Date 13 March 2023
Current status: 29 March 2023
Chapter 23 (since 15 March 2023)
Chapter 24 (since 21 March 2023)
Chapter 25 (since 27 March 2023)
Chapter 26 (since 29 March 2023)
Chapter 27 (since 4 April 2023)
Chapter 28 (since 8 April 2023)
Chapter 29 (since 14 April 2023)
Chapter 30 (since 19 April 2023)
Chapter 32 (since 24 April 2023)
Chapter 33 (since 1 May 2023)
Chapter 34 (since 12 May 2023)
Chapter 35 (since 15 May 2023)
Chapter 36 (since 20 May 2023)
Chapter 37 (since 23 May 2023)
Chapter 38 (since 26 May 2023)
Chapter 39 (since 29 May 2023)
Chapter 40 (since 31 May 2023)
Chapter 41 (since 5 June 2023)
KV 2/151-1, page 68
Dr. Karl Heinz Krämer
photo typically taken at Camp 020, after Kraemer's arrest on 15th May 1945 and his arrival at Camp 020 on May 17th
AOB: all these Camp 020 photos are typically bearing the separation between the two background cover plates. I don't like to designate them being white paper.
KV 2/151-1, page 10 (minute 454a)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.F.20 dated 30.7.45
The following piece of (AOB: additional) information has been received from our Stockholm representative concerning Grundböck (Grundboeck), which has a bearing on Kraemer's interrogation.
1. Anton Bela Ferenc Grundböck (Grundboeck), who was a Captain in the Austrian Army, obtained Swedish nationality on 16.12.1938. He died on 29.3.44.
2. His widow is Anna Ester Magdalena née Maier, born 30.6.1899 in Stockholm. She lives at Bragevägen 10I : telephone 11 73 31. She was formerly married to Nils Lilja and by this marriage had a son, Sten Axel Lilja, who was adopted by Captain Grundböck (Grundboeck) on 2.12.43, and who then took the name, Sten Axel Grundböck. This son was born in Stockholm on 17.3.21 and lives with his mother at the address given above.
(for Major P.G. Mason)
A.F. Blunt, Esq. M.I.5.
KV 2/151-1, page 12a (minute 454x)
AOB: on Ostro, real name Paul Georg Fidrmuc, I have dealt with extensively, please notice section 3 of:
Extract from War Room Report
Subject: Draft Reports from MFIU No. 3.
1.c. Introduction to Egmont Berichte.
AMT VI Sources 10. Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) was the code-name of a source located somewhere on the Iberian peninsula (living and operating mainly in Lisbon), running at least 12 different lines. The reports were prolific (inexhaustible) all round, covering both military and political questions, exceptionally well-posted especially on English matters. After the Yalta Conference Ostro turned in some good reports evidently based on information furnished by somebody who sat in on the conference.
Hasso (= Kraemer) (or Hector) was an exceptionally high quality source in Stockholm, well informed on domestic politics in England. It conveyed detailed and intimate reports on English trends of thought as prevailing in the inner circles of the main British parties. Hasso and Ostro were the pillars of England information, providing excellent counter-checks on the reliability of either.
KV 2/151-1, page 13b (minute 545w)
Extract from Interim Interrogation Report on
Karl Robert Johannes Meisner @ Peter
During 1943 and 194 Meisner received a few visits, he thinks about six in all,
from one Kraemer,
a member of the K.O. Sweden.
Meisner had no dealings of an intelligennce nature with Kraemer who, he
understood, came to Switzerland for express purpose of discussing certain
matters with Daufeldt.
Kraemer's visits to Meisner were purely courtesy calls as instructions had been issued by Canaris (Leiter of the Amt Ausland/Abwehr) to the effect that when Abwehr officials visited other countries they were to contact the K.O. At the time of Kraemer's last visit, about May 1944, he told Meisner that he hoped to be able to obtain some information from Switzerland. Cooperation with the Japanese was never discussed.
Meisner was asked by Okamoto, Japanese Military Attaché, to send 15,000 dollars to K.O. Sweden which was effected. Meisner does not know the reason for this and cannot say whether it was intended for Kraemer himself.
KV 2/150-1, page 25 partially
15. Fulloep (Fullep)
A contact of the Hungarian Intelligence Service, met by Kraemer in July 1942 at Lisbon. Fulloep had been for many years before the war in America and in 1937y/38 returned to Hungary and joined the Government Service in Budapest, visiting Spain and Portugal several times. In 1940/41 Fulloep went to the Hungarian Legation in Washington and was according to Kraemer in some way connected with the Hungarian Intelligence Service. Kraemer had a conversation with Fulloep concerning his activities in the USA, but did not forward a report to Berlin as he knew that former reports of Fulloep had reached OKW Amt Ausland (/Abwehr) via the normal Attaché exchange. This was the only occasion that Kraemer met Fulloep, but he knew he was still in Spain in 1943,
When told by Grundboeck about his Fullep source in the Iberian Peninsula, Kraemer asked him if this man was not identical with the Fulloep he met in 1942, but Grundboeck (Grundböck) denied it. (This subject will come to bear very exceptionally)
KV 2/151-1, page 33
Maybe not the most essential information, but next we find Kramer's information on K.O. Sweden, in Stockholm.
It might function as a reference document.
KV 151-1, page 36a
Organisation of the K.O. Stockholm.
From 1940 the chief of the K.O. in Stockholm was Obst. (Dr. Hans) Wagner @ Doktor his deputy being Hauptmann (Hptm. = Captain) Albert Utermark.
