KV-2/151-K-H-Kraemer

photo typically taken at Camp 020, after Kraemer's arrest on 15th May 1945 and his arrival at Camp 020 on May 17th

AOB: all these Camp 020 photos are typically bearing the separation between the two background cover plates. I don't like to designate them being white paper.

The following piece of (AOB: additional) information has been received from our Stockholm representative concerning Grundböck (Grundboeck), which has a bearing on Kraemer's interrogation.

1. Anton Bela Ferenc Grundböck (Grundboeck), who was a Captain in the Austrian Army, obtained Swedish nationality on 16.12.1938. He died on 29.3.44.

2. His widow is Anna Ester Magdalena née Maier, born 30.6.1899 in Stockholm. She lives at Bragevägen 10^I : telephone 11 73 31. She was formerly married to Nils Lilja and by this marriage had a son, Sten Axel Lilja, who was adopted by Captain Grundböck (Grundboeck) on 2.12.43, and who then took the name, Sten Axel Grundböck. This son was born in Stockholm on 17.3.21 and lives with his mother at the address given above.

AOB: on Ostro, real name Paul Georg Fidrmuc, I have dealt with extensively, please notice section 3 of:

AMT VI Sources 10. Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) was the code-name of a source located somewhere on the Iberian peninsula (living and operating mainly in Lisbon), running at least 12 different lines. The reports were prolific (inexhaustible) all round, covering both military and political questions, exceptionally well-posted especially on English matters. After the Yalta Conference Ostro turned in some good reports evidently based on information furnished by somebody who sat in on the conference.

Hasso (= Kraemer) (or Hector) was an exceptionally high quality source in Stockholm, well informed on domestic politics in England. It conveyed detailed and intimate reports on English trends of thought as prevailing in the inner circles of the main British parties. Hasso and Ostro were the pillars of England information, providing excellent counter-checks on the reliability of either.

During 1943 and 194 Meisner received a few visits, he thinks about six in all, from one Kraemer, ~~a member of the K.O. Sweden~~. Meisner had no dealings of an intelligennce nature with Kraemer who, he understood, came to Switzerland for express purpose of discussing certain matters with Daufeldt.

Kraemer's visits to Meisner were purely courtesy calls as instructions had been issued by Canaris (Leiter of the Amt Ausland/Abwehr) to the effect that when Abwehr officials visited other countries they were to contact the K.O. At the time of Kraemer's last visit, about May 1944, he told Meisner that he hoped to be able to obtain some information from Switzerland. Cooperation with the Japanese was never discussed.

Meisner was asked by Okamoto, Japanese Military Attaché, to send 15,000 dollars to K.O. Sweden which was effected. Meisner does not know the reason for this and cannot say whether it was intended for Kraemer himself.

A contact of the Hungarian Intelligence Service, met by Kraemer in July 1942 at Lisbon. Fulloep had been for many years before the war in America and in 1937y/38 returned to Hungary and joined the Government Service in Budapest, visiting Spain and Portugal several times. In 1940/41 Fulloep went to the Hungarian Legation in Washington and was according to Kraemer in some way connected with the Hungarian Intelligence Service. Kraemer had a conversation with Fulloep concerning his activities in the USA, but did not forward a report to Berlin as he knew that former reports of Fulloep had reached OKW Amt Ausland (/Abwehr) via the normal Attaché exchange. This was the only occasion that Kraemer met Fulloep, but he knew he was still in Spain in 1943,

When told by Grundboeck about his Fullep source in the Iberian Peninsula, Kraemer asked him if this man was not identical with the Fulloep he met in 1942, but Grundboeck (Grundböck) denied it. (This subject will come to bear very exceptionally)

26. Dr. Wirsing. (Dr. Gieselher-Wising)

Political journalist with close contact with the General Staff, including Jodl. In September/November, 1944, following the military reverses and Terboven's decisions to follow a "scorched (burned) earth" policy, Kraemer had long talks with Wirsing and various heads of departments in the Foreign Office in Berlin, as a result of which Terboven's policy was altered. The two men met only in Berlin (where Gieselher-Wirsing privately lived). Wirsing had nothing to do with the Abwehr. Ribbentrop had offered him a ministerial post at the Foreign Office, but he had refused it. Though, General Krebs, Chief of the General Staff. Wirsing had indirect contact with Himmler. (Schellenberg was on very friendly, non party terms with Himmler. Actually Schellenberg was the real man behind Gieselher-Wirsing's endeavour the "Egmont Briefe". He supplied Gieselher-Wirsing regularly by means of a secret courier with the most secret intelligence in the possession of Amt VI and the Mil Amt. It is thus likely, that also Himmler received a copy of Gieselher-Wirsing's, more or less, periodical "Egmont Briefe" (https://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm)

Maybe not the most essential information, but next we find Kramer's information on K.O. Sweden, in Stockholm.

