in the same code which he was to use in transmitting to Lourenco Marques. (AOB: Such a program was: Kamaradschaftdienstmarine, which transmitted (for example by the Foreign Office on various frequencies and times of the day) also messages for German Naval personnel stuck somewhere in the World. In the case of Franz Mayr there existed quite elaborate coding techniques) Werz is unable too state what arrangements were later made between Berlin and Sittig, as it was done without knowledge of Lourenco Marques.

For this work Sittig was not paid anything beyond a few Union Pounds fro travelling expenses to the Union, it being agreed that he should find of subsistence within the Union. (AOB: he managed quite well) Werz never saw Sittig again after his departure, and some time later, after the cessation of the broadcasts, it was rumoured that he had been arrested. Sittig had no training in Lourence Marques for the work, but told Werz that he had had some previous training - where, Werz claims he is unable to say.

It was not known beforehand where Sittig would install his W/T set, but later it was believed that it had been placed in van Rensburg's farm. Later, Kraizizek (KV 2/2638 - KV 2/2639; PF 66174) confirmed this personally to Werz. (AOB: By the way: the latter Kraizizek files paint a very interesting story, in the big struggle Major Ryde encountered in DFing on Sittig's transmitter signal to a very great extend - in vain as well!) A simple code was arranged between Sittig and Paasche (who remained behind in Lourenco Marques, as Werz thought it too dangerous to risk the life of more than one man) based on Edition 38 of the Morse Code, an ordinary German commercial code obtained from German or Afrikaander bookshops in the Union. To show that he had arrived safely, Sittig was to put a notice in the (S.A. Newspaper) the "Star" to the effect that a dog had been found. When he was ready to commence his transmissions, he was to put a notice in the 'deceased' column of the "Sunday Express". About two months passed before this notice appeared, the reason being that that Sittig had been arrested and interned, but later managed to escape. (AOB: as Kraizizek commenced escapes several times as well)

The notice duly appeared, mentioning times of transmission, dates, etc, and Sittig also informed Werz that he had contacted van Rensburg. This information Werz passed on to Berlin, also sending the code in which Sittig was working.

Sittig later stated that he was trying to make direct contact with Berlin, and gave the ours of transmission and wave-lengths, which Werz again passed on to Berlin by telegram. At this point, Berlin said that the code was no good as, for a time, until they quarrelled. The latter information had also been reported to Sittig.

When the transmissions actually commenced, they were very poor. Receiving was done on an ordinary (broadcast?) set (AOB: this would imply, when true, that the German Berlin station transmitted by means of mode A 2; which is tone modulated morse code signals, and it was practically impossible to get anything.) It was, therefore arranged through the Italian Consulate that the "Gerusalo??e", an Italian ship (AOB: once stuck in the harbour of Lourenco Marques authorities and which was confiscated, but kept its regular crew onboard the ship; but was not allowed to operate his wireless equipment) Assistance was given in receiving by Glu?ini (he also worked in the Italian Stefani (Press) Agency, later taken over by the Germans. (AOB: the latter circumstance might have been connected with the Italians going over to the Allied side. Hitler responded swiftly, and occupied Italy to a great extend and also the initiation of Mussolini Fascist State) and two operators working on board. The results were, however, still poor, so the Consulate communicated with Berlin by (mail) telegram (transmitting from the Italian cargo ship was prohibited by the Portuguese authorities) so the Consulate communicated with Berlin by (mail) telegram, asking Berlin to get in touch with Sittig by means of a pre-arranged code, to inform Sittig of the fact, and suggest he should change the times of transmission. (AOB: the reason might have been: that the wireless propagation following certain rules as sun-set and dawn periods) This code message was sent at night, after "Die Heimat Grüsst" (broadcast) programme from (broadcast station) Zeesen, this being the normal method by which communication were sent to Sittig. (AOB: one could on the receiving side in S.A. operating a simple broadcast receiver possessing short-wave reception)

Before broadcasts came regularly from Sittig, some weeks elapsed; but eventually they came through about once a week. Information was at first chiefly concerned with technical reports on transmissions, but later, news came through on military matters, shipping, and general conditions in the Union. These transmissions continued for about two to three months to Lourenco Marques.

During this time, Paasche ??? went out to join Sittig, who was in need of assistance. Werz had refused for a long time to sent him ?? but there had been trouble between Rooseboom (KV 2/941; PF 66179) and Sittig, so Werz agreed, following official blessing from Berlin.

As transmissions got better, Sittig first asked whether he could cooperate with Rooseboom, Werz relayed this to Berlin, advised Sittig against it, and later told Sittig to denies?? Rooseboom altogether. Sittig was, however, anxious for assistance, and ??? Paasche could join him. Werz refused, as he did not wish to risk ?? another man. Sittig then asked if he could use Maser (KV 2/942 ... KV 2/944; PF 106140 (AOB: the latter number implies that Hans Herbert Maser had been a long time under consideration at M.I.5) , but Werz was advised through Berlin that Maser was unreliable, and refused this request too. Werz then let Paasche, go, as stated above.

Sittig transmitted instructions regarding the route of Paasche was to take, which was the same as Sittig had taken on his way out. By this means Paasche would be able to find him. Should this fail, Paasche was to gr? on to Dr. van der Merwe. Werz denies that he ever met this man, but believes that Sittig and Paasche discussed van der Merwe before Sittig left.

Paasche left Lourenco Marques a few months after Sittig's departure He took with him a new code, which he memorised, and instructions concerning schedule times.

Before leaving Lourenco Marques, it was arranged with Sittig that he was to send information on all points which Werz would not pick up in Lourenco Marques from the newspapers, i.e., political and economic news, as far as was possible, and military information such as troop movements, etc. Werz can only remember definitely that Sittig mentioned a large concentration of South Africans troops on the frontier near Portuguese East Africa. It is possible that Sittig also spoke once of a convey of troops going to the Far East.

Then, when it was possible to get Afrikaans newspapers in Lourenco Marques, Werz enquired for information on the Ossewa Brandwag. Werz claim he does not know what further information Sittig sent to Berlin after they were working in direct communication.

Werz can remember that Sittig mentioned his difficulties with Rooseboom (KV 2/941; PF66179). He had asked if Rooseboom could collaborate with him, but later said that this was impossible as Rooseboom did not wish to. Rooseboom also got into trouble with the Ossewa-Brandwag and Berlin, through German broadcasts, not through Werz, instructed Sittig to dismiss Rooseboom.

Requests for assistance, i.e., for Masser and Paasche, also came through W/T. Again, after the arrival of Kraizizek (KV 2/2638 - KV 2/2639; PF 66174), who informed him of Masser's impending arrival in Lourenco Marques, Werz sent a message to Sittig asking him if he could somehow contact Masser and prevent his departure. However, this was impossible.

From Kraizizek also Werz learnt that Masser had a plan to set a strong transmitter for sending information to Germany. This transmitter was in the possession of a man named Wilde⁺ (usually referred to as Wild, Herbert) and was somewhere between Pretoria and Johannesburg. This information Werz passed on to Sittig, as he did not want a rival station set up, when he considered that Sittig's was quite strong enough for the purpose.

Werz did not trust Masser. The reason for this distrust was that articles had been written about Masser in the papers in Southern Natal's notebook, for which he had stood trial. In addition, Werz learnt from Kraizizek that Masser had become engaged in the quarrel between Sittig and Rooseboom. The reason is unknown to Werz, who believed it was due to Rooseboom's having quarrelled with the Ossewa-Brandwag.

After a while, Berlin sent out by telegram a new code, which Werz kept for a while in Lourenco Marques. He took the opportunity of sending this on to Sittig via Elfrink (see below) on the latter's second visit, with instructions that it should be handed to van Rensburg.

Elferink @ Hamlet (AOB: I do not know what goes wrong - but we possess: on Elfrink (KV 2/202; PF 65880 and the Hamlet case: KV 2/325; PF 63755. The two different PF serials may well point at the very fact that we deal with two different individuals)

Werz is unable to provide a date, but states that not long after Sittig's departure, a telegram couched in cautions term was received at the (German) Consulate from the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), informing that a man named Elferink (Elfrink) would shortly be arriving in Lourenco Marques, and that he had a mission to carry out in the Union. Elferink (Elfrink) duly arrived with his (S.A.) wife, on a Dutch passport, and gave to Trompke (the German Minister/Ambassador) (KV 2/757 ... KV2/768; PF 65657) as a password the name "Hamlet". Werz claims, and has maintained throughout, that he never learnt the nature of Elferink's (Elfrink's) mission. On his second visit to Lourneco Marques, which was also the last, Elferink (Elfrink) told Werz that he was worried in case leibrandt had compromised him, as his photograph which was to be used for identification purposes, was in Leibrandt's possession on his arrest. From this, Werz surmised? that Elferink (Elfrink) was to contact Leibrandt on his first visit to the Union.

⁺ Identical with Wild or Wilde referred to in reports on Masser and Kraizizek.

Because of mention being made in the South African Press, Werz made enquiries of Berlin concerning Leibrandt, and was told that he was a German agent who had been sent out by submarine. (AOB: nonsense! Leibrandt and Scharf arrive in June 1941 at a South African/Namibia coast with the sail ship Kyloe) (Leibrandt: KV 2/924 - KV 2/925; PF 63905 and Scharf (Kyloe) KV 2/207 .. KV 2/209; PF 600000) He considers it likely that Elferink (Elfrink) had been asked by Sittig to find a suitable place for a submarine to land some transmitter for him, Sittig - possibly Lambert's Bay - and to return with industrial diamonds and an Afrikaner for broadcasts to the Union from Germany. This request was subsequently made to Berlin by Sittig. Werz heard nothing further about this matter.

As far as Werz knows, Elferink was working for the Auswärtiges Amt. On Elferink's (Elfrink's) arrival Werz arranged for a message to be broadcast mentioning the word 'bloodhound', to give notice of this. Instructions for doing so were sent by Werz to the Auswärtiges Amt (code name Auswertig) (this may be simply considered being an abridgment and not as a particular code word).

Since Elferink (Elfrink) was a paid agent and a Dutchman, neither Werz nor Trompke trusted him. Werz only saw him twice on his first visit, as Elfrerink (Elfrink) paid a few visits to Trompke by night. No mention was made to Elferink (Elfrink) of Sittig by either Trompke or Werz, because this distrust.

On his second visit to Lourenco Marques, some six months later, Elferink (Elfrink) only brought some unimportant news, which Werz already knew by reading the (S.A.) Union newspapers. He also brought a pamphlet showing the programme of the Ossewa-Brandwag, which Werz sent to Berlin smuggled on a Portuguese boat. He also had with him a Leica film, which, as far as Werz can remember, contained only a repetition of the news which Sittig had broadcast, at greater length and, sine reception was frequently bad, Sittig had apparently seen fit to confirm some of it. This Werz forwarded to Kempke, Counsellor at the German Embassy in Madrid (AOB: by then the Embassy and all K.O. Spain offices were situated adjacent to one another). Werz does not believe that any articles by Elferink (Elfrink) were forwarded by Trompke, and doubts whether Trompke would have acted in anything without having let him know.

On his first or second visit to Lourenco Marques, Werz cannot remember which, Elfering (Elfrink) left a dictionary in Portuguese, saying that if he could not get back to Lourenco Marques he would send a message (means not stated to Werz) in which figures would indicate pages, lines and words in the dictionary. Werz never heard anything further of this proposal.

Elferink (Elfrink) also said that he was in a position of confidence with the Dutch Legation, and spoke of the Dutch Minister, Jonkheer van Lennep. He intended beginning historical studies in connection with Portuguese East Africa (Now Mozambique), which would give him the excuse of getting down to Lourenco Marques again. Elferink (Elfrink) spoke too, of a scientific work of his concerning Erasmus of Rotterdam, Werz got Zimmermann ( a commercial traveller staying at the Cardoza Hotel) to send off a letter, which Werz had drafted, enquiring about these courses, and mentioning something concerning Shakespeare, in which Elferink's (Elfrink's) alias Hamlet appeared. The reason Werz did this was because some while had elapsed since he heard from Elferink (Elfrink), and he wondered if he had been caught. The answer received was a normal one, and gave no indication as to whether or not it was from Elferink (Elfrink).

Elferink (Elfrink) asked for a large sum of money to be paid to him, both on his first and second visits, with which he wished to by a house in South Africa. Berlin refused this request, but gave instructions to a much smaller sum should be paid to him. Elferink (Elfrink) was paid a sum of money on his first arrival in Lourenco Marques on order from Berlin (sum forgotten) and thereafter was paid about £100 a month for about six month (this money was probably paid in a lump sum). Payment was made by the Consulate Secretary, Jericho, and it is likely that it was made out under Elferink's (Elfrink's) alias, Hamlet, given him by Berlin.

This code was worked out between Sittig and Paasche and used during the first period of the Sittig transmissions, the decoding being done by Paasche and Kolb (first name Hubert).

It was based on the Mosse Code Edition 38. The words in question were looked up in the Mosse? Code and the groups found there, Werz says he believes that they were groups of five letters, then changed into figures. The figure groups thus arrived at were changed by the addition of several figures which had been combined beforehand.

The above code was used by Sittig and Rooseboom during the period of their collaboration. After their quarrel, Sittig asked for a change in the code. This change was carried by Paasche when he joined Sittig in the (S.A.) Union, who took with him other figures, which had to be added to these resulting from the groups in the first code.

The above two codes had been communicated to the Auswärtiges Amt by telegram so that they could decode the messages from Sittig when it became possible for Germany to receive direct from Sittig. Later the Auswärtiges Amt informed Werz that the code worked out between Sittig and Paasche was not safe and gave by telegram to Werz a new code, with instructions that this was to be used in the future by Sittig. This code, too, was based on the Mosse code, but there were further changes in the figure groups. As Werz did not decode this himself, he claims that he is unable to indicate the method. He can only remember that arithmetical addition and subtraction came into it, so that when one group was not received clearly the whole message became unintelligible. The code took a long while to work out.

As there was no opportunity of getting this through to Sittig, it remained in Lourenco Marques for some while, until the arrival of Elferink (Elfrink), when the Auswärtiges Amt asked whether Werz would give him the new code for delivery in the (S.A.) Union. Werz had this code put on Leica film and Elferink (Elfrink) took it with him. He was told to hand it to van Rensburg. Some while after Elferink's (Elfrink) departure, Sittig began to use this code, and finally continued with it in his transmissions to Berlin.

As far as Werz can remember, the first direct transmission to Berlin took place soon after Masser's second arrival in Lourenco Marques in August 1943. These direct transmissions were also heard and understood in Lourenco Marques for about two or three month. Then the decoding of the message became impossible. On enquiries from the Auswärtiges Amt considered that information he sent would be of any use for Werz, they promised to forward it. Werz, however, received no information from them.

Four or five months after this (probably spring or Summer, 1944) Berlin informed Werz that the messages had ceased entirely, and requested Werz to find out what the reason was. Werz was unable to do this and was also unable to pick up any transmissions from Sittig in Lourenco Marques.

For transmitting text in foreign languages Sittig and Paasche had elaborated a special code in which each single letter was changed following a system which Werz, as usual, cannot remember. It took a long time and was only used once - for the "Malherbe report" contained in the message brought by Kraizizek.

AOB: for those of whom wish like to read the next few paragraphs are invited to do so yourself.

Werz first heard from Sittig by broadcast that Kraizizek that Kraizizek was going to Lourenco Marques. He therefore arranged to meet him at the frontier, whence he went accompanied by Mrs. Pechner and also Alois Mueller (Müller) (this was actually on 23rd May, 1943, though Werz cannot remember the date). Kraizizek did not turn up, so Werz returned to Lourenco Marques, where Kraizizek arrived some days later.

Kraizizek brought with him two Leica films (these 35 mm Leica film-cassette types, became the common world-standard, up to the digital photo era). from van Rensburg, which were, developed by Gerhard Hansing. He also brought coded message from Masser, but this was taken away from him by the Portuguese police. The gist of this code, according to the verbal reports of Kraizizek, was to the effect that Masser wished to establish wireless connection with Germany. Kraizizek had got entangled in this quarrel between Sittig and Rooseboom due to his friend Masser had a transmitter at his disposal which was owned by Wild. Werz considered that this transmitter might be useful to Sittig should he be able to persuade (Herbert) Wild to hand it over to him, so he informed Sittig of this through Berlin, though doubtless Sittig must have known of the existence of this set.

Werz, due to Kraizizek disobeying his orders not to instruct Masser to come to Lourenco Marques, distrusted Kraizizek in the beginning, but later gave him work to do under Kolb (this has been dealt with elsewhere) though Kraizizek caused further trouble with the Portuguese police by beating up Georg Dedek - a proceeding to which Werz did not give his consent.

Some time early in 1940 a Greek named Tellidis called at the Consulate. It is possible that he first saw Trompke, who had lived for some time in Greece and could speak the language - for this reason he was always anxious to interview any Greeks passing through Lourenco Marques. At any rate Tellidis eventually saw Werz. His story was very confused and Werz was only able to gather that he had been sent by someone in the (S.A.) Union whose name was not given. This person was anxious to organise a W/T information service. Tellidis brought with him a code which was actually a dictionary, by means of which certain figures transmitted would correspond with pages or linea? in the dictionary. Tellidis mentioned that transmissions were about to start, giving the times and dates. Werz is not certain whether or not Tellidis left the actual dictionary or whether he gave him the edition and name so that they procure a similar one.