Both Wagner and Utermark were forced to leave Sweden at the beginning of 1945, on account of their connection with two Swedes, Paulson and Loennegren who were arrested by the Swedish authorities for espionage activities.
It was decided therefore, in March 1945, that the K.O. in Sweden should be dissolved in view of the fact that it would be impossible for the remaining members of the staff to continue with intelligence activities (the Russians were already approaching Berlin), and it was arranged that the remaining personnel should leave Sweden in April or the beginning of May, 1945. Wagner and Utermark were to be replaced by a Deputy Military Attaché and a Deputy Naval Attaché, but Kraemer did not know who was finally appointed to the posts. (As he was no member of the K.O.Sweden)
In the meantime, (Major Heinrich) Wenzlau was called upon to liquidate the K.O. office.
According to Kraemer, the K.O. had the following sources of information in Sweden:-
a) Paulson and Loennegren: This was Wagner's chief source of information until the end of 1944.
b) Schaefer/Mueller: Kraemer states that Mueller was connected with the K.O. since 1941 and Schaefer since 1942. As far as Kraemer knows, Mueller's reports passed to the K.O. via Schaefer only concerned activities on the Bromma (Stockholm Airport) airport and details of the (British) courier air traffic as passed on to Kraemer himself.
c) Kumenius: The K.O. was also in contact with Kumenius, a Finnish refuge in Sweden since 1944, who furnished information regarding the Soviet Union. Wagner tried to get in touch with Hallamaa via Kumenius, but without sources.
d) Carlson: An agent of Wagner's who may be identical with Onodera's agent of the same name, though Kraemer is not sure of this. Kraemer only know that Carlson was supposed to supply Wagner with certain information and get him fresh contacts.
e) Adlerkreutz: This man was the head of the Swedish Intelligence Service and concerned with Military Intelligence. In the autumn of 1943 he was made Military Attaché in Finnland and went to Helsinki, which was important from the point of view of the Germans, as Adlerkreutz was distinctly pro-German, and gave Wagner information.
AOB: I suppose that the next page is not really of relevance in our context.
KV 2/151-1, page 49 Belongs to a brief chapter on Nina Siemsen, Kraemer's private secretary; but these are Siemsen's words, not Kraemer's:
In the case of messages sent by teleprinter (FS), those which were of interest to the Foreign Office were sent by the teleprinter (Telex) (FS) in the Legation itself, but all those containing military information were sent by the teleprinter in the Luft Attaché's Office, which was situated outside the Legation. Siemsen sometimes took these messages, but more often Kraemer himself. At first the messages were kept at the teleprinter office, but subsequently they were handed back to Kraemer and she (Nina Siemsen) filed them. They were, however, all burned before they left Stockholm.
(W1058 ↑↑↑↑ W1058return)
This brief explanation might put some different light upon some foregoing discussions.
Siemsen's interrogation on Kraemer:
KV 2/151-1, page 49b-partially + 50c-partially
Kraemer's Absences from Stockholm.
Kraemer was never away from Stockholm for any length of time. He usually visited Berlin every month or so, and his visits lasted anything from 2 or 3 days to about a fortnight, but he had never been away for so long a period as six months in 1944. Besides Berlin, Kraemer sometimes went on trips to Copenhagen, and Siemsen believed he visited Paris when she first worked for him. About once or twice a year Kraemer went on from Berlin to Switzerland, but never told her what he did there, although she knew he visited a friend of his, the Vice Consul in Lausanne, named Daufeld (Daufeldt?), as on his return, Kraemer would sometimes dictate personal letters addressed to this man, thanking him for hospitality.
KV 2/151-2, page 65 partially
Kraemer's expulsion from Sweden and Arrest in Flensburg.
Kraemer had been aware for some time that he was under observation by the Swedish Police, and towards the end of April, the storm broke. Kraemer's Secretary, Fräulein Siemsen, was arrested by the Swedish police on the 23rd April, and the next day, the Swedish Foreign Office rang up to say that both Siemsen and Kraemer would would have to leave Sweden within 24 hours, as they were held to be implicated in the activities of Schaefer, who had been arrested on charge of having furnished Germany with information regarding the British planes arriving at Bromma airport. Later, the Swedish Authorities telephoned to say that there was apparently no foundation for the charge against Kraemer as being the instigator of Schaefer's activities, but that Fräulein Siemsen would have to go.
About four days later, on the 28th April, the Foreign Office again rang up to say that they might have to arrest Krämer, and on the 30th, he was→
KV 2/151-1, page 66
informed that he must leave within one week. Kraemer had three alternatives open to him; to stay in Sweden and risk possible arrest by the Swedish authorities or surrender to the Allies at their request; to go openly to go to Germany and to go underground. Of these alternatives, Kraemer eventually chose the second and accordingly left Stockholm for Copenhagen on May 5th. He claims that at the time of departure he was fully aware that the possibility existed that the Allies would arrest him and was prepared for this eventuality.
Kraemer's wife and two children were allowed to remain in Sweden, though Kraemer was aware that the possibility existed that she would be interned by the Swedes.
At the time of his departure, Kraemer was able to leave his wife between 13,000 and 15,000 Kr. She had also at her disposal some valuable paintings and carpets which she could sell in case of emergency. Prior to leaving, Kraemer agreed with his wife on a number of addresses, amongst which was Fräulein Siemsen's address in Hamburg and some addresses of firms in Stockholm, through which they might regain touch with each other in more settled times.
Journey to Flensburg and activities there.