From 1940 the chief of the K.O. in Stockholm was Obst. (Dr. Hans) Wagner @ Doktor his deputy being Hauptmann (Hptm. = Captain) Albert Utermark.

Both Wagner and Utermark were forced to leave Sweden at the beginning of 1945, on account of their connection with two Swedes, Paulson and Loennegren who were arrested by the Swedish authorities for espionage activities.

It was decided therefore, in March 1945, that the K.O. in Sweden should be dissolved in view of the fact that it would be impossible for the remaining members of the staff to continue with intelligence activities (the Russians were already approaching Berlin), and it was arranged that the remaining personnel should leave Sweden in April or the beginning of May, 1945. Wagner and Utermark were to be replaced by a Deputy Military Attaché and a Deputy Naval Attaché, but Kraemer did not know who was finally appointed to the posts. (As he was no member of the K.O.Sweden)

In the meantime, (Major Heinrich) Wenzlau was called upon to liquidate the K.O. office.

According to Kraemer, the K.O. had the following sources of information in Sweden:-

a) Paulson and Loennegren: This was Wagner's chief source of information until the end of 1944.

b) Schaefer/Mueller: Kraemer states that Mueller was connected with the K.O. since 1941 and Schaefer since 1942. As far as Kraemer knows, Mueller's reports passed to the K.O. via Schaefer only concerned activities on the Bromma (Stockholm Airport) airport and details of the (British) courier air traffic as passed on to Kraemer himself.

c) Kumenius: The K.O. was also in contact with Kumenius, a Finnish refuge in Sweden since 1944, who furnished information regarding the Soviet Union. Wagner tried to get in touch with Hallamaa via Kumenius, but without sources.

d) Carlson: An agent of Wagner's who may be identical with Onodera's agent of the same name, though Kraemer is not sure of this. Kraemer only know that Carlson was supposed to supply Wagner with certain information and get him fresh contacts.

e) Adlerkreutz: This man was the head of the Swedish Intelligence Service and concerned with Military Intelligence. In the autumn of 1943 he was made Military Attaché in Finnland and went to Helsinki, which was important from the point of view of the Germans, as Adlerkreutz was distinctly pro-German, and gave Wagner information.

KV 2/151-1, page 49 Belongs to a brief chapter on Nina Siemsen, Kraemer's private secretary; but these are Siemsen's words, not Kraemer's:

In the case of messages sent by teleprinter (FS), those which were of interest to the Foreign Office were sent by the teleprinter (Telex) (FS) in the Legation itself, but all those containing military information were sent by the teleprinter in the Luft Attaché's Office, which was situated outside the Legation. Siemsen sometimes took these messages, but more often Kraemer himself. At first the messages were kept at the teleprinter office, but subsequently they were handed back to Kraemer and she (Nina Siemsen) filed them. They were, however, all burned before they left Stockholm.

This brief explanation might put some different light upon some foregoing discussions.

Kraemer was never away from Stockholm for any length of time. He usually visited Berlin every month or so, and his visits lasted anything from 2 or 3 days to about a fortnight, but he had never been away for so long a period as six months in 1944. Besides Berlin, Kraemer sometimes went on trips to Copenhagen, and Siemsen believed he visited Paris when she first worked for him. About once or twice a year Kraemer went on from Berlin to Switzerland, but never told her what he did there, although she knew he visited a friend of his, the Vice Consul in Lausanne, named Daufeld (Daufeldt?), as on his return, Kraemer would sometimes dictate personal letters addressed to this man, thanking him for hospitality.

Kraemer had been aware for some time that he was under observation by the Swedish Police, and towards the end of April, the storm broke. Kraemer's Secretary, Fräulein Siemsen, was arrested by the Swedish police on the 23rd April, and the next day, the Swedish Foreign Office rang up to say that both Siemsen and Kraemer would would have to leave Sweden within 24 hours, as they were held to be implicated in the activities of Schaefer, who had been arrested on charge of having furnished Germany with information regarding the British planes arriving at Bromma airport. Later, the Swedish Authorities telephoned to say that there was apparently no foundation for the charge against Kraemer as being the instigator of Schaefer's activities, but that Fräulein Siemsen would have to go.

About four days later, on the 28th April, the Foreign Office again rang up to say that they might have to arrest Krämer, and on the 30th, he was→

informed that he must leave within one week. Kraemer had three alternatives open to him; to stay in Sweden and risk possible arrest by the Swedish authorities or surrender to the Allies at their request; to go openly to go to Germany and to go underground. Of these alternatives, Kraemer eventually chose the second and accordingly left Stockholm for Copenhagen on May 5th. He claims that at the time of departure he was fully aware that the possibility existed that the Allies would arrest him and was prepared for this eventuality.