Tellidis only called once and Werz did not discuss much with him as he was afraid that the man might have been sent as an agent from the (S.A.) Union to find out what the Consulate intended doing. However, they listened in at the given times, but were unable to pick up anything. Nothing further was heard of the matter. Werz thinks that Tellidis might possibly have been sent by Rooseboom, for a short time before, a man named Schroeder, who called at Lourenco Marques at the beginning of 1940, had come with a similar mission from Rooseboom, who, he said, was a German agent. As in the above incident the Consulate was unable to pick up anything.

Tellidis did not ask for money, but? it is possible that he requested news of his safety to be sent to his family in Greece. Werz spoke to Trompke about this, but does not remember what transpired.

Two or three days before the Allied landing on Madagascar, i.e. beginning of May 1942, a strong, well-built Afrikaner arrived at the Consulate in Lourenco Marques to see Werz, stating that he had a message to the effect that an attack on Madagascar was about to be made within a few days. He also brought with him a small Leica film, but did not mention from whom it came. Werz, who was always suspicious of people who called on him with missions, did not interrogate him, but after the man had left had the film decoded. The message of the film merely confirmed what the man had said verbally but as it was written in the code used by Sittig, proof was obtained that the man was genuine.

Werz passed on this information by telegram to Berlin, but states that it was by then too late for Berlin to do anything.

This Afrikaander, whose name was Rokkebrandt, had apparently walked a great distance on his way from the (S.A.) Union. On arrival in Lourenco Marques he was arrested and searched by the Portugues Police.The film was so well hidden that it was not found. On giving a false German name and stating that he was a German, Rokkebrandt was allowed to go to the German Consulate - the routine procedure with all German refugees. At the Consulate Rokkebrandt immediately confessed that he was not a German. Werz never heard of or saw this man again.

Additional news to the broadcast from Sittig was brought by Muellner (KV 2/2445; PF 65919), who obtained it from the Greek Bathos, Basil (CO 968/1010). This news was passed to Werz almost daily by Muellner, Werz did not regard it as reliable as he would report, for example, that three Allied ships had been sunk near Cape or off the coast of West Africa. Werz considers that Muellner or Bathos was 'sinking' them for the sake of reports.

During the time of the peak sinkings by submarine, various Allied sailors, mostly Greeks, Norwegians and Dutch, came to the Consulate asking if they could be helped home. As all their contacts were made out in London and their own country, Werz refused to help them. These sailors, talked freely about their experience as well the experience of others when they met Germans in restaurants or bars. From these sources Muellner and Bathos were able to make reports.

Werz claims that his relationship with this man, who was an exaggerated type of Germanophile, were exclusively based on a friendship which arose through Barbosa's friendship with the da Costa family. Barbosa never worked for Werz. Eduardo's brother was also slightly known to Werz.

The only occasion on which Werz made use of his services was when he intimated that he would like to make the acquaintance of the Police Officer, Henriques, who had come from Lisbon, in order to find out about certificates needed by Germans to leave the town.

Werz claims that he meat members of the Portuguese Police, he never used them in his organisation. The following are the names of those he met or knew about:-

Martius: This man first came into contact with Merz when he boarded the train which bore the Consular staff in Garcia in 1939. (AOB: the reason being: - that it is general customary that diplomats getting the chance to return home. So also did the British diplomats, they got the possibility (facility) to return home by train from Berlin via the Netherlands to Great Britain. Even the Japanese diplomats, after the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour, they were allowed to pass through Sweden - as to enter Russian territory, and then to return to Japan again) Later the man sought contact with Werz in the Polano Hotel, but Werz would not see him. Martius also sought the acquaintance of the Consular Secretary, Jericho, but met with a similar refusal.

Gonsalves, Captain: Werz only met this man at official functions. He distrusted him, as he believed Gonsalves was in the pay of the Allies.

Henriques, Captain: This man came from Portugal to clear up anti-Salazar (the Portuguese dictator for decades) movements. When he took his censorship Trompke suggested Werz should meet him, this to be arranged through Barbosa, Eduardom who knew Henriques. Werz only met him once, as Henriques was suddenly ordered to return to Lisbon. Henriques had previously been put under temporary arrest by the Portuguese Governor, for accusing Consalves of swindle and theft; because of his unmerited experience, Henriques was rather excited and the discussion which concerned censorship got nowhere.

Trompke, Paul Consul General, Except in unimportant matters Trompke had little to do with Wer's activities/ He was engaged in normal Consular duties.

Werz Luitpold Subject of this report. (AOB: albeit that officially it should deal with 'van Rensburg' instead concerning its file title)

Pasche Paasche? Ernst Assisted Jericho, Before Werz obtained othe assistants, Pasche (Paasche?) listened in to the Zeesen broadcasts (AOB: the transmitter broadcasting on behalf of the German Foreign Office (Das Auswärtige Amt), "Die Heimat Grüsst".

Laudhahne An officer from the s.s. "Aller". He instructed Kolb, Tiele-Winkler, Mueller?? and Frehse in Morse reception, afterwards worked in the coding department until his departure.

Mueller, Ferdinand Worked for a time on decoding Sittig's telegrams. (AOB: likely sent from van Rensburg's farm, situated in a rather remote area)

Kolb, Huebrt Was head of the Press Bureau (DNB?) and controlled the reception of Trans-Ocean news. Also furnished the communiqués of the German High Command (O.K.W.) to local papers. Also took part in the reception and decoding of the messages from Sittig.

Tiele-Winkler, Freiherr von Roabi. Assisted Kolb in the Press Bureau and in the reception and decoding of Sittig's messages. Reported on American and South African broadcasts.

Kraizizek, Walter (KV 2/2638 - KV 2/2639; PF 66174) Assistant to Kolb in the Press Section, where he typed.

Eckhardt An officer from the S.S. "Dortmund". Reported to the Consulate the names, numbers and cargoes of the ships in the port (= Lourenco Marques).

Mutius, Baron von Christof Took part in the observation of shipping. Was assisted in this by Ludo Ughesto from the Italian Consulate.

Brachmeyer Assisted Gianini in reception of the Trans-Ocean news. Occasionally helped Kolb in reception of new from Sittig. By trade a barber (Friseur)

Gianini Whilst on board the "Gerusaleme" (an interned Italian ship) he was one of the three men who received messages from Sittig. When not engaged in this he took part in dealing with the Trans-Ocean news.

Mueller Alois. Camp 020 case. Wrote daily reports about German broadcasts in Afrikaans and Afrikaans reports from the (S.A.) Union. He also brought shipping news received from Bathos Basil (020 case).

Frehese, Werner. Helped occasionally in shipping observation. Was later caretaker of the German Club since he was unable to learn the Morse Code Later went to the German German emergency schol School?) at Badula.

Paasche Nils During his stay in Lourenco Marques listened to the German broadcasts in Afrikaans. Later received and decoded Sittig's messages.

Kellermann Concerned with the technical, side of this German broadcasts from Zeesen (broadcastings on behalf of the German Foreign Ministry = Auswärtiges Amt) Also advised as to what material should be broadcast from Zeesen to the (S.A.) Union.

Toennies, Gustav Assisted German before Diekmann (Dieckmann?). Had nothing to do with transmissions.

Andresen Olaf Composed songs for the German broadcasts in Afrikaans. This music was sent to Germany on Leica films (AOB: The Leica film cassettes contained 35 mm film, and became the world standard up to, say, the 1990s; when digital photographing became common practice) later, when the war situation became bad for Germany, he wrote a "March of the Liberated Nations" which was bought from him by the Americans and broadcast by them, together with the story of Andresen's conversations.

Alvensleben Offered information to the German Consulate which he claimed he got from a friend, the British Consul Muggerdge. Later, according to Werz, who did not trust him, it became obvious that hem with his Free German Movement (Freies Deutschland?), was working for the British.

Oliveira Translated the communiqués of the German High Command (O.K.W.) from German in into Spanish or Portuguese for publication in the Press.

Schumacher Johanna Registar, shorthand-typist. Was sacked, partially because of Masser's accusation, but really because of an affair she had with a married man.

Hansing Gerhard Engaged on photographical work. Developed the films sent by Kraizizek from Sittig and Andresen's music to Berlin.

October Werz left Lourenco Marques on the Portuguese steamer "Quanza" (AOB: think of leaving about October 1944 and it reached likely in November 1944 Lisbon, but was hold-up at Gibraltar, though all German passengers possessed a safe-passage guarantee on behalf of the British Authorities) which was taken into Gibraltar, where Werz was questioned. He refused to divulge anything. After some days in Lisbon and Barcelona, Werz went on to Madrid, where he was ill for some weeks. Following this, he flew to Berlin, where he arrived on 24^th (Heiligabend) December, 1944.

Werz is an intelligent and well-educated man, who was forced to run a very amateurish espionage organisation on orders from Berlin. Those he used were also amateurs, without previous training and hardly capable of sending, or even assessing, high class information. Without doubt Werz who, it would appear, wished solely to make life comfortable for himself and his mistress, took a little interest in possible in the missions on which he sent Sittig and Paaschem regarding any work they sent him through their communications as a hindrance to the pursuit of pleasure.

Considerable difficulty and confusion has been caused throughout Werz's many interrogations (at Camp 020?) due to his claim that he cannot supply dates. It is, though, totally impossible to accept this claim from a man such as Werz. Why he claims this is not quite clear, but it is highly probable that in an effort to tone down his activities and fog events, he has deliberately and consistently lied over dates. There can be little doubt doubt that, even if the information he has actually given is true, he has withheld information, and has only confirmed or admitted events when he feels sure that we already know about them.

Original in File No: PF 106140 (Herbert Maser KV 2/942 .. KV 2/944) Serial 153a (minute?)

July 1936. . . . Masser went to the South African Legation at Berlin where he was received by a Dr. Gie who introduced him to a certain Van Rensburg (Col.). Van Rensburg, who was apparently in a loquacious mood, told Masser that he had been attending German Army manoeuvres in company with the future Prime Minister of South Africa, General Pirow (= KV 2/908; PF66920). On hearing Masser wanted to emigrate, van Rensburg, whom Masser had met in Berlin, was the head of this organisation. Hennig said that he did not know van Rensburg, but that he was going to take shortly to the Orange Free State (Oranje Vrijstaat), where he expected to meet him. ...

Dec. 1940. . . .Masser became friendly with a German named Hermann Hennig , in Bataviaanpoort camp and in Dec. they both succeeded in escaping. Henning told Masser a certain amount about the Ossewa-Brandwag, mentioning that Dr. van Rensburg (a lawyer), whom Masser had met in Berlin, was the head of this organisation. Hennig said that he did not know van Rensburg, but that he was going to be taken shortly to the Orange Free State (Oranje Vrijstaat) , where he expected to meet him . . .

Jan-Oct '42. . . . While Masser was in prison (again?) he learnt that Leibrandt (KV 2/924 - KV 2/925; PF 63905) (https://www.cdvandt.org/robey-leibrandt-(sa).htm) wished to unify and control the entire disloyal movement in South Africa, but van Rensburg had not been prepared to surrender control of the Ossewa-Brandwag.

KV 2/907-1, page 40 (minute 73a) (AOB: Please be always aware: that the KV 2/xxxx serials, are with increasing pdf page numbers, running backwards in time)

According to Kraizizek, Rooseboom based his accusation against van Rensburg on the following evidence:

(ii) Nearly all the sabotage carried out in South Africa was done by Ossewa-Brandwag men, yet van Rensburg, who was in some cases given away in court by some of his own men, was never arrested.

(iii) During the Leibrandt (https://www.cdvandt.org/robey-leibrandt-(sa).htm) round up, the S.J. (Storm Jagers) was liquidated and most of its leaders were interned, yet van Rensburg, the chief of the S.J., was allowed to carry on his activities.

(iv) All those connected with Leibrandt and sent to South Africa or brought by submarine (AOB: no one was ever brought or were picked up by a German submarine!) were arrested by the police. Leibrandt had visited van Rensburg several times at his farm. (van Rensburg spoke to Kraizizek in connection with this, saying that the chief of the C.I.D. had questioned him concerning his visits, but managed to satisfy the police. He was quite pleased what had been summoned to the police, but questioned on his farm.) (AOB: the latter lived for some time at van Rensburg's farm)

(v) A former General of the O.B. (= Ossewa-Brandwag) Johannes van der Wast?, was mortally wounded by the police whilst attempting to evade arrest. Before dying he issued an affidavit accusing van Rensburg of being a traitor.

(vi) Everyone in South Africa knew of the transmitting set on von Rensburg's farm (AOB: Kraizizek's file contains an interesting inside vision on which the British, actually secretly, commenced as to catch Sittig's transmitter, but in vain with all effort the British had put in to it!)

In the evening Jerling arrived at the farm (Herbert Wild's farm) and spoke to Kraizizek of the arguments he had had with van Rensburg, whom he did not trust, concerning his alliance with General Smuts (The South African President in charge). He warmed up over the Leibrandt case, and openly accused van Rensburg of being a traitor. Jerling was apparently considering giving up his post as General of the O.B. (= Ossewa-Brandwag) and founding a new national party. Rooseboom agreed with Jerling's opinion of van Rensburg and said that he had documentary proofs of van Rensburg's treachery. Unfortunately for Rooseboom, Rensburg knew this and was awaiting the first opportunity of killing Rooseboom.

On 8th April Kraizizek met Mme. du Toit, wife of a Storm Jaers Colonel, arrested during the Leibrandt clean-up, and one of van Rensburg's stoutest supporters. Mme. du Toit told him that he was to meet van Rensburg who wished to see him in connection with a film. Before meeting van Rensburg, however, he was to see his adjutant, Anderson, an O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) General and a former Captain in the South African Army.

. . . After satisfying Anderson about his identity, Kraizizek was told by Anderson, who knew that he and Rooseboom, but Kraizizek found these reasons very unconvincing. Anderson confirmed that Rooseboom worked a transmitter on van Rensburg's farm, had had his own service before and had been dismissed by Werz. (AOB: more a hear-say testimony) Anderson and van Rensburg thought Rooseboom a danger to the whole cause and said that he would have to be killed one day before he could turn State evidence against O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) and van Rensburg.

On 17th April, Jerling sent a car and Kraizizek was driven to Pretoria where he met Sittig @ Maier (location of meeting place now forgotten). Sittig told Kraizizek that he had been sent by Werz to van Rensburg with a new code and instructions for transmitting. Furthermore, he was to relieve Rooseboom. Kraizizek asked him the reason for his animosity against Rooseboom, but Sittig claimed that he did not know, and was namely, that an order had been received from Werz to the effect that Rooseboom was to be dismissed as an agent.

Sittig then asked Kraizizek if he would be willing to serve his country by taking a parcel to Lourenco Marques from van Rensburg. Kraizizek said he would be willing to go immediately, but mentioned to Sittig that he had promised not to leave Masser in the lurch. Sittig replied that Kraizizek's return from Lourenco Marques could always be arranged.

Contrary to Anderson and Rooseboom, Sittig maintained that most military news of importance was being sent to Lourenco Marques, especially reports on shipping movements. He, however, had no say in the selection of news as van Rensburg undertook the censorship himself.

17 April Kraizizek spent the night in Pretoria at a place unknown to him (the sister of the house-owner was a school-teacher who knew Hilde Weiss), and then returned to Joubert's place with Sittig's assurance that he would be called on very soon.

18th April Kraizizek spent one night at Joubert's place and the next day with Witz?.

19th April On the 19th Anderson drove him by car to van Rensburg's wife whom Kraizizek knew well from his Bloemfontein days.

The conversation began with van Rensburg's asking Kraizizek if he were willing to take a small parcel containing undeveloped films (he did not mention the nature of these, and Kraizizek claims that he did not ask), to Dr. Werz whom he was to meet on the Portuguese side of the border (AOB: it did went differently). Van Rensburg added that Kraizizek could return when he liked, He went on to tell him that he had already sent four men, but they had either been caught or lost. This referred to Rockebrandt and Steffens, who were arrested near the border, and the two (Rommel's) Afrika Korps officers, Major Lipka and Leutnant von Grawert who had apparently been lost in the bush. Rockebrandt, when arrested, told the Portuguese authorities, who had imprisoned him near the border, that he was a German, and Werz was called in to confirm this. Rockebrandt was thus able to carry out his mission, although in a cell, by handing over his things to Werz. Both Lipka and Grawert had spent some time at van Rensburg's farm and van Rensburg said that he was sorry they had both wanted to go as he would have liked one to remain behind.

It was agreed that Kraizizek should meet near the border and arrangements regarding the date and place were to be transmitted to Lourenco Marques.

Kraizizek asked van Rensburg about Rooseboom, but he could add nothing new to what Kraizizek (AOB: Kraizizek lived already since about mid of the 1930s in South Africa) had already heard from Anderson and Sittig. He repeated the threat of having Rooseboom killed in the near future because he was dangerous. Kraizizek then handed van Rensburg both of the plans which Rooseboom had given him, instead of only one as had been arranged.

Van Rensburg then told him that he depend on railway officials from Durban (AOB: please view at the foregoing map east of Bloemfontein at the coast) and Capetown, old O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) men mostly, for news, of shipping movements. This had little value by the time it reached van Rensburg, as it came by rail.

Kraizizek then reminded? the question of van Rensburg's visits to General Smuts (AOB: then the President of the Union of South Africa), saying quite openly that people were talking about it. Van Rensburg did not deny it, but argued that his visits were of a strictly private nature as he had known the General for a very long time, and added that his last visit had been over a month ago. Kraizizek told van Rensburg that he had heard he was regarded by the Germans as a German Quisling (AOB: Vidkun Quisling former Norwegian Defence Minister, whom collaborated with the Germans during their occupation of Norway) de (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quisling) and en: (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quisling) in South Africa and also told him that Rooseboom had been accused of playing traitor to him. Van Rensburg refused to admit anything about his broadcasts and only indirectly admitted that he had sent military information. This, he claimed, was mere of a political than a military nature which the Germans were to use in the press and on the wireless.