Prior to his departure, Kraemer had been in touch by telephone with Dr. Schnurre of the German Foreign Office, who had recently been in Stockholm, with a view to his arranging for Fräulein Siemsen's further journey from Copenhagen to Hamburg. When Kraemer arrived in Copenhagen, however, he found both Schnurre and Fräulein Siemsen still there and eventually the party Copenhagen together in two cars with the intension of reaching Flensburg, and if possible, Hamburg, where Fräulein Siemsen had her home, and where Kraemer hoped to be able to establish himself. (AOB: Which sounds simple, but which wasn't, as the British controlled Hamburg, and only someone with very strong reasons were entitled to take residence in Hamburg!)
On his arrival at Flensburg, Kraemer found there the shadow government established by Admiral Doenitz and alos met Berg, who provided him with accommodation - a room in his brother's (Berg's) home.
He ascertained that it would not be possible to reach Hamburg even by car, and Barron Schwerin-Kroesigk (the temporary Finance Minister) decided that he should find temporary employment in such departments of the Foreign Office as were functioning in Flensburg. He therefore reported to Admiral Doenitz's Head Quarters at Flensburg-Mürwik, near Flensburg, and occupied himself with such durties in the Foreign Office as came his way. In particular, he had a short talk with a B.B.C. correspondent, Edward Ward, who was trying to get an interview with Admiral Doenitz or Count Schwerin-Kroesigk. This interview was eventually arranged and Kraemer was present.
Kraemer was arrested at his lodging in Flensburg by officers of the Security Service at 23.30 hours at night when already in bed. He states that owing to this fact he lost the opportunity of being arrested as an officer.
GM (G. Marseille)/EMB 23rd July, 1945 Investigated by: Captain Marseille, S/Ldr. Beddard (the latter being Marseille's successor)
KV 2/151-1, page 80-partially
The channel of communication through which information from the Fullep Organisation reached Grundboeck (Grundböck) and Kraemer was as follows:-
From England to Portugal and Spain by diplomatic bags. Kraemer has no certain knowledge that this was actual fact the channel, but states that the organisation had close contact with the Yugoslav Legation in Lisbon and maintains, that there was no other way by which the information could have been forwarded, as there was no question of the supply of W/T or secret writing material.
From Madrid, the Fullep reports were sent by Hungarian diplomatic bag to Berlin, addressed to a man called Horvath. He was attached in a civilian capacity to the Hungarian military or economic staff of the Legation, Berlin, and had been an intimate friend of Grundboeck (Grundböck) for many years. He had close connections with the Hungarian Intelligence Services, but Kraemer is not aware whether he was actually a member or not.
From Berlin reports were sent on by Horvath to Grundboeck (Grundböck) again vi a Hungarian diplomatic bag. Later, as will be seen below, this procedure was changed and the reports went forward to Berlin by German diplomatic bag.
Reverse communications, i.e. instructions and payments were forwarded through the same channels, that is to say, Grundboeck (Grundböck) (AOB: Grundböck passed away on March 29th 1944) Horvath, Fullep. Kraemer sent instructions to Fullep by means of microdots and microprints (the latter prepared in Berlin) and similarly received Fullep's reports in micro-photo form. ↓
KV-2-11.gif (Y1061 ↓↓↓↓↓ Y1061return) (K1075 ↓↓↓↓↓ K1075return) (H1097 ↕↕↕↕↕ H1097return) (J1098 ↓↓↓↓↓ J1098return) (N2002 ↕↕↕↕↕ N2002return) (S2008 ↕↕↕↕↕ S2008return) (Y2014 Y2014return) (H2025 ↓↓↓↓↓ H2025return) (R2034 ↓↓↓↓↓ R2034return) (S2035 ↕↕↕↕↕ S2035return) (T2036 ↕↕↕↕↕ T2036return)
This is a rare example where microdots are capable of; the content of the small black square contains the entire text-message on the right-hand side!
It doesn't need to be a square, consider also the small dust line at 24.9 cm, which is also capable of consisting, partially, message sections.
When you look carefully, you might find several dust like spots (spikes) which could contain some bits of information.
→ In November, 1944, it was proposed to establish W/T contact with Fullep in view of the fact that the air service between Spain and Germany was about to be disconnected. (AOB: it lasted ultimately up to April 1945)
The intention was to transmit from Spain to Oslo whence there was a teleprinter (FS) service to Berlin and Stockholm. The scheme was dropped because space could not be obtained in 'plane to Spain for the necessary W/T equipment, whilst in the second place, IE (wireless) could not spare the operators required.
KV 2/151-1, page 81b
Kraemer maintains that he never paid Grundboeck (Grundböck) anything for his services, and that he later acted out of pure friendship and presumably out of sympathy for the German cause. He was in any case a very rich man, worth from 2 to 3 million Krs. Similarly, no payment was made for information obtained from Swedish sources, but as regards Fullep, payments were made as follows:-
November - December, 1942 1,000 Sw. Kr. per month.
January - June, 1943 3,000 Sw. Kr. per month
July - December, 1943 5,000 Sw. Kr. per month
January - October, 1944 10-11,000 Sw. Kr. plus 1,000 dollars
November - March, 1945 16,000 Sw. Krs. and 1,000 dollars per month.
In November, 1944, when it looked as if German communications with Spain might be severed. Kraemer remitted Fullep a lump sum of 5,000 dollars and 80,000 Krs. which it was estimated would be sufficient to cover expenses and remuneration of the organisation for a period of five months.