Kraemer's wife and two children were allowed to remain in Sweden, though Kraemer was aware that the possibility existed that she would be interned by the Swedes.

At the time of his departure, Kraemer was able to leave his wife between 13,000 and 15,000 Kr. She had also at her disposal some valuable paintings and carpets which she could sell in case of emergency. Prior to leaving, Kraemer agreed with his wife on a number of addresses, amongst which was Fräulein Siemsen's address in Hamburg and some addresses of firms in Stockholm, through which they might regain touch with each other in more settled times.

Prior to his departure, Kraemer had been in touch by telephone with Dr. Schnurre of the German Foreign Office, who had recently been in Stockholm, with a view to his arranging for Fräulein Siemsen's further journey from Copenhagen to Hamburg. When Kraemer arrived in Copenhagen, however, he found both Schnurre and Fräulein Siemsen still there and eventually the party Copenhagen together in two cars with the intension of reaching Flensburg, and if possible, Hamburg, where Fräulein Siemsen had her home, and where Kraemer hoped to be able to establish himself. (AOB: Which sounds simple, but which wasn't, as the British controlled Hamburg, and only someone with very strong reasons were entitled to take residence in Hamburg!)

On his arrival at Flensburg, Kraemer found there the shadow government established by Admiral Doenitz and alos met Berg, who provided him with accommodation - a room in his brother's (Berg's) home.

He ascertained that it would not be possible to reach Hamburg even by car, and Barron Schwerin-Kroesigk (the temporary Finance Minister) decided that he should find temporary employment in such departments of the Foreign Office as were functioning in Flensburg. He therefore reported to Admiral Doenitz's Head Quarters at Flensburg-Mürwik, near Flensburg, and occupied himself with such durties in the Foreign Office as came his way. In particular, he had a short talk with a B.B.C. correspondent, Edward Ward, who was trying to get an interview with Admiral Doenitz or Count Schwerin-Kroesigk. This interview was eventually arranged and Kraemer was present.

Kraemer was arrested at his lodging in Flensburg by officers of the Security Service at 23.30 hours at night when already in bed. He states that owing to this fact he lost the opportunity of being arrested as an officer.

GM (G. Marseille)/EMB 23rd July, 1945 Investigated by: Captain Marseille, S/Ldr. Beddard (the latter being Marseille's successor)

The channel of communication through which information from the Fullep Organisation reached Grundboeck (Grundböck) and Kraemer was as follows:-

From England to Portugal and Spain by diplomatic bags. Kraemer has no certain knowledge that this was actual fact the channel, but states that the organisation had close contact with the Yugoslav Legation in Lisbon and maintains, that there was no other way by which the information could have been forwarded, as there was no question of the supply of W/T or secret writing material.

From Madrid, the Fullep reports were sent by Hungarian diplomatic bag to Berlin, addressed to a man called Horvath. He was attached in a civilian capacity to the Hungarian military or economic staff of the Legation, Berlin, and had been an intimate friend of Grundboeck (Grundböck) for many years. He had close connections with the Hungarian Intelligence Services, but Kraemer is not aware whether he was actually a member or not.

From Berlin reports were sent on by Horvath to Grundboeck (Grundböck) again vi a Hungarian diplomatic bag. Later, as will be seen below, this procedure was changed and the reports went forward to Berlin by German diplomatic bag.

Reverse communications, i.e. instructions and payments were forwarded through the same channels, that is to say, Grundboeck (Grundböck) (AOB: Grundböck passed away on March 29th 1944) Horvath, Fullep. Kraemer sent instructions to Fullep by means of microdots and microprints (the latter prepared in Berlin) and similarly received Fullep's reports in micro-photo form. ↓

This is a rare example where microdots are capable of; the content of the small black square contains the entire text-message on the right-hand side!

It doesn't need to be a square, consider also the small dust line at 24.9 cm, which is also capable of consisting, partially, message sections.

When you look carefully, you might find several dust like spots (spikes) which could contain some bits of information.

→ In November, 1944, it was proposed to establish W/T contact with Fullep in view of the fact that the air service between Spain and Germany was about to be disconnected. (AOB: it lasted ultimately up to April 1945)

The intention was to transmit from Spain to Oslo whence there was a teleprinter (FS) service to Berlin and Stockholm. The scheme was dropped because space could not be obtained in 'plane to Spain for the necessary W/T equipment, whilst in the second place, IE (wireless) could not spare the operators required.