19th April Van Rensburg then spoke of Leibrandt, who had been willing to work with him at first, but had insulted his O.B. officers, particularly Grobler of Bloemfontein (please consider the foregoing map). Leibrandt had threatened Grobler with a pistol because the latter refused to hand over the money had deposited with van Rensburg to a man named Erasmus, sent by Leibrandt to van Rensburg. According to Kraizizek, Leibrandt came to Bloemfontein with about 10,000 American dollars which he had received from Germany. He deposited this money at Bloemfontein and later sent Erasmus to collect it but met with a refusal. Erasmus was later killed.

When Kraizizek asked van Rensburg about the police major with whom he was seen shortly before Leibrandt was denounced by this police major. Van Rensburg said he only saw him once during a "Braivlais Partie" (Zuid Afrikaans?) and did not get a good impression of him, because he went off with a bottle of whiskey. This police major had a French-sounding name, possibly de Plessis?

Van Rensburg then told Kraizizek how difficult it was to obtain national unity and that he had appealed to the other partly leader, Pirow (KV 2/908; PF 66920), to come together on some understanding, but without success. All van Rensburg hoped was that Germany would win the war.

Talking about Masser (KV 2/942 .. KV 2/944; PF 106140) (AOB: this latter PF serial number, implied that Masser was of a different category; he otherwise would also have possessed a serial number in the 66... range. However, the 10...... serials weren't quite common) van Rensburg stressed the point that he had to thank him, van Rensburg for saving his life, because if he had not ordered one of his officers, Banie Basson, to shoot Lotter, Masser would have been found guilty of espionage. Basson, afterwards arrested by the police and imprisoned, later escaping, was never suspected of this murder, according to Kraizizek.

Major Mueller had also called on van Rensburg concerning the general use of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) in South Africa, but this van Rensburg had refused. Otherwise, Mueller had received all possible aid in his escape.

Kraizizek mentioned to van Rensburg that Herbert Wild had told him that he would like to join the G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) as he was in a position to help Germany. Van Rensburg speaking of the difficulties he experienced technically with the transmitter, as he could not get new parts and valves, said that he would be glad to get Wild's services. (Later Werz appointed Wild as an agent, but Wild, influenced by Rooseboom and Masser and wishing to operate alone, refused to work with van Rensburg.

Van Rensburg then offered Kraizizek money, but Kraizizek refused, accepting nothing from him but the parcel containing the film. Kraizizek cannot say how much money van Rensburg would have given him.

In the course of their long conversation, van Rensburg said that he did not generally approve of the escape from prison and internment camps, especially where Afrikaanders were concerned, as they could not get out the country and just endangered the lives of other people. He had sent an order to the internment camps strictly forbidding attempts to escape. Asked how van Rensburg was able to send this order to the camps, Kraizizek said that anyone was allowed to write to the Commandant and there were many O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) men employed in the administration offices and amongst the guards.

19th April Concerning sabotage van Rensburg said it was childish to do anything at the moment as it would just result in breaking up the whole O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag). It was, though, very difficult to reason with the younger and more lively elements of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) and he had therefore given an order now and then to have some telephone wires out or a bomb thrown, causing only a small amount of damage.

20th April On the 20th April, van Rensburg, his wife, Anderson, Sittig and Kraizizek celebrated Hitler's birthday, drinking champagne and listening to some recorded speeches of Hitler; later drinking a toast to Hitler in which van Rensburg wished Hitler a long life and a German victory.

AOB: please notice that north of the South African province Natal is the border with Mozambique, which country was during wartime days, still known as Portuguese East Africa. Lourenco Marques is now known as Maputo not too far of the South African Union border

Anderson and Kraizizek left the following day after the films arrived. For reasons unknown to Kraizizek he had to spend another night (22nd April) in Pretoria with some people whose names he cannot give, afterwards leaving with Anderson in van Rensburg's car for Natal.

?? April On the 23rd they arrived at Pienaar's place. Pienaar was one of van Rensburg's most trusted men and had concealed other agents including Lipka and Grawert (Former members of Rommel's Afrika Korps) in his mountain farm 30 miles to the north. It was at this farm that Kraizizek remained until 7th May.

Kraizizek then explained to Werz the advantage of the plan, with their? transmitting information, especially shipping movements, and said that he would, apart from that, receive all the political news he wanted and could thus form his own opinion instead of receiving opinions of the Afrikaners who did not like the German propaganda since van Rensburg was considered a German Quisling , they, did not wish to be rid of the British just? to become another 'Gau' of the Germans with van Rensburg as Gauleiter. (Kraizizek later reported this to Berlin)

AOB: I have to apologise for being unable to transcribe the next paragraph, as all has been so poorly reproduced.

1943.cont. that he would consider it but it was impossible at the moment because Kraizizek was not going back to South Africa as Werz had just sent a man from the Consulate over. Werz enquired if Kraizizek had met him at van Rensburg's farm. This man was Nils Paasche (AOB: combined within Sittig's file KV 2/939; PF 66173), but Kraizizek had never heard of him before.

Werz was aware of the difficulties van Rensburg had with the transmitter and accepted Wild at once, giving an order to the effect to van Rensburg. Wild, however, as stated above, did not want to work with van Rensburg.

Kraizizek reported to Werz Masser's anxiety about the documents he had been ordered to take from the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques to the German Legation in Lisbon (Portugal). Masser had got as far as Capetown when he was detected, but he managed to stowaway aboard a Portuguese steamer with the help of the Germans. Werz replied that the documents reached the German legation safely.

Their further conversation consisted of political matters and Kraizizek tried to make Werz understand that he was making a mistake in backing up van Rensburg and thus hampering the unification of South African nationalists. He said he considered it would better merely to conduct national propaganda as far as Germany was concerned, and leave it to the Afrikanders to choose their leader. Werz replied that van Rensburg had been chosen by the Reich, which personally Kraizizek doubted, as he had heard through the Consul General Trompke (KV 2/757 .. KV 2/768; PF 65657), that Werz, as Vice-Consul, had an absolutely free hand as far as Africa was concerned.

After this conversation Kraizizek left Werz, having spent about three-quarters of an hour with him.

KV 2/907-1, page 49 (minute 70a) AOB: Please bear always in mind that with increasing pdf page numbers you are going backwards in time!

At present, and until we can obtain further information about our correspondents in the South African Police, I think we should be extremely careful what information on this subject we should pass them.

A cable received from S.O.I. Capetown vouches for Brigadier Palmer's reliability from the security angle. A certain volume of correspondence is, however, coming in from other officers signing on Brigadier Palmer's behalf about whom we know nothing, and it may well be that information from the Security Service (think of AOB: RSS, M.I.5 and M.I.6, as well G.C.&H.Q.) receivers a wider distribution than we would wish it to have.

AOB: There are aspects that weren't clearly expressed. First, the British Services, partially operated illegally in South Africa. And were often not entitled to maintain what they actually were doing. Then the existed quite an "reserve" versus Britain. Then what was known as Most Secret Source (think of Bletchley Park etc.) was to be kept away from the South Africans. The diplomatic situation was also, sometimes, rather delicate between The South African Union and Great Britain.

I am anxious to know if any information concerning the activities of either of the abovenamed persons should come to notice as the result of documents seized in Germany or elsewhere or through the interrogation of any Nazi prisoners or sympathizers.

Mr. Pirow who, as you are probably aware, was Minister of Railways and Defence in the Herzog Government, visited Germany and interviewed Hitler 2 or 3 years prior to the outbreak of war. He is now the leader of the "New Order" Movement in this country, a "National Socialist" organisation, which is Anti-Semitic and Anti-Government.

Dr. van Rensburg is Commander-General of the Ossewa-Brandwag Movement that is known to you.

It is quite possible that both men had German contacts and should information come to light concerning them or either man's activities, I would be grateful if it could be passed on to me as soon as practical.

Dear Ryde (AOB: whom operated in South Africa, particularly in DFing on transmitters mainly operating from or about van Rensburg's farm),

Please refer to your letter PF 65657 (= KV 2/757 ... KV 2/768, on Trompke)/B.1.a. (= within M.I.5.)/MR (= Masterman?) of 19.5.45 on the subject of collaboration between South African subversive organisations and the German Intelligence Service. (AOB: directly in contact with the German Foreign Office or Auswärtiges Amt)

I confirm our meeting of the other day and several telephone conversations and I agree that we should try to provide the (South African) Union Government with evidence, other than that based on special material (AOB: think here of Most Secret Source material and that of Bletchley Park and that like), showing the extent of the assistance provided b to the German Intelligence Service in espionage matters, by such organisations as the Ossewa-Brandwag.

Without doubt, Trompke and Werz in Mozambique, were the prime movers and organisers of the German espionage network in the (S.A.) Union. I we could arrest them and persuade them to talk we should obtain all the evidence required by the Union Government. (AOB: which not very fruitfully will occur, in due course)

As far as I know Werz is in Germany: (AOB: after being expelled accompanied by Kraizizek they arrived in Lisbon, where Werz continued his passage by regular airline flight from Spain to Berlin, he arrived there on 24 December 1944) and I have asked the appropriate section to take the necessary steps to locate him and have him arrested. His interrogation could take place either here or in Germany, whichever was more convenient.

Trompke was still in Lourenco Marques until a few days ago and we were advised that the Governor of Mozambique was in no hurry to move him with the expulsion order decreed by the Portuguese Government (pushed by British diplomatic pressure). We have asked that our Ambassador in Lisbon should protest to the {Portuguese Government. We have asked that our Ambassador in Lisbon should protest to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the delay and ask for Trompke's immediate expulsion.

I agree with your suggestion that we should try and get Trompke's story, before interrogating Werz or →

Mueller, and it should not be impossible to arrange air transport for Trompke to Germany. I expect to hear further from you on this point, after your proposed talk with Hart and Liddell (M.I.5).

After careful study of Courtenay Young's admirable summary of the special material (M.S.S.), which reveals the full story of the relations between van Rensburg, of the Ossewa-Brandwag and the German Intelligence Service, I am inclined to agree with Courtenay Young's conclusion that it is difficult to accept the theory that the Ossewa-Brandwag and van Rensburg were under the remote control of General Smuts (the South African President). On the other hand, no reasonable explanation is forthcoming for the fact that the intelligence passed back to Trompke and Berlin (German Foreign Office, Auswärtiges Amt), by Sittig, Wild, Elferink (Elfrink) and van Rensburg, was practically valueless; bearing in mind that their opportunities for obtaining good material appears to have been unlimited (AOB: ???).

It is also hard to understand why Wild has not been arrested, since the Union Authorities must have known of his whereabouts for some considerable time.

We shall doubtless know the answer to all these questions at some time in the future, meanwhile we should try to obtain the arrest of Trompke and Werz as soon as possible.

I spoke to you the other day regarding the possibility which now arises of obtaining from overt sources information which will be of value to the South African authorities, would they decide that the time has come to take action against individuals and organisations who have been in active collaboration with the Germans throughout the war.

In this connection I think that I told you that we have received a telegram from Brigadier Lenton, head of Censorship in South Africa, in which he states that the Minister of Justice, Mr. Colin Steyn, dealing with him (Lenton) alone, is anxious to get any information implicating Pirow or van Rensburg in association with Germany before or during the war. Brigadier Lenton thinks that there must be proof somewhere, and suggests Bohle or his records, or Hess (the latter was in British captivity since 11 May 1941), or some of the South Africans who have been associated with Zeesen (AOB: The main broadcasting site of the German Foreign Ministry; Auswärtiges Amt), such as Holm, Donie Mitchell, Miss Marshall, Miss de Jager and Sister Theron (AOB: Afrikaans broadcast speakers).

Whilst we do not think that these people mentioned by Lenton are likely to provide us with evidence that Pirow and van Rensburg have actively collaborated with the Germans during the war, we know from special sources that van Rensburg certainly has done so, that Pirow may have done so, and that dr. Malan, the leader of Smut's opposition in the South African Parliament, did in fact have an interview with Trompke as late as August 1941.

This information is, of course, entirely based on special material, and there are obvious objections to our releasing it to the South African authorities unless it can be covered or wrapped up in other information provided by such overt sources as, for example, the interrogation of individuals who have been conducting German espionage in the Union from the neighbouring territory of Portuguese East Africa. (AOB: their eager to tackle those once supporting Germany, may well have endangered Most Secret Sources; afterwards they had to take counter measures as to prevent the South Africans to combine the very facts. I my perception very un-professional attitude)

In view of the fact that Lenton, on behalf of the Minister of Justice in South Africa, has cabled asking for information which might implicate such well known characters in the Union politics as van Rensburg and Pirow, we feel that we should look upon the matter of obtaining what information we can from whatever characters we may find as one high priority.

We know that throughout the war both Trompke and Werz, in their official capacities, have busily engaged themselves in espionage (AOB: the author of this current document is not really possessing sufficient knowledge! Practical matters were handled mainly by Werz, whereas Trompke was an old type diplomat), and that if we were able to lay our hand on Trompke (AOB: what will not happen - as the US G-2 service interrogated Trompke in Germany. After he was set free, he was asked where he would live. This information was incorrect as he was never traced again. I suppose he returned to some country where he possessed good contacts during his diplomatic career) there is a good chance (wishful thinking) that he would talk and provide us with a great deal of information which we require for the exposure of a number of prominent South African politicians (children they are!). Trompke is still in Lourenco Marques, but I gather from you that the probability is that he will shortly be repatriated to Germany, and we feel that on arrival in Germany he should be arrested and brought to the U.K. for for detailed interrogation at Camp 020. (AOB: these children do even not know the actual legal situation: It were the American Forces who took Germans in captivity, and G-2 then interrogated them extensively. The British Foreign Office had then to apply for a 'slot' for their own interrogation in Germany. This mainly was allowed towards the end of the captivity; think of one or two days, maximally. Only in case of very special urgency, they could 'borrow' a body, but should return this person (body) at a scheduled window!) I do not know yet whether there is a SHAEF card for Trompke; but whether there is or is not, I think that we should advise both the British →

and Americans in Germany that we are anxious to have him here as soon as he arrives. I do not know whether there is is a card for Werz; I am taking steps to find this out; but having had personal contact with this man, I am not at all optimistic that even we do get him to England he will be persuaded to discuss his activities whilst in Lourenco Marques. At the same time, I am not at all sure that he is a person who should be allowed to be at large in Germany, and I think that we should carefully consider whether he should not be kept in confinement, at least for the time being.

I have just heard that Werz's right-hand man when he was in Lourenco Marques, namely Alois Müller (Mueller), is at the moment on board the "Drottingholm" (a Swedish ship well known in repatriation in the wartime days), which is either at Holyhead or Liverpool. He undoubtedly has a great deal of information which would be of value to the South African authorities, and should be closely interrogated. Unfortunately there is some objection to our taking this man off the ship at an English port, and I have arranged with Martin Forrest that he should be arrested and sent to this country as soon as he arrives at his destination in Germany. (AOB: as I have already explained before, he then fell under US jurisdiction, who were superior to every desire from England)

I think that Trompke, Werz and Müller (Mueller) are probably the most important of the Germans who have been in Africa throughout the war, although I do not forget Herbert Masser, who undoubtedly has had personal contact with some of the agents working in the Union, probably including Sittig, and it may be that we should inform those in the field that he also should be brought to this country for interrogation.

So far as these officials who have directed the activities of these people from Germany are concerned, I am at the present time endeavouring t get out a list of Abwehr officials whom we know to have interested themselves in South African affairs throughout the war. There are a number of these people, and I think are likely to be most valuable from our point of view. I shall discuss this matter with you as soon as I have completed the list.

I would be interested to have your comments on this general problem in due course, and in particular I should be interested to know whether you think that the information that we have had from special sources, which clearly shows that van Rensburg and other South Africans have played with the Germans throughout the war, can be used if suitably camouflaged or by attributing it to it to denunciations by captured Germans since the German surrender.

AOB: now it is clear to me: Major Ryde was most unsuccessful in pinpointing the transmissions from the surrounding of van Rensburg's farm and on other places within the South African Union. I do understand now - what personality type this young man was. Not very promising, by the way.

Reference your letter PF 106140/B.1.b./CTY (Courtenay) (= Masser) of September 12th.

I am certain that R. refers to van Rensburg I? have always understood that vis a vis Berlin Shrapnel represents the link with van Rensburg and has officially been lent to van Rensburg and has officially been lent to van R. as a sort of communications officer. Trompke, who was at least always correct, would therefore theoretically approach Shrapnel through van R.

We, of course, know that van R. has no difficulty in sending letters to the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques by hand of various South African visitors, e.g. Pin Wessels.

(AOB: the latter was one of the Cambridge five - Russian Spies within the British Secret Service during WW II and thereafter!!)

You will have noted that BJ (Blue jacket) 135893 (AOB: special folders, only accessible by particularly authorised Crown servants) shows conclusively that Masser has been double-crossing us with the Germans (AOB: otherwise he would have been double-crossing the Germans, on Britain's behalf). I presume you will inform your representative in :Lourenco Marques of this so that he can be cautious in any further approach to this creature.