Payment was made by Kraemer to Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) (formerly an Hungarian) in the first place, who passed the money on to Fullep via the usual (Hungarian) channels. After Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) dies about April 1944 (29 March). As a result, Kraemer lost Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) sources in Swedish official circles, as well as that in Switzerland (Okamoto). To some extent, however, as will be seen below, he was able to tap some of these sources of information through the Japanese Military Attaché, General Onodera, and others.
As regards the Fullep source, Kraemer, after consultation with Hansen (must have been before say 20th July 1944) arranged with Horvath for the reports from the Iberian Peninsula to continue. The only change in arrangements was that whereas previously reports had been sent by Horvath via the Hungarian diplomatic bag to Grundboeck (Grundböck), they were now sent by German diplomatic bag to Kraemer himself. Instructions as to information required and money were forwarded through the same channel.
(D1066 ↓↓↓↓↓ D1066return)
For your convenience - please notice the trajectory which Fullep's messages took before it reached Kraemer.
Towards the end of 1944, however, the Hungarian courier service between Berlin and Madrid became very irregular and Kraemer got Fullep's reports in batches at irregular intervals. For instance, he received on batch at the beginning of January, 1945, but did not receive anything further until March. However, he continued to pass on the contents of the reports to Berlin at regular intervals as and when he terminated the deciphering of any particular item from the microdots, with the result that there was no interruption in the steady flow of Hector teleprint (FS) messages.
As a result of Swallving's position as head of the Freight Department in the A.B.A., he was in a position to furnish Kraemer with a considerable amount of information which came to him in the course of his duties which were to a large extent confidential. In addition, he had close contacts with other important personalities in the A.B.A., particularly Carl Florman, Director of the Firm, Ekerberg official at the Head Office, Palm in charge of the Bromma airport →
KV 2/151-1, page 82c
airport, and the Directors, Noerling and Lignell, also Froedlin, formerly A.B.A.'s representatives in Berlin. He was also in touch with pilots on Great Britain/ Swedish run, as for instance:-
Swallving in his official capacity undoubtedly obtained a considerable amount of information from Florman, instances of which are quoted below, but Kraemer is of the opinion that this, in so far as it was not information which would normally come to him in the course of his duties, was rather due to indiscretion on Florman's part rather than to conscious effort to help the Germans. Kraemer maintains Florman had no idea that Swallving was giving information to him. He is not in a position to say to what extent Swallving obtained information from other officials of the A.B.A. quoted above, but definitely states that he did not obtain and any information from pilots claiming that our control was far too strict. At one time, Kraemer proposed to Swallving that he should try to and get himself transferred to Great Britain to remedy this deficiency, but that A.B.A. could not spare him from his duties in Stockholm. In addition to members of his own firm, Swallving was in close relation with the forwarding of agencies, Wilson & Co., Setterwall & Co., and Nyman & Schulz.
From the autumn of 1942, until Swallving's arrest on 23rd April 1945, on a charge of complicity in activities tending to prejudge Swedish neutrality, Swallving furnished Kraemer with the following information:-
a) List of all exports, particularly ball-bearings to England or via England to the Dominions, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, inclusive of details as to the number of packages, weights, components, shippers and consignees. During 1943, this information was supplied weekly, but from 1944 onwards, the lists covered first a fortnight, and latterly one months.
b) Information as to British imports into Sweden. In this case, however, detailed statements of shipments were not given, but only particulars of the types of goods imported. Kraemer was in any case not particularly interested in receiving details of such shipments.
c) Information regarding the intensions and operation of the A.B.A., B.A.O.C. and Russian Aeroflot Lines, but not the times of arrival and departure, post war plans and negotiations between Sweden and foreign airports, in so far as the A.B.A. was concerned in them.
d) As from the winter of 1943/44, Swallving supplied the details of shipments of ball-bearings and other goods to England by M.T.Bs (Motor Torpedo Boats). These shipments which were in the first place sent by rail to Lyseckel, were handed by the Freight department of the A.B.A.
e) After the commencement of an all out air offensive against Germany, a considerable number of American bombers made forced landings in Sweden and Swallving gave information as to the airfields where they were housed, the condition of the aircraft as regards air worthiness, imports of lubricating oil and reserve motors required to make the airworthy.
f) Information as to the conversion of American bomber bought by the →
KV 2/151-1, page 83d
Swedes for civil aviation purposes, together with reports on their condition and costs of effecting the necessary conversion.
g) Also, as from the beginning of 1945, the number of A.A.T.S. personnel brought into service these machines in Sweden. The A.A.T.S. maintained a weekly service of from 10 - 15 planes between Prestwick and Bromma (Stockholm airport). Kraemer maintains that there were far more then were actually required for the job on hand, and the Germans suspected that in actual fact the Americans were building up an bomber fleet in Sweden for the eventual use against Germany.
h) from Florman Swallving obtained and passed on to Kraemer advance information as to the impending stoppage of air traffic between England and Sweden prior to D-Day, and also prior information as to the trips made by Paasikivi to Moscow in April/June, 1944 in connection with the Russo/Finnish peace negotiations, Kraemer quotes this as an instance of indiscretion on Florman's part. who boasted to Swallving that he would himself be leaving in Moscow on the same plane as Paasikivi. This was in connection with instructions gave to Swallving regarding the obtaining of export licences for some goods he wanted to take with him.
i) At the instance of Kraemer's colleague, Major Wenzlau, Swallving furnished information as to the future movements of certain Finnish ships laden with goods for Germany which were in Stockholm harbour, at the time of the russo/Finnish armistice. This information he obtained from the shipping agency, Nyman & Schulz.
j) After the liberation of Northern Norway by Russian forces at the end of 1944, swallving furnished information as regards transport by air in American planes of Norwegian volunteers, who had been trained in Sweden, from Umea to Kirkenes, but Kraemer is unaware of the source of Swallving's information in this respect.
Channel of Communication.
For the most part, Swallving handed his reports to Kraemer in person, but at times, Schaefer acted as a go-between bringing Kraemer and Schaefer took place two or three times a week. In consequence, however, of the arrest of K.O. agents and the expulsion of certain members of the K.O. which took place in about the autumn (known as the Günther case), meetings were restricted to about once a week. They took place in Schaefer's own office, which Kraemer had legitimate excuse for visiting as he was constantly arranging for consignments of parcels to and from Germany, at a chalet which Kraemer had rented at a place called Lindingoe, outside Stockholm, and as from the end of 1943 and throughout 1944, in a flat which Kraemer rented from a certain Frau Busch, a friend of Swallving's at Bahevagen 5. They also met at times in restaurants outside Stockholm and at the flat occupied by Swallving's daughter and Fräulein Siemsen (Kraemer's secretary). Swallving used to visit his daughter every two or three days and Kraemer often passed that way to and from the office in order to pick up or drop Fräulein Siemsen. Kraemer insists, however, that Siemsen was in no way a go-between himself and Kraemer, or that Swallving's daughter was aware of her father's espionage activities. Swallving and Kraemer were always in a room by themselves when discussing Intelligence matters.
When it was only a question of handing over reports, Kraemer sometimes picked up Swallving in his car.
Apart from Intelligence activities, Kraemer also had Black Market dealings with Swallving.
AOB: I prefer to jump over to more relevant matters.
KV 2/151-2, page 4
May, 1940 - December, 1940.
During this period, Kraemer was promoted to Feldwebel (Uffz. = N.C.O.).
About June, he was given permission to take off time to study for his Assessor examination, which he duly passed in October.
KV 2/151-2, page 5 partially
May, 1941 By May of the following year, however, the position had altered, and Ast Hamburg received instructions from Colonel (Obst.) Piekenbrock (Leiter I Berlin) to open up Intelligence activities in Sweden directed against Great Britain and the U.S.A. Ast Hamburg instructed Kraemer to go to Stockholm to assess the possibilities.
On arrival, Kraemer first of all contacted Grundboeck (Grundböck), an ex-Austrian-Hungarian Intelligence officer of the last war (1914-1918) whom he had met in Budapest in August, 1940. (AOB: there existed a friendly relation between Hungary and the Germans, in particular on the Intelligence fields) Grundboeck (Grundböck) had for many years been established in business in Sweden and had influential connections in business circles. Grundboeck (Grundböck) was already an agent of Ast Vienna (Wien) and Kraemer had made equities, about him from count Marogna Redwitz (KV 2/3160; whom was later murdered after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler, of 20th July 1944), to Grundboeck (Grundböck).
Grundboeck (Grundböck) was a close friend of Colonel Usszayzy, former head of the Hungarian Intelligence Service and had close contacts in this quarter.
Kraemer informed Grundboeck (Grundböck) of his mission and asked for his assistance. He was particularly interested in the business contacts which Grundboeck (Grundböck) had with South America and through his Swedish friends to firms with relations in Great Britain and the U.S.A.
It was agreed that Grundboeck would look into the possibilities and report to Kraemer when he was next in Stockholm.
KV 2/151-2 page 9a + 10b partially
Intelligence Activities in Sweden: November, 1942 - May, 1945.
Kraemer arrived in Stockholm to take up his duties at the Legation on the 1st November, 1942. he was, however, not posted to the Cultural department as originally suggested, but was attached to the Press Attaché's Office. This arrangement lasted until about the beginning of 1943m when Kraemer was transferred to the political department and appointed a Legation Secretary.
Kraemer insists that his position in the Legation was not entirely a cover and no sinecure. His work on the diplomatic side consisted in the main of collating political information regarding enemy and neutral countries to be found in Swedish and foreign newspapers, and the rendering reports thereon. His gross salary, subject to deductions for such things as Winter Hülfe (old grammar, now used Hilfe), amounted to 2,400 per month.
In March 1943, Fräulein Siemsen came over from Berlin to act as his secretary.
KV 2/151-2, page 10c partially
In July 1944, the complete absorption of the Abwehr by the the R.S.H.A. (originating from Hitler's Order on 11th (12th) February 1944, after Hitler had been informed about the defection of the Vermehren Couple, whom went over to the British side in Istambul (Istanbul) (KV 2/956 ...KV 2/958; PF 66208) (https://www.cdvandt.org/erich-vermehren-case.htm) (This is a rather sad story and the Vermehrens have been treated most sadly by the British Secret Services; really scandalous!) Berlin, took place, and the former Abteilungen I, II (sabotage, a strange Referat) and III (counter intelligence) of the Abwehr were absorbed into the Mil amt (Amt Mil), which was subdivided into (B) - West and (C) - East.
In spite of the fact that Kraemer was dealing with Intelligence regarding the Western Allies, he went to Milamt C as he was working in Stockholm which was under C. His Chief in Milamt was Major (later Obstlt.) Ohletz (KV 2/106) . On occasion, however, he reported direct to Colonel Hansen (before the 20th of July 1944) and later Schellenberg (After Hansen's arrest on 22th July, Schellenberg Leiter Amt VI headed both entities Amt VI and the Milamt (Amt Mil)), this was particularly true with regard to Onodera exchange of information and the Grundboeck (Grundböck) complex.