I should be grateful for your views as to whom the letter 'R' on page 3 refers. I presume from the context that it is van Rensburg. It is possible, of course, that it might be Rooseboom, but this seems unlikely owing to the estrangement between him and Shrapnel. (AOB: might once Rooseboom have been Shrapnel?)

It is learnt from a most secret source that the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques reported that Masser had stated that Rooseboom, after his quarrel with the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) drew up a document, signed by two witness, of self-justification describing the work he had done for Germany and his attempts to establish contact with the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques. Masser then walled up this document with the assistance of Wild, who later on handed it over to the South African Government. Masser stated that this was the reason for Werz recall.

The German Consulate thought that if this was true, Felix (= Sittig), of whom they had received no news in Lourenco Marques from R (= van Rensburg?), would also be heavily compromised and perhaps caught. They thought, however, that this silence might have something to do with the fact that under pressure of circumstances, the O.B. (= Ossewa-Brandwag) had changed its course. Apparently, now that van Rensburg's hopes of a rapid German victory had faded he was trying to gain influence over the workers and the soldiers by means of his labour front, and having failed to achieve a union with Malan, was threatening ?? form a Parliamentary front. The German Consulate considered that in acting thus van Rensburg would gain little advantage as the secret wireless link with Germany would involve him in great risk.

AOB: I have skipped, an interview taken on behalf of a US representative, with van Rensburg and his surrounding, a we follow a certain line, which otherwise would have become propaganda like, as this was the essence of this interview. (KV 2/907-2, pages 7 ... 19)

. . . In December it was stated that two transmitters in Cape Province, but that both were cut of action to lack of spare parts, and that the Germans had two transmitters in Lourenco Marques (??), and none in the North of the Colony. Apparently the intention was to dismantle the last named one to provide spares for the two in Cape Province, and Kraizizek was to smuggle into the Union. (AOB: it all went differently then the author expresses here) Masser added that Werz and van Rensburg had arranged to meet near Catuane, but van Rensburg was frightened and changed his mind at the last minute. None of these reports have been really confirmed up to date.

On 25.3.44 Berlin asked Felix (= Sittig) to ask van Rensburg if he considered that the founding of a branch of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) in Germany and its use for wireless purposes would be advisable.

Felix (= Sittig) replied that van Rensburg's opinion it would be highly desirable to start a branch of the O.B. particularly among the N.C.O's (= non commissioned Officer = German ranking Uffz.) and men who were prisoners of war. Felix (= Sittig) also asked, in order to avoid mistakes, Berlin must explain exactly what they meant by 'use for wireless purposes'. To this question, as far it is known, Berlin vouchsafed no reply.

No information from Most Secret Source was used against Wild, but he was led to believe that he had been blown by someone in Lourenco Marques. No names were mentioned, but Wild clearly blamed Masser. The result of this confession was that Wild had blown van Rensburg, Sittig, Rooseboom and Anderson, but had never mentioned Paasche (AOB: Paasche is also covered with Sittig's file (KV 2/933; PF 66173) and Paasche).

Apparently the friction between Rooseboom and Sittig and Paasche, and Rooseboom's dismissal as a German agent still rankled, as in June 1943 the latter wrote a 26 page confession incriminating van Rensburg and Sittig. This report was cemented up in a bottle in a wall and held as threat against van Rensburg to whom he had for long opposed. This report was produced by Wild in March 1944. It is a long document giving Rooseboom's activities from 1939 to 28.6.43. He accuses van Rensburg and Sittig of double-crossing him, and it implicates Anderson and Wild as well as van Rensburg and Sittig and others.

Rooseboom suggested to the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) a radio link with Lourenco Marques, or if possible with Germany direct ... as the attempts by the Afrikaaners themselves to get the new service working had failed, Rooseboom approached van Rensburg, with the request that he should be entrusted with the management. After the transmitters had been re-build (https://www.cdvandt.org/felix-sittig-tx-sa.htm), Sittig arrived at Pretoria at van Rensburg's (farm). He also called himself Meyer, and was known to Rooseboom from former year. Few dates appear anywhere in the confession, but this must be presumably between the date of Sittig's escape from Bavianspoort on 7.4.42 and the statement in Most Secret Source, dated 4.5.42 that 'the agent who had succeeded in breaking out of Internment Camp was working with van Rensburg, ... Sittig did the encoding of the reports. These reports arrived at van Rensburg's farm and were sent on to Sittig.

Rooseboom stated that 'a Hollander, named Elfrink (KV 2/202; PF 65880) , usually called Mr. X in O.B. circles, was stated to be appointed an agent by Germany. Soon after Rooseboom's stated working for the O.B. van Rensburg asked him to enquire in Lourenco Marques if 'Elfering' (Elfrink) was alright.

KV 2/907-2, page 21 (minute 60 c; AOB: implying that there does exist at least a minute 60 a and 60b)

We are aware of the possibilities which detailed interrogation may provide (AOB: at least not by the British institutions, but US G-2 did in Germany) for implicating the characters mentioned in collaboration with the Germans and are energetically pursuing all possible channels with a view to providing the South African authorities with a complete a dossier as possible (wishful thinking).

The Ossewa-Brandwag, whose origin was inspired by the by the common-creation trek of the Ox-wagons, and which was started by Col. Laas as a purely cultural association, became a menace to the A.B.'s rival concern F.A.K. A skilful whisper campaign, based ironically enough on the rumour that Col. (Overste) Laas was a Free Mason, caused the Colonel (Overste) to be ejected and Boer Dr. Hansie van Rensburg successfully installed.

In the meantime the A.B. ever since the arrival, circa 1933 of the first Nazi agents, camouflaged as scientists, educationists, etc. had become immensely interested in the Nazi system.

Broers Dr. N. Diederichs and Dr. van Rensburg both visited Germany to study the Nazi system at first hand, and became ardent admirers and adherents o'? National Socialism.

Through Broederbond intervention the Afrikaanse Nationale Student-bond (A.N.S.) was formed with Hans van Rensburg as hon. president, as an anti-dote to the liberally inclined N.U.A.A., and conducted tours of Afrikaans student were arranged to Nazi Germany;.

Part of the A.B.'s scheme of vengeance recoiled on its own head when the split occurred in 1941 between Malan and Pirow (KV 2/908: PF 66920), leads? to rupture with the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) as well, and participating the A.B. into its most serious crisis. There was also a strained atmosphere in the Uitvoerende Raad as well, since some of the members aided with Malan and some with Pirow and van Rensburg.

The first breach between Malan and van Rensburg occurred early in 1941 when van Rensburg prematurely published the Broederbond's "Konsep-grondwet" for the intended republic.

AOB: May I suggest an option: Was this telegram dealing with improper behaviour versus the legal status within the: Union of South Africa?

As it is known: that they did this deliberately, quite frequently; in particular where Major Ryde was being implicated.

AOB: this is where I am always hoping and waiting for!!!!! A mistake, which quite often in elaborate documents one or twice is happening. The last screener in 2002 did not understood the application of the S.I.S. CX/ serial numbers!

CX/12724 actually constituted a subject - group number /3/ is making it particularly pointing at group and the particular Rooseboom's person: CX/12724/3

V.T2. is the designation code of the one regularly dealing with this file (Sachbearbeiter)

With reference to my letter 12724/3/V.T.2. of April 3rd in which Rensburg accused Masser (Hans Herbert Masser KV 2/942 ... KV 2/944; PF 106140) of being the author of report, our Lourenco Marques representative thinks it is most unlikely that Masser has ever passed anything to the Portuguese Police. Moreover according to Anderson is suspected of being the author.

In one of the documents in this file referred to Shrapnel as a course of information.

I already noticed at: KV 2/907-2, page 8 about someone whom got the cover-name Shrapnel

I attach two copies of the statement written by Rooseboom last June and two copies of an English translation. (AOB: this might be considered an illegal act, as most subjects dealt with being South African Union Citizens!) This is the document handed over to me (AOB: Major Ryde, on behalf of M.I.5) by (Herbert) Wild and mentioned in my telegram number P.57/44 of 13th (March, paragraph 1(b). I (Major Ryde) stated in the telegram that this was a 26 page document but but the original was not written on foolscap? size paper.

I (Major Ryde) know nothing of the Police report mentioned by Rooseboom (Shrapnel?) in paragraph 5), and as General Smuts is in the moment anxious that the police should not be called in, I (Major Ryde, M.I.5) cannot very well ask time to let me see their file. This point will have to be gone into at a later date, indeed there are a number of names mentioned in the document that will have to be referred to the police in due course.

The main difficulty that I (Major Ryde) am in at the moment, is to see where Pedant (likely a British code-name for a South African citizen) enters into the picture. He has never been mentioned by Wild, he is not mentioned by Rooseboom in this document, but he has been mentioned by Masser in Lourenco Marques. I (Major Ryde) can well believe that Rooseboom may never have heard of Pendant for his entrangement (= the fact of no longer being on friendly terms of a social group) from Shrapnel for his entanglement from Shrapnel and the Ossewa-Brandwag occurred before Pendant (AOB: maybe Masser? bear also PF 106140 in mind) for his entanglement from Shrapnel and the Ossewa Brandwag occurred before Pendant arrived in the Union.

At the same time Wild was a strong supporter of Rooseboom's and so far his history to me (Major Ryde) has gone at the moment, he claim that he knows little or nothing of Shrapnel's activities since Rooseboom broke away from him and the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag).

I (Major Ryde) would begin to doubt whether Wild has been the technical expert for Pendant and the existing transmitter, were it not for the fact that I (Major Ryde) am informed by S.O.E. (AOB: a 'branch' linked to M.I.6, but also executing killings and that like) that Masser has stated to be the case.

I (Major Ryde) have not had time to comment on the attached report in detail, beyond the fact that Wild has stated that the transmitter which was built after the theft of the first transmitter from the motor car is the one mentioned in my (Major Ryde's) telegram P 57/44 of the 13th March, para 1 (a) which Wild handed over to me (Major Ryde).

Statement about the activities of Henri Jaques (Hans) Rooseboom during the period from 9th October 1939 to 28 June 1943.

I the undersigned Hans Rooseboom, christened Henri Jaques Rooseboom, officer stenographer (short-hand) of the Parliament of the South African Union and Journalist, without fixed residence, lately residing at the Internment Camp of Leeuwkop, District Johannesburg, Transvaal, under the Internee-Number 987, born on the 8th October, 1904 at Uelsen (County Dentholm?), herewith make the following declarations:

I am making this declaration out of my own free will without being forced to do it, only for the possibility that something may happen to me, in order to give my collaborators an explanation for their activities.

I left Berlin on the 9th October 1939, under instructions to communicate important ?? through channels of neutral countries, i.e. Holland. I got an? order from person with whom I got in touch through the former Commercial Attaché of the German Legation in South Africa, Dr. Ludwig Beye. A certain Mr. Grass (or Grasp) was instructed to me as the chief, whereas the negotiations with me were carried out by a Mr. Haelberstadt. At no time I met these gentlemen in an official building, but once this Mr. Haelberstadt remarked: "Of course you will understand that you are dealing with the military". (AOB: implying Abwehr I) Twice I had to sign an official document. Personally I was perfectly satisfied with the assurance of Dr. Beye that those gentlemen belonged to the O.K.W, (Amt Ausland/Abwehr).

Preparations for my activities were rather scanty, mainly because there was not much time before my departure. I was given some chemicals with which I learned to write. Then I had to learn by heart which things were wanted most in my (Rooseboom's) reports. All reports should be forwarded via an arranged channel by letter, if possible by airmail. I did not get any money to take along as though it would be dangerous and unnecessary, as I believed I could defray (pay) from my yearly income of more tan 12.000 Marks??.

I would like to mention that the attitude of the gentlemen of the O.K.W. with regard to other officials was hard to understand. Councillor Bielefeld of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), for instance, asked me to represent in the German point in view in South Africa as much as possible, especially in the Boer Press. For this purpose he gave me quite a number of photos etc. Mr. Haeberstadt told me with regard to this conversation: "Always say Ýes'and then forget about it, whatever he told you. On no account you must tell him what the real purpose of your journey will be." Even at Police Headquarters I was not allowed to say a word in order to speed up the issue of my exit permit. I mention these facts because, as will be explained later. I was also given the order never to get in touch with any official German representative abroad nor to try to work with their help. I also should keep aloof from any political South African group or party. I had to work completely independently. However, I was told, I had to use my own judgement as it was possible that conditions could change completely without Germany being able to give me other instructions. It was with regard to these instructions that later or I had to act against my orders. I thought these instructions were rather to be regarded as precautions as I was not too well known then.

During my trip some strange accidents happened, the meaning of which will become clear in the course of this description. In the plane between Rome and Serville the bottle with one of the chemical liquids ?an? out to about three quarters of its contents, although I was sure that I had corked it safely in Berlin. Secondly, in Madeira I was continously approached by a man who offered his services as a guide. Thirdly, our Portuguese boat when it was one day's journey from Dakar got instructions not to call at any French or British ports as, it was said, the day before Germans had been taken from a boat of this line at Dakar. Finally at Lobito there was a clear hint that I was under suspicion, When I wanted to go from board, one of the officers said he would accompany me, and when the Assistant-Paymasters of the "Windhuk" which was lying there, asked the Port Captain for permission to invite a passenger of our boat (my name was not mentioned) to dinner, he replied "You mean this South African journalist", eh? Gentlemen, that is out of the question." Apparently I had been expected at Cape Town, so I proceeded without any difficulty via Lourenco Marques to Johannesburg. In South Africa I learned from an officer of the Secret Police the following: the other day he had something to do in →

to do in record-officer and by chance a file came into his hands which gave details about my person. To his surprise he read that already in Berlin I was under observation by agents of the British Secret Service who saw me with persons who were believed to be members of the German Secret Service. Then I arrived in Rome the local branch of the British Secret Service was already informed, and while I was out of my hotel room, my luggage had been searched and there they found the liquid with which they did not know what to do. In order not to grouse suspicion with regard to the taking of some of it for testing, they put the cork in loosely so that contents would run out. Then it was indeed to get me from on board in a French port, however, the boat did not call at the port (Dakar). Thereupon, according to this document, the South African police was now busy to keep me under observation, and if my conduct would arouse any suspicion I would be dealth with immediately.

I therefore did not have the chance any more to act according to my orders in the disguise of a harmless journalist, and I decided I had to convince people here that I was harmless indeed. I started writing articles for the press in order to stress my independent attitude as reporter. The articles found such an attention that I was offered to write a book about my experiences. I made use of this opportunity to prove my innocence explicitly. That I succeeded in my purpose has been proved by a secret Police report which I had a chance to read and in which it was said "Reading the book and the article by H.R. (Hans Rooseboom) makes it clear that the agent in Berlin must have been wrong or that the negotiations which have been conducted there by R. (Rooseboom) must have failed, as only a lunatic would describe all details of his journey as a secret agent as R. does. A search of his rooms was completely negative, and R. himself gave, without being asked, an quite credible explanation of his dealings with certain officials of the Foreign Office (das Auswärtige Amt) at Berlin.

The book I wrote "Die Oorlog trap was" broke all records in book selling in South Africa, the Police were not able to arrest me me without a good reason with regard to the dangerous mood among the Boers, and they stopped to keep me under observation. Now my hand were free and I began to send my reports. However, soon some difficulties arose. My letter went first to my mother in Holland abd forwarded them to a young lady friend of mine in Germany. But soon I was warned from Germany that this lady named Kaethe Hartmann, had shown had behaviour and from some hints I could understand that she was guilty of treachery. Therefore I told my mother she could send my letters to my sister the address of whom was known to the gentlemen in Berlin. I don't know if this was done as my mother knew nothing of secret content of my letters. I don't know if this was done as my mother knew nothing of the secret content of my letters. I chose this alternative as the said K. Hartmann for some time used to stay with my sister in Kiel and as it was probable that Berlin, wanted to test this channel.

At the beginning of May 1940 the invasion of Holland occurred and therefore my channel was cut oof. Twice after that I had a chance to send reports, once with somebody via South America, and the other with a lady from from scuttled "Watusi" ? who was returning to Germany. In any case this last report has arrived as I got a reply from Lisbon later on. I hoped to get new address in neutral countries and started building up my sources of information. In this connection I gave I gave certain hints to one Mrs. Bettie Zweistra (nee Hanekom) of Kameelstraat Epping Tuine, Kaapstad, who I have known for years and about whose attitude I had no doubts. Her husband, however, was a soldier in the Coastal Defence but this fact made this connection even more valuable. Later I found out that this lady had given me away by telling an invented story to the Secret Military Police. As in the meantime some very important ship-news came in, I decided - contrary to my instructions to go to the border of Portuguese East Africa (whole distance about 3000 miles in order to forward the news by a trusted person to the (German) Consulate in Lourenco Marques. I did it in order not to leave these valuable of? information unused and because a reliable friend named Otto Schroeder had offered to take the news across. At the border I had enough connections to facilitate a crossing of the border without much difficulty. Schroeder carried out his instructions, was, however, treated rather unfriendly by the timid representative of the Reich at Lourenco Marques. There was no talking of aid or financial support although he as well as I were well known for years to Dr. Werz who was in charge of South African Affairs.

I, want to mention in this respect that in Berlin I was given the address of Messrs Schroeder & Leidenberg in Lourenco Marques to be used as cover, and when I come to the Union via Lourenco Marques I visited Leidenberg as arranged in Berlin. But there I found out that this address was of no use as Mr. Leidenberg not only was kept under constant observation but also was not allowed to cable by code to Germany. Therefore I thought if of no use that Schroeder should approach Schroeder & Leidenberg for other reason than contacting the Consulate. During our return trip from the border I learned of the warrant against me. I had to decide for myself if I should give myself up and try to get free during the investigation - which it is pretended to be granted to every internee - or to try working on as a fugitive. This last alternative was out of the question with regard to the few few people I knew then among the Afrikaners. Furthermore I had no more an income, and the journey to the border had proved that the costs about £80 would make a regular use of this route prohibitive. Finally it was just the time in France's collapse and everybody expected a speedy end of the war. As I was sure that there could be no serious charge against me, I gave myself up to the Police in order to improve my chances for a release.

After being three months at the Internment Camp of Leeuwkop, the outrageous Police attack against the camp of Baviaanspoort occurred during which 800 of the 1200 inmates were injured, some of them critically. About 20 men from Baviaanspoort were transferred to the penitentiary camp next to our camp and the inmates soon found a possibility to communicate with us. Some of these comrades knew me already and they approached me with the suggestion to forward sworn declarations about the ill-treatment of helpless prisoners to the newspapers and if possible to the Consulate in Lourenco Marques. They approached just me because they knew about my collaboration with German officials before the war, and also because it was known that I was continually? in touch with people outside the camp. I studies the declarations and found their contents so scandalous that I decided to send them on. My friends outside responded immediately and sent an original of the declarations to Lourenco Marques. A few days later the German shortwave station broadcasted the declarations word by word. As we had secret receivers in the camp this message was son known and at the same time word went around that I was in touch with Germany. A few days later an internee named Botha, a general of the because the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) wanted to get enlightened about Germany's intention for South Africa after the war. "General" Botha who was in charge of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) group in the camp hinted that the letter came from headquarters of the O.B. Two years later the O.B. Headquarters denied this and it transpired that the letter originated from the Provincial Headquarters Transvaal of the O.B. which was in charge of three quarters of all O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) members. With regard to my instructions to keep aloof from political organisations I declined this request, explaining that such a step would be outside my d??es. A few days later a second letter from the O.B. arrived in the camp. In it was offered the O.B.'s assistance and support for my future work if I would get free and would initiate connections between the O.B. and Germany. Again I was faced with a difficult decision. After three months in the camp it did not look as if the war would come to a speedy end; prospects for an interrogation during which I could get free (as I learned confidentially) were bad, and as fugitive I could not count on success without the support of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag). Connections with Germany were accomplished after my successful flight with the assistance of Otto Schroeder and a reply to the questions of the "Kommandant-Generaal Dr. Hans van Rensburg" were transmitted to him. So far my side of our agreement was settled. The O.B. commissioned one Abraham Spless with helping me in starting my activity again and a few reports were sent to Lourenco Marques. However, thanks to the hopeless organisation of O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) the intrigues in the O.B. Headquarters and finally thanks to the fact that the "Stormjaers" made illicit use of my communications across the border, the whole communication broke finally down. Otto Schroeder was caught while crossing the border, others were caught too or kept aloof.

A year after it had been posted at Lisbon a letter from my sister arrived in which I was asked, by my superiors in Berlin to do my utmost best in order to restore communications.

in order to restore communications. This letter mentioned an address in Lisbon, however, my brother who got this letter while I was in a camp and did not know about my activities, replied as if it was a normal letter from my sister. The Police were continuously searching for me so that only after months I could dare getting in touch with my brother. With his letters which, of course, he signed with his proper name, he drew suspicion to this address. And finally in a moment of greatest danger I had to destroy the letter soon afterwards thus losing the address.

11. To replace the old means of communications I suggested a radio communication with Lourenco Marques or - if possible - with Germany direct. The war had made the sea route via the Cape much more important and I had in Cape Town all the necessary sources of information. During the first tests with transmitters which had been built meanwhile, the said A Spless was arrested and interned. In his place came leading "Officer" of the Stormjaers" to me, promised the blue from the sky and did nothing. I waited for 3½ months in my hide-out without hearing anything and then I tried to get in touch with O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) Headquarters. That was not easy as I could only move with the greatest precautions during the first year of my flight. Finally the Provincial Leader of the O.B. in the Transvaal "Assistant-Kommandant Generaal" Jerling arrived and told me that the "Stormjaers" (with whom he was constantly at loggerheads?) had simply refused to tell him my whereabouts. This happening is typical of conditions in the O.B. organisation. Now a radio technician named Piet Boshoff from Beoni was ordered to get the radio service going. After several months he proved to be a complete failure and he was replaced by an Air Force Captain "Bosseau" Boshoff. He did his utmost to get a radio service going, was, however, subjected to continuous criticism and sabotage of his work by the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) Command, with the exception of "A.K.C." Jerling, who was the only one among the high officers of the O.B. to show appreciation of the importance of my task and the obligations of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) to me. Mainly by constant intrigues by the Provincial-Leader of the Cape Province, "AKG" J.A. Smith and his Aide-de-Camp "Hymer" Anderson the built up organisation was again and again destroyed. The leader of the O.B. Dr. van Rensburg, deserves the reproach that he never took the building up of an information service seriously and that he never put the necessary funds at our disposal. (AOB: one should also consider Dr. Hans van Rensburg's merits which Rooseboom, rejects to acknowledge; hatred is never a good judgement) As time went on I learned that, unfortunately, Dr. van Rensburg must be regarded as irresponsible in every respect and that every intriguer could influence him. The pretext that no money was available, does not stand the test, as alone from membership fees the O.B. has a yearly income of about 1,350,000 Marks (AOB: what was the legal South African currency named?), and because there were ample funds for other unimportant purposes (AOB: Mr Rooseboom, a non member of Ossewa-Brandwag, should decided what has to be done with the O.B.'s money - is only emphasising at the very fact, that Mr. Rooseboom is having unsound motives - but to counter van Rensburg and the Ossewa-Brandwag organisation). With the exception of some support by Transvaal thanks to A.K.G. Jerling, Captain Boshoff had to provide all the costs out of his own pocket until he had used up his cash of 10,000 Marks and resigned, disappointed, and with a nervous breakdown. That happened in January 1942. Boshoff had done a lot, transmitters had been built or bought and erected in general places in the country, tests for sending and receiving had been made, but there were still some unsolved technical difficulties. Cap. Boshoff had tackled too many problems with his restricted means and got stuck in details.

12. As repeated attempts by Afrikaners had come to nothing, I approached Dr. van Rensburg with the request to entrust me (Rooseboom) with the managing the News. (AOB: whatever Mr. Rooseboom wanted to accomplish, he had to communicate with a German entity. And, that was the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) and they followed also the guidelines in communication with Consul Dr. Werz. But, Werz followed the guidelines provided by the German Auswärtiges Amt) Section of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) He fully agreed. As the most efficient section worked in Johannesburg under the commandant of "Generaal" "Outboet" Toerien, I concentrated all my efforts in getting the section going. Soon sending and receiving tests with Cape Town group were made several times per week, but as there were no results after 2 month time, I decided to go by train to Cape Town together with my collaborator, Pierre de Villiers. That was an hazardous enterprise but there was no other way with regard to lack of tyres and petrol. Persistent lack of funds was another reason for this decision which, however, went well. The transport question at the beginning of 1942 became more and more difficult. Later on we got over it by stealing tyres and forging petrol coupons. Our technician too came from Johannesburg, but still our tests were unsuccessful in getting communication. Just when I learned from from the radio-technician of the Police in Cape Town that the Police had over come the difficulty by erecting higher aerials, Dr. van Rensburg, who also was in Cape Town, gave order to hand over our apparatus to the local O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) command. The intriguers once again had got the comprise-loving van Rensburg on their side. Our so important communication to Cape Town was made impossible, however, we →

(AOB: this proves that Mr. Rooseboom did not possess any knowledge on 'propagation'. The height of an antenna is mainly related to the frequency concerned. Also significant being: the daily propagation forecast. This is also a season phenomenon (such as the latitude of the sun) and is related to the altitude of the various ionospheric layers (Heavyside layers) such as: the D, E and F layers (to keep it simply). Daylight is mainly restricting to maximally medium range communications. Long range propagations is complex mixture of time of the day, such as Grey-line propagation (East-West). When Sittig started the Germans told him the frequencies to be operated in respect to the time of the day. Mr. Rooseboom did not possessed any knowledge about these aspects.)

After our return to Johannesburg we immediately erected higher aerials. For the first time we got an appreciable amount from the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) Headquarters. This, however, was not the merit of the O.B. Command. Some young men, members of the "Stormjaers", had stolen £12,000 (240,000 Mark) from a mine near Johannesburg and had decided that we should get about £1,000 of it for our work. The people who had to decide about it; were one Rockebrandt and one Bareney Basson. In fact we only received £200, and later a second hand car.

After rebuilding the transmitters and questioning how to get in touch with Lourenco Marques, a certain Sittig (Felix), made his appearance in Pretoria (AOB: it was Sittig whom realised later a constant communication directly Germany) at Dr. van Rensburg's. He called himself also Meier, I knew him from former years. He escaped from Leeuwkop shortly before I did, had spent, a year in Cape Town where my sister Wilhelmine Ramage had cared for him, and then he escaped to Lourenco Marques when he nearly was caught again at the border and interned again. He then escaped once more from Baviaanspoort. He brought a (German) code with which we now could try to send to Lourenco Marques, and in fact we soon succeeded. All transmissions except one came through faultlessly during the months up to my resignation. In spite of these successes we still did not get a chance to build up a signaller group. Apparently it was much more important for Dr. van Rensburg to safeguard the peace within the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) and to arrange prayer meetings instead of giving us the possibility of an efficient news service. (AOB: we should not forget - that van Rensburg facilitated the later successful secret transmission towards Germany! And also had to stand the many nuisances of searching his premises rather often; without catching a transmitter and its operator) As we were not allowed to work in Cape Town communication of news remained scanty and incomplete. It should not be overlooked that I (Rooseboom) still was wanted by the Police and therefore could not do anything on my own will. Just before we started transmissions to Lourenco Marques we got news of the imminent, attack on Madagascar. Several times we wirelessed a general "SOS" as a warning for Madagascar, we also sent two persons with the message to Lourenco Marques. One of these persons, Rockebrandt, was gaught in Lourenco Marques and extradited to the Union. However, he had fulfilled his mission. Nevertheless nothing has been sent on from Lourenco Marques apparently, as we learned later that for instance the German boat "Wogenfels" in Diego Suarez had been in radio communication with Germany but had not heard anything until the British were there (AOB: the latter became actually caught due to fears resistance on the Island inland) (AOB: Werz did not trusted the message; but another important fact counted: The Germans were not entitled to pass on strategic information on their diplomatic communication, via the Portuguese communication lines). The other one, an Afrikaner whose name I have forgotten, took a small, specially built transmitter along which he delivered to the Consulate at Lourenco Marques. The one sided transmissions were, as can be understood rather unsatisfactory as one never knows if the other side is listening in. Therefore we asked Lourenco Marques to give us every time the short receiving signal with this transmitter but they never did it. (AOB: The Germans weren't entitled to transmit themselves!) (AOB: similarly occurred in Sweden and Switzerland, there the Germans had to rely upon telephone lines, albeit telex (teletype) could be operated) Apparently the gentlemen in the neutral Portuguese East Africa with quite a number of refugees kept by the Reich, were not able to do only a fraction of what we did in enemy country.

For the code brought by Sittig a book had to be used which I got hold of thanks to my personal connection. (AOB: a book title is not sufficient, one necessitate an exact equal book copy. Some in South Africa used the Bible as a code book, here also mattered that both copies must be exactly equal) After making the above mentioned report I gave this book to Sittig according to his wish, and from now on he translated all reports into code. This arrangement had the advantage that all the reports which arrived in the last minute at the farm of Dr. Rensburg could still be sent on as Sittig was living on the farm of Dr. van Rensburg, could still be sent on as Sittig was living on the farm near Pretoria whereas the wireless group and the transmitter were in Johannesburg, The other advantage was the possibility for Dr. van Rensburg to control all reports. When transmissions to Lourenco Marques began he made it a condition that no news about ships in which South Africans were serving. should be transmitted. I protested repeatedly against this condition, had however, to give in in order to be able to transmit at all. IT should not be forgotten that all my collaborators were Afrikaners who as member of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) had submitted to the orders of Dr. van Rensburg. Outside the Internment Camps there were no germans who could give the necessary assistance. No person outside all of this can imagine what an amount of work had to be done for my personal safety alone.

After about two months of collaboration I noticed a gradual change in Sittig's attitude towards me. He asserted that through a channel unknown to men news had come from Lourenco Marques that my first transmission with the warning about Madagascar - arranged by Sittig and me - had been full of mistakes. Ostensibly Lourenco Marques demanded that Sittig alone should be responsible for arranging the code. It may be that in our hurry with the first transmission →

some mistakes have been made, but upon my request Sittig checked some of the code-words and found them alright. (AOB: when this is true Sittig made an essential breach: storing foregoing messages. When these were found during a police raid, this is pure evidence!) Perhaps Lourenco Marques had another addition of the (code) book. By the way, in at least four instances we noticed mistakes also in reports sent by Sittig. When my collaborator Pierre de Villiers procured a second code-book, Sittig insisted that it should be handed over to him because "he was made responsible for the safety of the code-books by Dr. Wertz". That was quite a divergence from his original explanation that he came only to hand over the code. It became more and more clear that Sittig made use of the feeling against me in the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) and that he wanted to ?it pretty in order to claim one day "All this has been accomplished by me". Therefore I made an except of all important sentences of the code-book in short-hand (stenography) which only I could read (Rooseboom's profession was short-hand), before handing over the second copy to Sittig. I did this with the express remark that I could demand this book back every time. This was flatly refused later on.

16. Te report which had been translated into code by Sittig, were transmitted by my group in Johannesburg, About a week after handing over the second book my collaborators gave me the the copy of a report which had been transmitted on Saturday last. They had reasons to be doubtful about its contents and indeed the decoding with the help of my excerpt proved that Sittig made use of my code-book and of the wireless service organised by me, in order to run me down in Lourenco Marques (Werz office at the Consulate was the handling service). And we had to risk our lives (as did Sittig, and likely van Rensburg as well!) for the transmission of such mean slander. As Dr. van Rensburg was absent I was forced to inform Lourenco Marques in my next report that that Sittig's assertion that his reports about me had been made with the comivence?? of Dr. van Rensburg was wrong and that they should await further news. (AOB: this was typically a 'looser's' behaviour. As Dr. Werz and the German Foreign Office, in charge of the entire endeavour, considered Rooseboom as not relevant) Before Dr. van Rensburg's Aide-dé-camp, the already mentioned Anderson, at once declared that he had to remove me temporarily from my position until Dr. van Rensburg's decision had been made. Although the apparent order from Lourenco Marques nothing to do with the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag), I did not want to interrupt the transmission of news and therefore agreed under the condition (AOB: there should be two side agreeing, apparently only Rooseboom's wishful thinking was considered) that my best collaborator Pierre de Vielliers, should retain full control of the apparatus. Without me having a chance to a conversation, Sittig (AOB: German versus Rooseboom's S.A. citizenship) was put in my place. The one opportunity given to me by van Rensburg had made made me up his mind long ago before he returned to Johannesburg or Pretoria. As always he chose the simplest way out and used the pretext of an "order" by L.M. (Lourenco Marques; thus Werz's order) in order to refuse to give me an interview. (AOB: quite many decisions originated directly from the German Foreign Office; Auswärtiges Amt) I then tried to apply for an investigation by the "Great Council", the highest authority within the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) but it was in vain. The letters and other documents are kept by Miss H. Costzee of 46 Surbitonlaan, Auckland Park, Johannesburg.

17. In my letter to the "Great Council" of the O.B. the accusation of treachery is mentioned. This applied to the following incidents: a Hollander named Elfrink (KV 2/202; PF 65880), usually called Mr. X in O.B. (Ossewa-Barndwag) circles, asserted to have been appointed an agent by Germany. Soon after I started working with the O.B. Dr. van Rensburg asked me to inquire in Lourenco Marques if Elfering (Elfrink) was all right. The original of the reply which I received out of the prison by Otto Schroeder is in Miss Coetsee's possession. (AOB: Everybody possessing dangerous materials from a directly past period is acting - laymen/amateur like - in respect to the secrecy where they were dealing with!) IN spite of this unfavourable reply, read to Dr. van Rensburg in the presence of Capt. Bonhoffm AKG J.A. Smith went to Elferig (Elferink) to inquire from him about me. (AOB: from other van Rensburg's document series - it is well known, that 'killing Rooseboom was considered seriously. And for a long'-time I (AOB) lived with the impression, that they really did kill Rooseboom) Witness for this fact would be AKG Jerling. Here was the foot of sabotage and intrigues against which I was struggling in vain. Of course, when over he asked Elfering (Elferink) was told that nothing was known about me at all. Dr. van Rensburg who knew all this, had never the decency to take action against all this.

18. My collaborators saw themselves in a very difficult position. They all were officers under oath of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag). That nevertheless two of my most important collaborators decided in my favour, is the best proof for the justness of my attitude and also a splendid proof of my comrades' character. They were Pierre Vielliers of 88 Laan Melville, and J.G. Strydom of Harmonie Tweede Laan. Victoria Park. The rest of my collaborators resigned after having tried in vain to urge an enquiry.