As regards information required in respect of air matters, Kraemer was guided by Major Dewitz of the Luftwaffenführungsstab, and Oblt. Berg acted as liaison officer between Kraemer and the various Intelligence departments. That is to say, that he distributed Kraemer's reports to the various quarters and received instructions from them for him.
Up to November, 1944, Kraemer reported in person about once a month usually to Berlin, but on occasion he met Oblt. berg in Copenhagen.
He received definite instructions from his superior in Berlin not to enter into any intelligence contact with the K.O. or S.D. (Amt IV) in Stockholm.
In August or September, 1944, Major Wenzlau arrived in Stockholm as Deputy Air Attaché, and took over from Kraemer all matters appertaining (relating) to the Eastern theatre of war though as will be seen below such matters largely passed through Kraemer's hands.
Major Wenzlau had been Kraemer's superior officer in Ast Hamburg in 1941, had been transferred to Eins Luft, in Berlin.
Channels of communication with Berlin.
a) By teleprinting (FS) at the office of the Air Attaché in the Legation. The greater part of material was sent this way. (They possessed G-Schreibers)
b) By diplomatic bag of the German Legation. The bulky material such as photostats (Fotokopien) were sent this way.
c) Personal contact with Berlin and with Berg in Copenhagen.
KV 2/151-2, page 12 partially
Work for Foreign Office (A.A.) and Abwehr.
Ritter (Referatsleiter I) (Ritter changed Hamburg for Rommel's North African Campaign about February 1941; he acted then as a temporary pilot for Almásy's special operations, until he crashed in the Mediterranean Sea) informed Kraemer that it was desirable for him to maintain his connections with the Foreign Office and allowed him to accept missions to foreign countries for the Foreign Office as these could at the same time be used as cover for Abwehr activities.
Kraemer therefore was put in touch with Councillor von Haeften at the Foreign Office in Berlin, and also with Ahrens and Koch at the Konsular Abteilung in Hamburg. Kraemer states that he was never on the pay roll or under the direct orders of the foreign Office, merely receiving his expenses if his trip was solely in connection with Foreign Office work. He was however issued with a diplomatic passport in 1940. The foreign Office (A.A.) was short of personnel at this time and was glad to have the use of a man whose duties took him to countries where the Foreign Office also have need of a courier.
For the Abwehr, Kraemer's work was exclusively under Ritter's order. (thus before February 1941) Ritter Chief in Berlin was Major Brasser - since dead.
The Organisation of the Ast Hamburg is set out in Appendix D (i). For Eins Luft, see Appendix D (ii).
KV 2/152-1, page 1
Kraemer Karl Heinz
Siemsen, Nina Anna
KV 2/152-1, page 4
1.8.45 Extract from Camp 020 Monthly Summary re Kraemer 455x
1.8.45 Extract from report on Stiege re
(KV 2/196 ... KV 2/201)(AOB: this intriguing topic should, Deo volente, be
covered next to Kraemer's file series) organisation & Josephine
all is their guessing, as Fidrmuc had been expelled, to the American zone in
Germany; from Barcelona in January 1946)
3.8.45 Extract from report on Schueddekopf ((Amt IV represenative alt the German Legation in Lisbon) (and Amt VI-D) (KV 2/2646 .. KV 2/2648; PF 600205)
6.8.45 From S.I.S. re cover name for Onodera (!) 456b
KV 2/152-1, page 5
Ohletz (KV 2/106) first heard that Douglas (Swedish) was an agent of Kraemer through Amt VI-Z (Obst. Freund). Ohletz checked this up himself and was convinced that it was true. The information was not based on any statement made by Kraemer to Ohletz. It remains however possible that Amt VI Z may have got the information from someone to whom Kraemer gave it. It seems on the other hand more likely that it was the result of a genuine investigation on the part of Amt VI.
KV 2/152-1, page 6a + 7b partially
Kraemer has now handed in a statement saying that he had so far been concealing
the part played by (Count)
representative of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt (I only could trace the
German Wikipedia version :
was in touch with Kraemer calls Swedish noble (Nobel?)
and Foreign Office circles and supplied Kraemer with information from the
1. Count Rosen
3. Count Bonde
4. Count Douglas, brother of the C.in.C. (Commander in Chief) of the Swedish Army.
The last named was the most valuable contact and provided information about Allied intentions etc. Kraemer repeats that he gave the name of Douglas to Kleyenstüber (whom left Milamt about June/July 1944, for Spain), but now withdraws his story that this was a bluff.
Kraemer will be asked to give further details about these characters and also to state which parts of his previous statement he wishes to withdraw.
The above information extracted by the threat to arrest and interrogate his wife to whom Kraemer is devoted.
B.1.b/Anthony F. Blunt (one of the Cambridge five) 8.9.45.
KV 2/152-1, page 12 (minute 488b)
Subject: Karl Heinz Kraemer
Washington has asked that, if it is all possible, Kraemer be interrogated specifically in the G.I.S. (German Secret Intelligence) connexions of Count Paul and Countess von Toggenburg.
KV 2/152-1, page 55 partially
ad Invasion: The Swedish official circles did not expect the invasion would take place via Scandinavia. All reports about the invasion carried through via Northern Europe are designed to confuse the German Supreme Command (Operation Fortitude: after all in vain, by the way). However, Sweden prepared certain measures of protection in the southern provinces. It was realised very well that the officer-corps was resolved to fight for the country's neutrality, whilst the ratings were parted in their opinion and approximately more than 50% did not intend to resist any longer than two days. Source of information was Count Douglas, the brother of the C.i.C. of the Swedish Army.