After my separation from the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) I had to find private financial help for my work, then our small group built another big transmitter under incredible difficulties, in order to transmit to Germany. (AOB: how, as he was highly suspected on the German side. It isn't simply transmitting at a random frequency with a random code and then expecting that the Germans will reply? It is a matter of tight coordination on both ends. Mr. Rooseboom apparently had no idea how matters actually did commence.) In this respect one W.H. Wild helped us in overcoming difficulties which seemed to be insurmountable. O? the 16th December, 1942, the nearly finished apparatus was stolen out of the car of our group. In spite of this severe blow we started again from scratch and now after 6 months time a new transmitter was ready. It is hardly imaginable what those 6 months have cost us us in work and worries Apart from the persecution by the Government and now also by the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) the fiancé question the finance question because more and more difficult; parts for the apparatus were not available for money, traffic-control was more severe from month to month, supporters became more and more timid and the numbers of hide-outs reduced. These are only a few of the difficulties we had to fight daily. We were lucky to meet some German Officers who had escaped in March and who promised us help after investigating our position.

(AOB: ridiculous! These men hiding themselves, without means of contact with Germany, should be of any benefit to Mr. Rooseboom?) The first one, Walter Kraizizek (AOB: was not a German officer, and this individual, clearly on van Rensburg's side arrived in Lourenco Marques, and became engaged in some News business somewhere in the Portuguese East Africa, and he returned with almost all from the Legation in Lourenco Marques about October 1944 by special free conduct via Gibraltar to Lisbon. (KV 2/2638 - KV 2/2639: PF 66174) Kraizizek lived for some time at van Rensburg's farm. In Kraizizek's file series there is an interesting story on his time at the farm and Sittig. But also the considerations about killing Mr. Rooseboom!)

A week ago he succeeded in crossing the border. His comrade Masser (KV 2/942 - KV 2/944; PF 106140 he might even have been 'shrapnel') also appeared in the meantime and will help us here for the time being, afterwards he also will try to get away to Germany. ( https://www.cdvandt.org/KV-2-2639-Kraizizek%20OB-SA-modi.pdf )

20. In the case of Kraizizek - Masser, Dr. van Rensburg showed himself at his worst. These two comrades had to meet necessarily before Kraizizek's departure departure. However, they were kept separated by the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) command with all kine? of pretence. The irresponsible and - from the German point of view -treacherous attitude of Dr. van Rensburg was proved (AOB: ? is this a proof ?) in his attempt to frustrate communications between me and Germany. He asked Kraizizek to give me the impression as if he would take along the suggestion for opening radio-communication. (AOB: radio communication went on in the meantime regularly between Sittig and Germany!) In fact, however, he should give them to Dr. van Rensburg. As K. as a German officer (AOB: what he de facto was not, as Kraizizek was dismissed from 'Hitler's Leibstandarte' about 1934) as a German officer was not inclined to be used to such treacherous action, he gave Dr. van Rensburg, after having informed men a forged message and the right one to Lourenco Marques.

21. Recently I received two warnings from circles near Dr. van Rensburg that danger is threatening me from the part of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) Soon afterwards I received a confidential message from Police circles that a new search for me had begun. It seems to be evident that the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) command probably anonymously had put the Police on my trail.

22. In conclusion I want to point that I am not carrying on purely out ambition. But I have to fulfil my duty unless the authorities in question in Berlin are relieving me of my duties. If such an order by the O.K.W. should arrive, I am prepared to resign from my task and to hand over the apparatus etc. to somebody else. (AOB: in my perception - an mentally ill person)

23. If my source of information which were usually based on personal relations, would also be at disposal, seems to be doubtful.

Rooseboom document, copies of which have been despatched to you by air mail mentioning the following characters. (AOB: this actually is breaching South African law (authority))

1. Mrs Bettie Zweistra (neè Najekom) Capetown, described as one of Rooseboom sources.

4. Jerling, assistant Commandant General (OB) (Ossewa-Brandwag) Transvaal, generally assisted Rooseboom in organising transmitter.

5. J.A. Smith, assistant Commandant General Cape Province and Anderson who intrigued against Rooseboom.

8. Shrapnel (Sittig likely) and Rooseboom's sister Wilhelmine Ramage of Capetown with whom Shrapnel lived for a year after his escape before his departure to Lourenco Marques. (AOB: but Sittig returned to South African territory, and lived for a while up and around van Rensburg's farm where he operated the transmitter communicating with Germany directly, albeit that the reply might have been conveyed via : Die Heimat Grüsst broadcasts)

9. Rockbrandt who took warning of pending Madagascar campaign to Lourenco Marques.

10. Miss H. Coetzee of Johannesburg, Rooseboom's fiancé, who now works as a telephone supervisor in General Post Office (group corrupt) (AOB, not correctly being received and therefore could not be decoded) and Rooseboom lives on a farm owned by her.

11. Elfering (Elferink) (Dutch), obviously Empress??. known in O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) circles as Mr. X.

12. Pierre Villiers described by Rooseboom as one of the most important collaborators who now works in Wild's shop.

14. Wild who assisted Rooseboom in construction of transmitters after Rooseboom's break with O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag).

15. Walter Kraizizek offered (? to forward?) wavelength details Lourenco Marques.

. . . I was later introduced to Dr. van Rensburg by Mr. Barney Basson, a Staff Major of the Secret Service of the Stormjaer section of the Ossewa Brandwag. Dr. van Rensburg explained explained to me his plans for organising a rising by the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) against the Government of the Union of South Africa, but he told me that his organisation did not possess sufficient arms for the purpose. . . .

I contacted Dr. Werz who was in change of the direction of subversive movement in South Africa and little later he told me that he was able to carry out Dr. van Rensburg's plan for smuggling arms from Germany to the Ossewa Brandwag. Minute

18.3.44. Copy of letter to S.I.S. (London) re the following development in the Felix case. 55a

AOB: This is again a very strong indication, that S.I.S. did breach the diplomatic custom in dealing with an illegal document, which were definitely important to the South African Government.

17.3.44 From Major Ryde (M.I.5.) Pretoria, Telegram mentioning Rensburg (again a clear diplomatic breach)

The next pages refer to minute 53a as well as does page 44 concerning minute 51a.

and all concerning a diplomatic breach versus the Union of South Africa.

The British operations did not entirely concerned German involvements, which were minimal - but also inflicted with internal affairs inside the Union of South Africa!

They certainly were aware that this could engender diplomatic controversies between Britain and the authority of the Union of South Africa.

Is this an apparent lack of supervision on behalf of the the British Foreign Office, or of the Dominion affairs, as usually?

Anthony Blunt (AOB: also a member of the Communist spies spy ring as the Cambridge Five) has probably told you the story of Ryde's 'ploughman'. Ryde in reply to our telegram giving him the gist of BJ (Blue Jacket) 126671 of December 30th (1943?) states that the last paragraph of the BJ is the explanation for the para 2 of his telegram to our conference P.3/44 of January the (the ploughman story.)

Ryde continues "it seems clear that Wild has been planted on us by van Rensburg , Paasche and Sittig to find out what we know. This situation has obvious possibilities and I have asked for M.I.5's consent to accept Wild's approach. If this is approved can you and M.I.5. indicate any particular lines on which you would like me to work.

Ryde's telegram P.3/44 was discussed and it was agreed that Ryde should let Wild have his say and report to us when the position could again be discussed.

(2) Jan: 3rd bearing obtained from position 24 degrees 38 East, 27 degrees 24 South gave 26 degrees. Owing to (group corrupt) period of transmission only one check obtained.

(3) Jan: 7th learning obtained from position 24 59 East, 27 degrees 03 minutes 40 degrees South gave 253 degrees. Owing to long transmission 3 separate checks obtained on this bearing which is first class.

(4) Signals described by operator as loudspeaker strength on earphones. (AOB: We are apparently looking at HD/DF bearings on Sittig's transmissions; as this story of the loud reception of a signal; though this did not imply that they caught Sittig!) (https://www.cdvandt.org/KV-2-2639-Kraizizek%20OB-SA-modi.pdf)

(5) Reference my telegram P.134/43 of December 31st. Vacuum (van Rensburg) is Francis May (group corrupt) district.

(6) A fishing boat with European went out about January 6th anchored 2 miles out and returned later. Some boat out again January 7th.

(7) U. Boat picked up by Y considerable distance South of Cape. (The British expected regularly U-boat droppings, but I AOB have no knowledge about any of such endeavours)

(8) As 2 members of MU party are wanted urgently for finish party at Francis Bay they returned today and I have had had them flown to Port Elizabeth.

November 14th Addressed Lourenco Marques. 926 (telegram serial number?) repeated Pretoria 44, Your telegrams nos 303/307 repeated Pretoria 75 of November 2nd, and Pretoria's telegram no. 28 addressed Lourenco Marques 38 of November 4th. Following are our comments to which Z.B. (M.I.5/London) agrees:-

F. Sub para (3). According to W.W. distrust among O.B. due to Vacuum's (van Rensburg) dealing with Leybrandt. No evidence Stooge allegation.

2) Details of his associations with Shrapnel (Sittig), Pedant (Paasche) and Vacuum (van Rensburg).

I took Captain Courtenay Young with me to Camp 020 yesterday, where we discussed this case at length with Colonel Steffens, Major Short and Captain brown being present. This discussion was general, but was concerned to a great extent with the methods by which the Most secret Sources of our information against Elferink could be concealed from him in interrogation. It was thought that a useful cover might be the suggestion that van Rensburg had betrayed Leibrandt. Captain Young will produce a short note on van Rensburg and Leibrandt. (AOB: might this indicate that this not really was the case?)

Doctor J.F.J. van Rensburg, a distinguished Afrikaner lawyer, ex-Secretary for Justice and former Administrator of the Orange Free State, became Head of the Ossewa Brandwag in January 1941.

The Ossewa Brandwag (the sentinel of the Ox Wagon) was originally a cultural movement, but it developed rapidly along Nationalist lines and by the time of the outbreak of war it had become a militantly nationalist organisation run on para-military lines with the various leaders being given the appropriate military titles. Thus van Rensburg became "Commandant-General".

Field Marshal Smuts described Doctor van Rensburg as being a political fanatic, though not of a criminal type. He added that he thought it perfectly possible that van Rensburg would pass information to the Germans if he thought it suited his political book. (Field Marshal Smuts did not apparently consider that such action was criminal.)

Within the Ossewa Brandwag there is a circle of persons pledged to militant action against the Union Government known as the Sturmjaer. Van Rensburg has said publicly that in order to prevent this inner circle committing acts of open revolt, he himself became their nominal Head in order to get the leadership in to responsible hands.

An escaped internee who was associated with Sittig and Paasche, stated that he understood that the militant section of the Ossewa Brandwag distrusted van Rensburg and regarded him as being "Smuts' stooge", and that the control of the Stormjaer was in the hands of a certain Ossewa Brandwag "Colonel" du Plessis.

Information has also been received, though this may not be particularly reliable as, though it comes from a person who knows South Africa, yet I suspect its origin is in gossip, to the effect that Smuts was in contact van seriously endanger the position of the Union Government. I do not believe this to be true, but as this is gossip, it is quite possible that it may have come to the ears of Elfrink and may sow the seeds of doubt in this mind as to van Rensburg's whole-hearted adherence to the Axis (Germany - Italy and Japan) cause.

KV 2/907-3, page 9a (minute 32a) Masser file series are: KV 2/942 ... KV 2/944: PF 106140.

According to our representative Masser gave a good deal of fruitful information but the following is believed to be true.

1. Paasche greatly mistrusts Werz who, he believes, is working against him for personal spite because: ?

2. When left Portuguese East Africa in July 1941 he did so against Werz's orders and it was only after he had been working for the O.B. (South African Ossewa-Brandwag) for some time that his uberfulness??

3. Masser complained that Werz was so dombe?? (AOB: Dr. Werz possessed an academic Doctor degree, by the way) he had not been able to understand a very simple newspaper advertisements code which Paasche had composed (copy attached).

4. Masser received no instructions to return but merely informed Werz that he was doing so. The trip Werz took on May 23rd was to interrupt Masser and send him back to the (S.A.) Union. (AOB: in this context it is worth considering Werz interrogation about the instructions he did receive from the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) in Berlin. What Werz considered himself, is one aspect, but 'his masters in Berlin' constituted the real state of affairs'! (T2162 T2162return)

(Note: Werz P.W.J. Mueller and Mrs. ??? passed the police post outside Lourenco Marques is Mrs. P's car at 5 a.m. on Sunday May 23rd going in the direction of Catuane? on the Natal border. No more was heard of them until their car was challenged close to the border by a soldier but this challenge was ignored. They returned to Lourenco Marques on May 25th).

5. The money and revolver found on Masser by the Police when he last entered Portuguese territory were given to him by van Rensburg.

6. Masser intends to return to the (S.A.) Union in about three weeks time to work for the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) but not for Werz.

7. Masser thinks the document planted on him which contained instructions for sabotage of Lourenco Marques harbour installations was there by Werz.

8. Masser has an intense loathing (hatred) for Werz whom he again accused of trying to ruin all the work he had done for the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag).

9. Sittig (KV 2/939; PF 66173) originally escaped from Baviaanspoort camp together with Masser, and after wandering about the (S.A.) Union for some months, eventually settled down to live on a farm in Nothern Transvaal with an English woman, whose husband was an Army Captain then stationed in Egypt. When this woman became pregnant, Sittig left hurriedly and joined the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) who found him a job on another farm in Natal where he stayed for some months and then went to Lourenco Marques. Here he became very friendly with both Mr. Pechnier and with Nils Olaf Paasche with the result that Paasche became jealous of Mrs. Pechnier and threatened Sittig.

10. Sittig was frightened and asked Werz to send him back to the (S.A.) Union where he was arrested and re-interned, but escaped shortly afterwards with the help of the camp guards.

11. He then worked for the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) and ran a W/T transmitter for them.

12. Paasche fostered suspicion of ?? him amongst the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) who about five months ago imprisoned him in the cellar of a farm near Pieter-Maritzburg where according to Masser, he still is.

13. His whereabouts are known to Colonel Coetzer? and many of his police, and Masser was not allowed to see Sittig nor to know of, his whereabouts. (Colonel Coetzer? is working hand in glove with the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag).

14. Baston is considered to be the O.B.'s (Ossewa-Brandwag's) biggest asso? because "he is such a bloody fool".

15. van Rensburg is now considered suspect by the real leaders of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) some of whom think he is the Prime Minister's 'stooge' (foil).

16. The leaders of the 'Violent action' branch (of Stormjaers?) of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) is du Plessis who is described as a military type with small military moustache.

17. N.O. Paasche is responsible for working a clandestine W/T transmitter which is the O.B.'s (Ossewa-Brandwag's) link with Berlin. Paasche is now→

living near Pretoria but not in the city itself. The last time? Masser met Paasche was about three months ago at the Central Hotel H'Barante?? (If we had only known!)

18. A doctor Pfriffer?, who owns a garage in Johannesburg used to give accommodation clothing and transport on behalf of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) to escaped interness and other fugitives from justice the password being "Doctor Pfriffer?" H.H."

Many people whom he helped were afterwards caught (e.g. Mrs. Hennig? and Pfriffer? was accused of double crossing and condemned to death by du Plessis.

19. 50% of the burgheries? committed by soldiers in the Union are really the work of du Plessis's men wearing stolen uniforms.

20. The man (name unknown to Masser) who shot the crown witness in the Leibrandt case, Terbolt, did so on du Plessis's orders. He was arrested three days later when he was caught doing a burglary on line described in para 19 and is still in prison on this count doing hard labour.

21. The papers which were found on Masser when he entered Portuguese East Africa recently (see your letter PF 106140/B.1.b/CTY of October 7th) were from Malan and were given to Masser by du Plessis.

22. It was originally intended that papers should be brought by Dr. Pin Wessels. Wessels is a veterinary surgeon from Weetner?, Orange Free State (Oranje Vrijstaat), who arrived in Lourenco Marques on September 3rd. He has been openly making O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) propaganda and associating with Jericho, the Secretary of the German Consulate. (Ryde was asked for information about Wessels by Lourenco Marques but so far I have seen no reply).

23. Kraizizek (KV 2/2638 - KV 2/2639; PF 66174) was sent to Lourenco Marques by van Rensburg to get rid of him because he was indiscreet and knew too much.

24. When Masser left Lourenco Marques clandestinely on board the s.s. Lourenco Marques in July 1941 he was helped by Lucas, one of Werz's contacts in the Portuguese Police, but without Werz's knowledge.

25. Kraizizek was given permission on November 2nd (1943?) to live at NaHaacha? where he is staying with Mrs. Koch.

(Mrs. Koch is an ex-Union national married to a German Theodor Paul Koch. Her farm is reported to be used by Germans entering clandestinely into the (S.A.) Union.)

26. Masser also reported that de Lioio and di Bora pretended to turn over to Badoglio (AOB: The Italian General turning the Italian Government/Army on to the Allied side in Autumn 1943!)

but are really staying to work for Werz, this is partly confirmed by a Portuguese official who stated, that German brought diplomatic pressure to bear in Lisbon to keep these two in Lourenco Marques.

Our represenative points out that he cannot judge the reliability of this information as most of the facts relate to events in the (S.A.) Union and is waiting for Ryde's comments. Meanwhile a comparison can be made with information already in our possession.

Para 2 and 8: We have nothing to confirm that Mueller did not get on well with Werz, and there is possibly that this may be a plant on the part of Werz, to trap our source. Another point worth noting is the para 24, where Masser stated that he left in July 1941 without Werz's knowledge - according to the B.J. (Blue Jacket) he left with Werz's permission (Even if "the business Friend" is Mueller or Lau?ahn. Werz have known about it); although he carried no instructions from Werz.

Para 2a: This of course is not news, and after the police raids on the farm in March it must become knowledge in Lourenco Marques.

Para 3: The code referred to was among the papers taken off Kraizizek, which included Masser's code, and his instructions for linking his W/T transmitter with Lourenco Marques and Berlin.

Para 4: It is known that a messenger was to be sent to Werz on or about 23rd but it was not known that he was to be Masser.

Para 6. No confirmation of this, it is more than likely that he will try and go back to the (S.A.) Union since he had never remained in one place for any length of time. But that he will work for the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) and not for Werz is not confirmed.

Para 9: According to the information in the South African police records, Sittig escaped with Paasche from Leeuwkop, and not with Masser.

According to Masser, it would appear that Sittig first met Nils Olav Paasche in Lourenco Marques whereas according to the police records he was in the same interment camp with him.

Para 10: This would appear to be correct, according to the police records he was arrested on January 13th and escaped again on April 7th.

Para 11: This is correct, and it is probably Not a piece of information which Werz would wish Masser to pass on to us.

Para 12: This is the strangest piece of news in the whole report and it is difficult to find any likely confirmation of it in B.J.'s (Blue Jacket = AOB: a particularly kept confidential blue coloured folder, and which only could be accessed by especially authorised Crown Servants) other than the repeated statements by Sittig and Paasche that they could prefer to be independent of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) but had not the necessary funds. Again the extraordinary lack of genuine intelligence reports sent by Sittig and the continual stream of messages dealing almost exclusively with the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) were now in complete control of the transmitter. (AOB: mainly situated at of about van Rensburg's farm)

Para 13: This is confirmed by our former representative and by (Major) Ryde (M.I.5) who was at the meeting in Pretoria in March 1943 at the time of the (unsuccessful) police raid.

Para 15: Compare this information with that obscure passage in BJ (Blue Jacket) 114875 message 28 of January 8th (1943?).

This statement that van Rensburg is the P.M. (S.A. Prime Minister) 'stoog' would fit in with Rooseboom's views (AOB: what Rooseboom's view were was only known about after June 1943). It is a good reason for not wishing to implicate van Rensburg in our case, and to continue concentrating on the two Germans. Ryde's comments on this will be interesting.

Para 17: The same comment as for para 11 with regard ?? the transmitter. The meeting at N'Babane seems rather incredible - it is a small place and Major Fenn could be able to check ??

Para 18: No information on this man. It looks as though he is suffering the same fate as Lefton's stooge in the Durban Saboteur's Case.

Para 21: Among the papers found on Kraizizek there was a key (AOB: this may imply the British representative in Lourenco Marques might have possessed some friend with the country of local police organisation) there was a key to Masser's code which Malan's name appeared.

Para 25: Rather a dangerous thing to do I should have thought, to send a man to neutral territory when he has every opportunity of contacting the enemy because he knows too much about one's own organisation, why not lock him up with Sittig?

Para 24? Escoroio? was used by the former Union Consul General and by Werz's but on balance Werz obtained better service: Sc?allan? was warned through Forsyth? and Esco?oio? now holds a less important position.

Para 25: Major Penn was informed of Mrs. Koch's farm, but I think it would be advisable that he keeps a sharp look out for Kraizizek who since he "knows too much" would give some useful information if properly interrogated (legally?).

1. Hyde does not think Werz would utilise the information about Sittig and Paasche's transmitters which have implicated van Rensburg just to trap our source.

2. Ryde confirms Goetzee's activities, and has heard that he may be relative of van ?? Merwe?

3. Ryde also referred to Goetzee's attempt to find out the source of our information.

4. du Plessis is head of the Broeder Bond, and Ryde considers that it is quite possible that Sittig is in their hands.

5. Hyde thinks that van Rensburg is not the P.M. stooge but that his O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) movement may be a cover for the Broeder Bond activities.

We could have a further talk about the report when we have studied the B.J. (Blue Jacket folder) again.

My dear Cowgill, (AOB: Lt.-Colonel J.F. Cowgill head of counter espionage S.I.S. (M.I.6))

As arranged Mr. Duff Cooper, accompanied by the Director General and Captain Courtenay Young, saw Field Marshal Smuts (AOB: P.M. of the S.A. Union) this morning.

Mr. Duff Cooper explained the stage that the enquiry had reached and the decision that had to be made in regard to the taking action, possibly, in view of the negligible amount of actual harm caused, the political excitement aroused might make the game scarcely worth the candle.

The Field Marshal then read the summary we brought, (a copy of which is enclosed, which is, as you will see, an amalgamation of the original memorandum, the addendum and the information received from Masser last night) and said that he did not believe that van Rensburg, though a fanatical nationalist, would stop to any actual crimes, though he would not stop short at giving information to the Germans if he thought it would advance his political ends. He thought there was a possibility that Sittig and Paasche might represent to their employers that their connection with van Rensburg and the Ossewa-Brandwag was closer than it actually was in order to enhance their own importance, to their own greater financial profit (AOB: I, myself, do not believe that financial motives did play any rôle, but, essentially - ideological, in respect to the aftermath motives after the lost Boer-Wars versus Britain; of about half a century before) He felt it would be advisable to wait and see what could be got out of Empress, whose revelations might enable us to get a truer picture of the whole situation. He considered that the attempts to incite (provoke) a rebellion, which at the time had to be regarded seriously, and been firmly dealt with, have definitely failed and were now further off from success than ever. He would not be afraid, because of any political repercussions, to order arrests if ever the time came of the highest intelligence, was thoroughly loyal and true as steel, though it was possible that the sympathies of some underlings might lean to a different quarter.

It was agreed that we (M.I.6 and M.I.5) we should arrange to keep the Field Marshal in touch with the results of Empress' (= Dr. Lambertus Elferink, KV 2/202; PF 65880; Dutch) interrogation (AOB: held at Camp 020, in England) as he will here (England) for the rest of the month.

1. Smuts seen this morning and given summary of (selected) information regarding Shrapnel (Sittig) - Pedant (Paasche), but not, repeat not, given the allegations regarding Goetzee. Director General (= AOB: Head M.I.6; known as 'C' Sir Stewart Menzies) considers und?sable? to bring this aspect of the case before Smuts at the moment.

2. Empress (Elferink) arrives tomorrow and it was decided that it would be best for no, repeat no, action to be taken till all information extracted from him.

3. Smuts will be seen again when interrogation of Empress (Dutch Mr. Elferink) completed and all of us will then be able to decide best course of action.

4. For your personal information Smuts stated no objection to ultimate police action against shrapnel-Pedant (Sittig - Paasche) from political point of view, even if denunciation and confessions involve Vacuum (van Rensburg).

AOB: please bear always in mind: that in the KV 2/xxxx serials a curiosity occurs: with increasing PDF page numbers - you are going backwards in time! The only exception are the successive order of the minute sheets, as these follow a logical sequence)

A report on German espionage in the Union has already been submitted by the M.I.6 representative in Pretoria, who has added further details from time to time. The case now developed to a stage where it becomes necessary to consider what action should be taken.

1) The principal agents are Lothar Sittig and Nils Paasche, whose precise whereabouts are unknown, but we are in close contact with Ossewa Brandwag in general, and Doctor van Rensburg in particular.

2) One transmitter believed to be operated by Paasche, is working and is probably situated on one of the farms by K. Wilz in the Union near the Bechuanaland border.

3) Sittig is considering using a new set, which is known to be somewhere on the property of Walter Hubert Wild at Bothasfontein Farm. near Half-way House between Pretoria and Johannesburg.

4) Information has just been received which is not of the same degree of reliability as the above, to the effect that Sittig has been under arrest by Ossewa Brandwag for five months owing to intrigues against him by Paasche, and is confined in a cellar near Pietermaritzburg.

5) Information from some source states that Paasche is living in the environs of Pretoria, but not in the town itself. These last two items do not necessarily clash with the information we received from Most Secret Sources. It is perfectly possible that the Ossewa Brandwag have kept the German ignorance of their action against Sittig while continuing to use his name.

6) (I) Sittig has been given instructions for the manufacture of homemade sabotage equipment.

(II) He has asked how he could sabotage high grade steel; how he could treat bales to make them ignite after delay, and what explosives should be put in cases of fruit to make them blow up on board ship.

(III) He has also asked for railway sabotage information and stated that contamination of oil depots was already being done.

7) The Germans have a scheme on foot for sending wireless and sabotage equipment to Sittig and his organisation by submarine (AOB: apparently the British had a obsession about submarines send for South Africa. Which endeavour would have been ridiculous - sending a submarine 10.000 miles to drop some explosives or some persons; whereas the submarine did not possess a real chance to return to, say, France safely again), and for taking back on the return journey a person who would be the Ossewa Brandwag representative in Berlin.

8) With regard to 6(I) a warning has been passed to our M.I.6's joint representative in Pretoria. It is thought by our sabotage experts that the schemes outlined in 6(II) and (III) have a rather unreal flavour and display a certain ambitious amateurishness, though until we get further details the menace must be taken seriously.

If the sabotage equipment mentioned in 7 is landed, this may assist Sittig's sabotage plans.

9) Johan Lambertus Elferink, another German (actually a Dutch) agent of longer standing then Sittig, is on his way to this country and will be arrested and interrogated on arrival.

10) Jaques Henri Rooseboom, alias Hans Rooseboom, a dormant German (South African) on bad terms with Sittig (and van Rensburg), but a friend of Wild's is also still at large.

It is suggested that no action should be taken until Elferink (KV 2/202) has been intensively interrogated, as his information may give us pointers as the the exact whereabouts of Sittig and Paasche. If this line is unproductive, it might be possible by local enquiries, to identify the farm in which Sittig is imprisoned and the location of Paasche himself, though this will necessitate the cooperation of a large number of police and increase the possibility of leakage, and the compromising of our informant.

as well as possible drastic action by the Ossewa Brandwag against Sittig and Paasche.

An alternative scheme would, if successful, lead to the capture of the clandestine transmitters (plenty of wishful thoughts), but might gave Sittig and Paasche at large. This would involve:-

It is possible that the results of (a) might lead to the discovery of the whereabouts of Paasche and Sittig and Rooseboom through the interrogation of these arrested; (c) might lead to the capture of Sittig and Paasche if they attempted to escape from the Union when they learned of the police action.

(1) Confessions by Wild, Wilz (and Sittig and Paasche if they are found) may implicate Doctor van Rensburg and the Ossewa Brandwag, and may lead to political complications.

(2) It must be remembered that most of the information passed by those German agents is of low quality, though occasionally they have obtained information of value to the enemy.

It is possible that more information may be obtained from our informant which will enable us to evaluate it more exactly, and it may also be possible to check it with Elferink. If it is valueless, then we are left only with the mass raid.

If the above is agreed, it is suggested that Brigadier Baston should be instructed to work out details with Major Ryde in Pretoria, who is jointly M.I.5 and M.I.6's representative.

Until the time comes for action, it would obviously be undesirable to inform the police in general of the proposals for fear of international or unintentional leakage.

From information which has become available since the last report was issued, it is clear that Sittig first started to transmit messages from the Union to Portuguese East A in May 1942 with equipment provided by van Rensburg. Since that date the Germans have made constant efforts to introduce a second more powerful transmitter in the (S.A.) Union. in order to make and maintain direct contact with Berlin; this they succeeded in doing at the beginning of June by means of a new and more powerful transmitter which is believed to be near Pretoria. It seems that while Sittig is mainly occupied with transmitting political and military intelligence, Paasche's functions are more in the nature of a press agency. Trompke's (the Minister in Lourenco Marques) main effort during the period April-July has been concentrated on obtaining reports about the forthcoming election in the (S.A.) Union. Elaborate propaganda plans have been made and there is a project to forge a document for use at time of the elections which will "prove" that General Smuts is the arch-enemy of Allied interest. (AOB: don't forget the Boer-Wars against Imperialistic Britain, some 40 à 50 years ago!) ...

Another important agent has been identified since the last report as a very able Dutch intellectual, aged 32, called Dr. Lambertus Johann Elferink (KV 2/202; PF 65880). Before the war, as a journalist of the staff of the Amsterdam "De Telegraaf", he was an open advocate of the Nazi movement and he is known to have attended political courses in Germany. He left Holland for the (S.A.) Union via Lisbon in 1940 to take up professorship at one of the South African Universities. He is running a correspondence course in Johannesburg. He is a inevitable archaeological tasted of a German agent, although he appears in other respects to be a cut above the average German agent. His salary is certainly much higher. The exact scope of his activities is not known, but his main task appears to have been to act in the past as liaison officer between van Rensburg and Trompke. (AOB: as Trompke was an old style German diplomat, it is likely that Trompke was not actually incorporated - but Werz the actual Consul in Lourenco Marques) although Trompke has from time to time expressed doubts of Elferink's reliability. Berlin does not appear to share Trompke's doubts but has agreed that Elferink and Sittig should work separately and that they should not collaborate.

Note: Section Y (= S.I.S. counter-espionage) rang up to state that they thought that P.W.J. Mueller was "our business friend" and not Trompke or Werz. They based this theory on the fact that in the cover-name given in B.J. (Blue Jacket; a secret folder) 119809 it stated that thanks should be given to "our business friend" for his excellent work, and that this could not be ~~Wertz~~ Werz, already had the cover name of 'X'. The argument does not seem to be entirely watertight as Trompke is given no cover name in the paragraph.

It does seem plausible, however, as "our business friend" is entirely concerned with the reception and transmission of information which would fit in with Mueller's functions as expressed in Little's (AOB: their good friend's cover-name) letter.

It is learned from a most secret and delicate course (AOB: Mr. 'Little' from the foregoing copy, or decrypted intercepts of the communication between Sittig and Germany?) that Sittig considered on 5.7.43 (AOB: this was about the time that Rooseboom broke-off contacts with van Rensburg and Sittig/Paasche. It was considered once that Rooseboom should be liquidated; may this be connected with this episode?) He intrigues against them; they cannot explain his attitude and have to envisage the possibility of treachery; he was already made known Sittig's whereabouts to unauthorised persons. In his many long conversations with van Rensburg he has declared himself ready to take full responsibility for his liquidation at the first sign of treachery. All German officials are urgently advised to out themselves loose from him once and for all.

Until his separation from Sittig Rooseboom was in charge of all wireless sets in the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) and the personnel are still partly under his (Roosebooms's) influence; the reason for bad transmissions is therefore not only untrained operators but also sabotage. They shall continue to work under any circumstances.

Sittig wishes his mother to broadcast (Zeesen transmitter program broadcast: "Die Heimat Grüßt") greetings to him from Germany. If for political reasons it is not advisable to do so under his own name (it was custom to use cover-names which the addressed one will recognise), then under the name of Ludwig Schneider of Munich (München) (AOB: also used were the names of grand-fathers and that like; or using particular nick-names)

It is learnt from a most secret source that on 5.7.43 the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques (AOB: the German Legation communicated, obligatory, by means of the Portuguese telegraph line system, which were intercepted at some point before it reached Lisbon and the German Legation there; coded messages weren't permitted) reported that up to and including November (1942) all transmission from Germany were withheld from Felix (= Sittig) by Rooseboom, apparently on purpose.

The bearer of this report was at first unfavourably influenced by Rooseboom, but the German Consulate have tried to make it clear to him (Rooseboom) the real state of affairs by means of an interview with Felix (Sittig) and a meeting with van Rensburg.

In the grand council Rooseboom lodged an accusation against van Rensburg and several officers of alleged treachery. The accusation was rebutted and the documents are in the hands of Felix (= Sittig). The latter has doubts about Rooseboom's mental state.

(Blue Jacket reference) 119692 (AOB: in my perception - this must originate from S.I.S. London)

It is learnt from most secret source that on 3.7.1943 the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques reported that without the knowledge of Felix (= Sittig) or van Rensburg the messenger brought him a proposal by Masser (KV 2/942 .. KV 2/944: PF 106140), who according to the German Consulate, is a good German though he often acts rashly and without orders, for transmissions to the German Consulate (AOB: thus before, van Rensburg/Sittig deployed their own W/T with Germany directly) in Lourenco Marques and to Germany with sets placed at the disposal by the Germans in the (S.A.) Union. The messenger, apparently, was able to deliver to the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques, reports from Felix sent on Leica film and encoded in Rose and Press, but the German Consulate state that Masser's transmission plan, written in an easily decypherable code, was taken away by the (Portuguese) Police for a short time and obviously photographed.

Masser proposes to start his transmissions to Lourenco Marques on the 12th, July (1943), that as the German Consulate thinks the enemy will doubtless read them, they wish Felix to be instructed to order Masser who is supposed to be in Johannesburg not to transmit as his code is known to the enemy, and to take no action at all until further notice. Felix (= Sittig) is to report to the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques.

It is learnt from most secret source that on 10.9.42 the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques was given instructions to make monthly payments of up to £100 to Hamlet (= Elferink KV 2/202; PF 65880).

On 21.10.42 Hamlet travelled back to the (S.A.) Union with encyphered instructions for Felix (= Sittig) and new songs by Andressen for the Ossewa Brandwag. These were apparently delivered to van Rensburg. Hamlet asserted that it was a fault of circumstances if he had as yet not been able to do more, and the state of affairs inside the Opposition has developed in such a way so far he had very little opportunity of doing anything. He is continuing to cultivate the contacts which have been established and will give news to van Rensburg to be passed on. In order not to arose suspicion he will for the present undertake no further journeys in the Union. He is thinking of going to Portugal in May 1943 under the pretext of finishing some scientific work there. Since payment by instalments is impossible the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques has given him £800 for the period October (1942) - May (1943).