Note. This Count Douglas is not identical with the secretary of the Swedish Foreign Office, Count Douglas, who, as I mentioned in former statements, was one of Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) sources of intelligence. I (Kraemer) thought in the beginning, when Toggenburg mentioned the name "Douglas" as his source that he referred to the Secretary of Count "Douglas" had been attached to the Swedish Legation in Madrid, it became clear to me that Toggenburg had meant Count Douglas of Norkoeping Estate, who was an intimate friend of his.
Ad Inter-Allied Relations: Except from details the general trend of Toggenburg's reports was: There had existed some chances to end the war before Germany's annihilation, but all these chances had been spoilt by the arrogant and clumsy so-called policy of Ribbentrop. (AOB: actually nonsense, as it was Hitler whom decided these aspects alone, and no one else!) Toggenburg's reports were on this line and resourced from officials of the Swedish Foreign Office, the Diplomatic Corps and leading Foreign press representatives in Stockholm. Basing on these discussions he commented various political happenings i.e. the Casablanca, Teheran and Cairo conferences, the Balkan and the Polish question, Lend-and Lease, Russian and American Far Eastern problems. The comments were very useful for my (Kraemer's) reports.
ad Situation in Northern Europe: The Finnish war and its termination, the Soviet-Russian aspirations in Northern Europe, Sweden's position and the difficulties in obtaining the neutrality-policy, the North-Norwegian question (Russia just had occupied Norwegian territory). The various sources were the Swedish Court, political and business circles.
ad Anglo-American Inner Policy: English and American party-policy, the elections in USA, Labour movements in both countries, the national Government in G.B., Conservative and Labour attitude against the different phase of the war. Sources were neutral diplomatic circles in Stockholm.
KV 2/152-1, page 63a (minute 472a)
Copy of Statement by Kraemer
Handed in on 8.9.45.
Statement about Coiunt Paul (von) Toggenburg.
A valuable source of information out of influential Swedish circles, the Court, the S
Swedish Foreign Office, the Army and the Corps Diplomatique, was Count Paul (von) Toggenburg. He was from 1941 to 1945 one of the leading German journalists in Sweden and represented the "Hamburger Fremdenblatt" and other German newspapers. I didn't mention the full value of this source in earlier statements because of my friendship to Toggenburg.
I know Toggenburg since 1939 and met him in Sweden on my trips in 1941/1942. When I was transferred to the German Legation in Stockholm I met naturally Toggenburg very often. During our military and political discussions I gather very soon that Toggenburg had excellent contacts, especially in Swedish noble circles, the Court, The Foreign Office and to various other groups of influential persons in Sweden. Naturally I was interested about the informations which Toggenburg got in these circles, we discussed the problems and I made reports to Berlin. The information dealt with:-
1) the general political situation in Europe, mainly in the North
2) the conduct of the war
3) the policy of Sweden and the attitude of the Swedish Government against the different partners of the war
4) possibility of the invasion and military situation with regard to the fact that the Allies would start an invasion in northern Europe
5) the political situation in England and USA, Foreign and inner policy.
I didn't get the information from Count Toggenburg on special request and didn't give orders generally. As I stated earlier I got the information in our discussions and also the names of some of his sources:-
1) Count Rosen
3) Count Bonde
4) Count Douglas, the brother of the Swedish Army C.i.C.
There were other contacts but I can't remember all the names.
Of special interest for me were the informations* of Douglas, which dealt with the military situation in Northern Europe, the possibility of an Allied landing and the future attitude of Sweden. It was with regard to these reports about the Allied invasion in Europe and possible actions in Northern Europe that I was questioned by Obstlt. Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber) about the source these informations. I stated that they came from Douglas, asked him to be careful with the name because of the value of the source.
KV 2/152-1, page 64b
Obst. Hansen was informed about the organisation and knew that Douglas was one of the under-sources of von Toggenburg. On special request of von Toggenburg I didn't mention his name in my reports. But for several reasons it was necessary later in Summer 1944 (not being on demand of Obst. Hansen, as he was arrested on 22th July 1944 due to his suspected involvement with the failed assassination attempt on Hitler) that I came out with von Toggenburg. He had always difficulties with the NSDAP and on request of the Propagandaministerium he should give up his post in Stockholm. When Obstlt. Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber) in June 1944 came to Stockholm, I presented Toggenburg to him as one of my valuable sources, later in autumn I sent several telegrams to Oblt. Berg I/Luft (Milamt) and to Gieselher-Wirsing to stop the transfer of von Toggenburg to Germany with all means because of the importance of von Toggenburg for my intelligence work. Nevertheless we did not succeed because of a special order of the Reichskanzlei (Hitler's or Bormann's orders). So von Toggenburg worked for me until the autumn (October or November 1944), he then went to Berlin, his wife and children were in April 1945 still on the estate of Count Douglas. (AOB: would, eventually, von Toggenburg have rejected to obey to the German order, he most likely would have lost his possessions, and finances, in Germany) His address in Stockholm was Engelbrechtsgatan 17 von Toggenburg was not paid for his activity.
KV 2/152-1, page 67a (minute 458c)
Typed 17 hrs 5.9.45 Reference 22602/p
Dispatched 4.9.45 10.30 Case Officer WRC1E
To : Dumont, Carlsruhe (French Zone) (really Karlsruhe)
From : War Room
Reference Major Friedrich Busch
A. Understand ?/M has personal grudge (resentment) against Karl Heinz Kraemer and suggest he be asked to give full account of latter intelligence activities.