Webster has sent the following information which has asked to be forwarded to you:-

1. Van Rensburg's address is Pyramid Farm Pretoria and it is a few miles from Van der Merwe's home.

2. Van der Merwe's farm belonged to his wife Mrs. R.C.G. Van der Merwe (née de Jager) who bought it from C.T. Hennig on 2nd July 1938.

3. On July 4th 1942 farm was sold to O.S. Bekker (Manager of Die Vaderland) and van Heerden (Chief Editor) and J.J.H. Victor (Secretary).

4. On the same day it was resold to C. Preller employed by advertisement department of "Die Vaderland".

Sittig was interned at Leeuwport internment camp, Transvaal, whence he escaped in 1941 and went to Lourenco Marques (M.I.S. (Africa) No. 24 of August 1942). Later he returned to the (S.A.) where he was re-interned at Baviaanport internment camp, whence he escaped a second time and is still at large.

Webster stated that his address prior to his internment was P.O. Box 83 Vereeniging and Farm Hartebeete-Fontein, near Vaalbank Dam.

Sittig according to S.I.S. (M.I.6) representative speaks English, Afrikaans and Portuguese fluently, has spent at least 15 years in the (S.A.) Union and had also lived in Angola (also Portuguese language speaking). While in Lourenco Marques he spoke of Ossewa Brandwag connections particularly in Potcheesstroom, Bloemfontein, Pretoria and Barbeton. Potchesstroom is the H.Q. of the Ossewa Brandwag movement. He was described as being a genuine enthusiast, energetic, resourceful and clever, fond of music and crank (eccentric) on the subject of diet. His mother is Frau Stoessel Sittig of Muenchenplatz (Münchenplatz) No. 1 Dresden.

It would appear from a telegram from the (S.A.) Union of 18.3.1943 that the police not aware of the fact that Sittig had escaped for a second time until confirmation was obtained from the Baviaansport internment camp by Webster.

The Police Gazette particulars concerning Sittig are on their way here in the High Commissioner's bag.

The first reference to Sittig in most secret sources in message 265 of 4.5.1943 which states that he was sent out from Lourenco Marques. This message also confirmed his escape from the internment camp, and added that he was working with van Rensburg. Message No, 326 of 13.5.1942 gives his name. It would appear at this time that direct Felix (Sittig)/Berlin transmission was being attempted, and also that it was mooted that Lourenco Marques should communicate by W/T with Felix, but that this would have to be limited or renounced altogether as the Portuguese had a D-F-ing van. (Blue Jacket 116117 of 2.5.1942).

S.I.S's information is that Sittig is Werz's only direct contact in the Union and that Doctor Gert van der Merwe is the head of that portion of the Ossewa Brandwag organisation through which Sittig operates on behalf of Werz. This would appear to be borne out the fact that Paasche, when he left Lourenco Marques for the (S.A.) Union, had on him only the name of Sittig, and the name and address of van der Merwe.

It would appear from R.S.S. (Radio Security Service; often volunteer listening stations) evidence that the Berlin/Felix contact only started about July 1942 though with Lourenco Marques before then (Blue Jacket 116117 of 2.5.1942). He had apparently escaped for the second time by 4.5.1942.

Blue Jacket evidence that Sittig is Felix is also borne out by the fact that Sittig has, as has Felix, a mother in Germany; is a great friend of Paasche alias " O", as is Felix (they escaped from internment together), and is connected with the Ossewa Brandwag,

The case of the Felix Organisation differs from the usual cases investigated by this office in that normally the smallest fry are caught and provide pointers towards the principles of the organisation, while in this case we have the names of several of the principles and know little or nothing about the satellites.

Evidence from most secret sources shows quite clearly that the head of the Union organisation Felix, who is now positively identified as being Lothar Sittig. He works in close collaboration with van Rensburg, who obviously acting as a conscious traitor.

Apart from these two figures we also know that Doctor Gert van der Merwe is closely connected with the Organisation. His, and Sittig's names were the only two names given to Paasche when he left Lourenco Marques for the (S.A.) Union. Paasche disappeared close by one one of his farms, and it was near the same farm that the murderer of Lotte, a witness in the Henning case also disappeared. His name never appeared on most secret sources, but the evidence given in short should be enough to link him up with the Organisation.

Nil Olaf Paasche alias "O" is still at large in the (S.A.) Union. Apparently he was lost his disappearance near van der Merwe's farm, and presumably is now in touch with Sittig, whose whereabouts are also unknown.

S.I.S. representative in Lourenco Marques also mentioned a British Indian named J.F. de Mello who may still be in Johannesburg and whom when in Lourneco Marques was in contact with Alois Mueller, a German piano tuner, who arranged communication between Wertz and the (S.A.) Union. The (S.A.) Union Police have established connexion between van der Merwe and Sankie Boshoff, an insurance clerk in Pretoria, who was alleged to collect shipping information from a Police sergant in Durban. This angle is being followed up by the Police.

Apart from these persons, of whom the last two probably of little importance, we know nothing of the other ramifications of the Felix Organisation in the (S.A.) Union itself. Presumably if the Police could be trusted to carry out an honest investigation, many more persons in the Organisation could be identified through van Rensburg, van der Merwe and Paasche were arrested, the Organisation might be broken up as the most important figures would have been eliminated. The arrest of Sittig and Paasche, if they are ever located, would be a comparatively simple matter as they are both German nationals and escaped internees and there would would be no need to produce evidence from most secret sources. Similarly van der Merwe might be arrested on the grounds that Paasche was housed in his neighbourhood of his farm and had on him van der Merwe's name and address (AOB: to a high degree wishful thinking), though this might endanger Muggeridge's (AOB: is he a British agent?) position in respect to his agent in Lourenco Marques. The arresting of van Rensburg on the other hand is not only tied up with the chaotic political situation in the (S.A.) Union (AOB: The (S.A.) P.M. General Smuts is not particularly pro-Britain) but also could at the moment be only justified by reference especially to most secret sources.

Assuming that full confessions were extracted from the above agents in the (S.A.) Union there should be enough evidence which would be represented to the Portuguese authorities to justify demanding the withdrawal of the executor from Trompke (not proven) and Werz. The former is now thought by S.I.S. not to be a sleeping partner as was previously believed, but the active head of espionage activities operated from Lourenco Marques. Their evidence is based on information supplied by an agent, and is borne out to some extent by material from most secret sources in which certain instructions are sent for the information of the Consul General alone and in which he states specifically that he sent Felix to the (S.A.) Union. The removal of ~~Wertz~~ Werz should ensure the cessation of the Leo reports and their ramifications to the Italians and the Japanese, though it is arguable that the cessation of these reports might be a disservice to the Allied cause as they are uniformly inaccurate. (AOB: their sweet dreams will not come-out for about 1½ year to come and thereafter) Here again, as in the (S.A.) Union, the removal of the two head men might so disorganise the sub agents that even if another Counsel General was appointed he might find some difficulty in gathering threats together again, at least for some time.

You will now have studied the last summary out out by Section V (S.I.S. (M.I.6.) counter-espionage) on German Espionage in the Union of South Africa. C.S.S. is now considering how much of this information could be passed to Field Marshal Smuts (please consider: U2164 U2164return) and meanwhile, it seem to me important that we should be have a meeting attended by D.G.S.S., D.B. myself and Courtenay Young and Colonel Vivian, Colonel Cowgill, Major whose name and likely others of M.I.6 have been made invisible; as is quite usually when M.I.6 being involved. (AOB: these men lived in excitement, but in vain, as can be derived from the former "U2164 "links) of Section V. It would probably also be profitable to Mr. Oliver to attend this meeting. The purpose of this meeting would be to consider what means are available to us for keeping some sort of coordinated control over investigations into the Felix case after Field Marshal Smuts has been informed of the matter. (AOB: again reconsider the just foregoing U2164 related links; as nothing really is due to happen! All may be described as: Their sweet dreams)

It will probably be necessary to take up a careful watch upon Sittig, ~~van Moeve~~ van der Merwe and van Rensburg to start with and, if this type of enquiry is to be conducted without disaster, it may be necessary not to use the South African Police. It is for consideration therefore, whether Field Marshal Smuts would accept a special Commission of Enquiry (V2165 V2165return) (AOB: which he does not agree!)

consisting of Webster, Ryde, Muggeridge, Oliver and certain picked South African Officials who could be entirely replied upon. Such a Commission might be able to provide watchers from among S.O.E. (?) and S.I.S. agents or especially selected South African Policemen. The pivot of such a Commission of Enquiry should, in my view, be Webster and, if is to put forward a suggestion on these lines after the Field Marshal has had time to consider the information he is given by Oliver, then we shall have to send some sort of instruction to Webster and, it is for consideration whether that instruction could not be taken by the hand of Oliver.

I suggest that a meeting on the lines mentioned above should be called at an early date.

With reference to C/2595 of the 16th March, we have considered the point in the light also of the letters from Loxley (P.N. at F.O.) of the 27th March and D.N.I.(= Director Navy Intelligence) of the 29th March.

In general we entirely accept the position that it must be for your representative to exercise the discretion as to the communication of material to General Smuts. At the same time, it is very clear from the information that there is an active German organisation in the Union and it is also the case that if anything is to be done to stop the activities of this German organisation it must be done by General Smuts and his governmental machine. It seems to us that the Government here would be in a very embarrassing position if they knew of espionage and sabotage activities being carried out by Germans and their friends in South Africa and did not give General Smuts sufficient information to enable him to deal effectively with these nuisances. But, of course, this does not prevent you, through your representative, offering suitable advice as to the time at which action is most desirable and the scope of such action.

There is one small point. I notice that the paper van Rensburg's name is spelt with a d; the correct spelling is van Rensburg. Whether this is a slip of copying or a mistake in the original source, I do not know. I would, however, suggest that it would be as well to attempt to verify that it is actual head of the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) with whom the Germans are in contact (AOB: the Germans in direct contact with Ossewa Brandwag as an organisation, but they made use of the existing environment in South Africa) and that they are not merely using his name as cover.

(AOB: I myself admire often the legal perspective within some British Ministries - such as the Home Office and now also the Dominion Office; in contrast to the sometimes 'childish-naive attitudes' represented by quite many Secret Service Servants, during these wartime days.)

Note: Though there is no direct connection as yet ascertainable between the Felix organisation and the cases of Leibrandt (https://www.cdvandt.org/robey-leibrandt-(sa).htm) and the Durban Saboteurs, its way be of interest to have short summaries of these cases on record, together with a short note on the Avila/Tino set up.

The Leibrandt cast shows a connection between Leibrandt and van Rensburg on the one hand and Leibrandt and the German Secret Service on the other. The fact that van Rensburg denounced Leibrandt to the Police would seem to show clearly that Leibrandt had no connection with the Felix organisation.

The case of the Durban Saboteurs is of interest as regards the Ossewa Brandwag set up, as their organisation contained Stormjaer, who again had an inner ring, who were responsible for the outrages in Durban.

Although it would appear from Blue Jackets that Tino is being dropped it may be useful for this short note on his past career to be on record.

The diagram at (minute) 29a gives a tentative picture of the Felix act up as regards communications. It would appear unlikely that the broadcasts to South Africa (transmitter Zeesen with their short-wave broadcast program: "Die Heimat Grüßt") contain plain language code, as I learn from Trevor-Roper that they identified Berlin/Felix material, which is now being sent to function of the broadcasts to South Africa is to give acknowledgement of (correct) transmission.

From the reports of D.M.I.'s special agent "A-Mann" (Major Coetzee of South African Intelligence-Corps0 which Lt. Colonel Kreft has passed on to us for persual, it appears that Pirow (KV 2/908; PF 66920) and van Rensburg are working together fairly closely, and that there is no great difference between the aims of Pirow's "New Orderites" and the leaders of Ossewa Brandwag in the establishment of a republic up on the lines of German National Socialism, the disappearance of the British influence and a complete alternation of the system of Government and the Constitution. Like General Hertzog's Nationalist Party (now under the leadership of Havenga) and Malan's Reunited National Party (Hereenige Nasionale Partie) they are anti-Smuts, but the difference is that whereas Pirow and van Rensburg are prepared to attain their objectives by unconstitutional and, if necessary, violent means, the Hereenige Nasionale Partie and Havenga wish to see a republic run on democratic and constitutional lines. For this reason it seems unlikely that any fusion of opposition in the Union could ever be very successful. From time to time strong efforts have been made to represent a united front, and last year General Hertzog; was accepted as the leader by all but Malam's Party. It will be interesting to see whether Havenga, now his leader is dead, will be prepared to throw in his lot with Pirow and van Rensburg. As he is now Pro-German than he is Pro-British it is difficult to believe that he will do so, and it is almost certain that Herzog's death has again divided the opposition camp.

The reports give the names of many prominent Ossewa Brandwag and New Orderites, and alphabetical list of which is attached. (p.a'd O, B. File).

Mr. White, Major Luke and I had a meeting with Colonel Cowgill (S.I.S.), Major (name as usually deleted) and Captain Trevor-Roper to discuss the Felix situation on 17.3.43.

It was learned from Colonel Cowgill that the sequence of events up to the present were as follows. S.I.S. representative in Lourenco Marques had learned from a source that Nils Olaf Paasche was proposing to leave Lourenco Marques and enter the (S.A.) Union., and had on him two names: Lothar Sittig and (Dr.) Gert van der Merwe of Salisbury House, Pretoria. On learning this S.I.S. representative saw Brigadier Baston in the (S.A.) Union and informed him of this. It is thought that this action was taken after consultation with Colonel Webster, (W2166 W2166return) As a result Paasche was followed when he entered the (S.A.) Union and was last seen bicycling into a farm, which was owned by Gerd van der Merwe. The South African Police then arranged to raid the farm on 14.3.1943. It is as yet unknown whether in fact the raid took place, or if it did what was found.

Gert van der Merwe is a Gynaecologist of some repute, is violently pro-Nazi and at one time was doctor at the Baviaan Internment Camp. He owned two farms near Pretoria, on of which is recently sold to the newspaper, 'Die Vaterland'. It was to one of these farms that Paasche was followed, and the same farm that previously come to the notice of the Police as the murder of Lotte, a witness in the He??eg case, had disappeared close by.

I understand that S.I.S. representative has arranged with the South African Police that Paasche should be allowed to escape as he had promised this to his source and were his promise to be broken his position in Lourenco Marques would be gravely compromised.

As regards Sittig, Section V (S.I.S. counter-espionage) said that they had learned from Lourenco Marques that he was Werz's only contact in the (S.A.) Union. Sittig escaped from the (S.A.) Union with Nils Olaf Paasche, who is, of course, 'O'.

Mr. D.G. White (M.I.5) suggested that action by the South African Police would almost inevitably prejudice further enquiries.

Colonel Cowgill took the view that though S.I.S.' representative's action in regard to Brigadier Baston had been undesirable, yet the ultimate result would not be unsatisfactory as if in fact the farm contained Felix's transmitter, Felix would have no means of communication with the outside world and by the time he got a new transmitter the Shipping information which he would be able to send would be unimportant as by then would not much traffic round the Cape, and that anyway it would be unlikely owing to political complications that van Rensburg could be brought to book. (AOB: why are the British expressing, time and again, so many 'sweet dreams' without a realistic perception of the true state of affairs, in South Africa?)

Major Luke, on the other hand, considered that if evidence could be found, which would incriminate van Rensburg, The South African authorities would in fact take action.

The handling of this case at this end was then discussed. It was decided that (name and details being deleted) from Section V and myself should keep in close touch and that he should see the file in our office on the Durban saboteurs, and that I should have made available to me such information as they received from Lourenco Marques. It was also decided that Colonel Webster should be asked to send copies of his replier to queries from Lourenco Marques to us so far these had not been available in London. There will thus be on record in this country copies of all queries sent from Lourenco Marques or this country to the (S.A.) Union and the reserve traffic. A telegram to this effect has been sent to Colonel Webster.

It was arranged that Major Luke and myself should go round to South Africa, lists of escapes and, if possible, copies of the South African Gazette. (It is learned from B.5. that South Africa House has not got copies and does not receive copies of this Gazette.)

AOB: First, this entire story dealt with played in the "white people's minds"; and they all gave a damn on what non-white people were thinking! In some respect the situation in "India" was comparable. However, these "white men" being insensitive for anticipating - that "Anti-British" animosities were still in existence within the South African "Boer" community; what counted, sometimes, in the background, was: "the enemy of my enemy is my friend".

AOB: after due consideration, I have decided to terminate herewith this, more than exciting, file series.

KV 2/939-1, page 4: (minute 11)

D.G. (Mr. Dick G. Withe) (M.I.5.)

…, I would particularly draw your attention to para 2. Of Mr Luke’s note at (minute) 8a I do not agree with the last sentence of this para. As far as I know Muggeridge was asked to keep a close watch on the movements of Paasche who was thought to be visiting Felix (Sittig) in the Union. It seems that in carrying out these instructions he has heard one of his informants that Paasche is going to visit Sittig, and without reference has been making the necessary arrangements with the South African Police. In discussing this case with S.I.S. we (S.I.S. and M.I.5) had come to the conclusion that any attempt to follow Paasche would only lead to disaster and that it would be far better to let the transmitter run and eventually to liquidate it through D.F.ing process. There would seem to be a certain danger of the whole thing being blown.

Sgd. G.M.L. (Guy Liddell) (M.I.5.)

D.B. 16.3.43

A direct hyperlink can not yet be provided, as we have to start up the new file series; and: I have to pre-study the first chapter.