B. If this does not produce results, following questions may help/
1. How long has he known Karl Heinz Kraemer
2. What does he know of Kraemer's activities in Stockholm and Switzerland?
3. Who was Kraemer's source in the Swedish Foreign Office?
4. Can he identify Kraemer's sources Josephine and Hektor (Hector)?
5. Does he know anything of the activities of Carl Wilhelm Douglas?
6. Was Anton Bela Grundbock (Grundboeck / Grundböck) ever closely connected with the GIS (German Intelligence Service), especially Eins Luft and did he ever produce any intelligence of economic or financial nature?
7. Did the Japanese run an extensive intelligence net-work in Sweden? If so, can he give details?
KV 2/152-1, page 68a (minute 468b)
Extract from Interrogation on Friedrich Busch alias Bergmann, dated 4.9.45.
The Arabal Network.
In 1944 Obstlt. (Dr.) Ludwig von Bohlen of the Milamt, (KV 2/1975; PF 602800) (Milamt B-3; Milamt alias Mate) Referat Iberia, informed Busch that there existed in the U.K. a network of 4 agents, network had the cover name Arabal, and each had an alias beginning in "A", one being Alaric.
They were: a) a Polish officer, ? a Colonel. (Walenty??)
b) a De Gaulist officer
c) an officer's batman, called Jonny
d) one D... (name forgotten)
Busch studied their reports and found an astonishing similarity between them and those of Kraemer from Stockholm, and of Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) (the latter is, Deo volente, a future aim of my contributions) from Lisbon. He told von Bohlen that he considered they were controlled. But von Bohlen tersely that if he informed Schellenberg of Busch's views, the latter would be shot as a defeatist. There were no other agents producing information of similar value and the G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) could not admit that it had no genuine agents, in the U.K.
Jonny gave information about plans for the invasion of the Pas-de-Calais (Fortitude?) which his Colonel had spoken to him about, and also concerning the maps which he had seen prepared for the landing.
The Agent Ostro.
Dr. Beck was Ostro's case officer (=
Wilhelm von Carnap).
He told Busch that his real name was Fidermuk (Fidrmuc)
and that he had a Danish wife (correct).
He had worked for long before the war for I H Ost (=
against Czechoslovakia. He was in Denmark in 1939, where he was arrested by the
Danes, but was released by the Germans in 1940 (early
Dr. Beck took him over and he was sent to Lisbon to work against the U.K.)
Ostro also sent back reports on British aircraft factories and their production, stating that he had a friend in the Society of British Aircraft constructors. he sent reports on the strength of the R.A.F. in June 1940, which the General Staff considered too high, but Ostro was vindicated by the Battle of Britain, and stated that he would cease working if he continued to be disbelieved (please reconsider my forgoing comments) Beck went down (we probably possess a photo of both men meeting at Estoril in Portugal) (AOB: here a mix-up in time does take place) As the attack on Fidrmuc life occurred about late 1943 or early 1944) (AOB: but again Beck was not Fidrmuc's actual handling officer - that was Oblt. von Carnap, alias, for some time, Skapura)
Please digest the last paragraph yourself. As there is too much expectation and guess.
KV 2/152-1, page 71 (minute 468a)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.F.20 dated 3.9.45
Would you please let us have two more copies of Camp 020 Interim Report on Karl Heinz Kraemer. I find that O.S.S. (= Office of Strategic Services) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Strategic_Services) have quietly sent a couple of copies across to their representative in Stockholm without letting us know, which has resulted in rather embarrassing situation for our man. I had originally not intended to send anything to Stockholm till we had got Kraemer to tell us something nearer the truth.
for P.G. Mason.
Major Blunt (one of the "Cambridge five men") M.I.5.
KV 2/152-1, page 72 (minute 467a)
D.4.a. Major W.S. Mars (P.O. Box 500) (Home Office?)
It is probable that a Japanese citizen called Monotaro Enomoto will apply for a visa for this country (AOB: really?). Section V (S.I.S) and this section are particularly anxious that he should come here (he will in fact be put into Camp 020).
I imagine that this problem would have to be put specially to the Home office who would presumably not normally encourage a Japanese to come here from Sweden. I should be grateful if you could urge them to grant the visa, or if you prefer, I could put the case to them myself. (AOB: I myself admire the Legal stand of the Home Office! They, regularly operate legally - quite strictly, though often not much appreciated, by the British Secret Services)
The reason for our wanting Enomoto here is that he has been deeply involved in the activities of both the Japanese and the German Intelligence Services in different parts of Europe, and that he may be able to supply us with valuable general information (and the Russians?) and with details bearing on other cases at present under investigation. (pointing mainly on the "Klatt" (= Richard Kauder) case)
B.1.B./Anthony F. Blunt. 1.9.45. Sgd. A.F. Blunt
KV 2/152-1, page 73 (minute 466a)
Dear This is to confirm our conversation on the subject of Monotaro Enomoto. I have consulter (Guy) Liddell who approves of the idea of bringing him (as to trap him) to this country (into) Camp 020, but would prefer to do without directly involving Lord Marley (H.O.). (AOB: a clear statement that M.I.5. feared the pure Legal standard within the British Legislation; disliked by most British Secret Service Members) (likely implying some tricks as just to by-pass the British Legislation!) I understand, however, that your scheme would not involve him.
I am telling our visa section that we are both anxious for a visa to be granted to this man if he applies, and they will no doubt do what they can with the Home Office.
KV 2/152-1, page 120 (minute 462c)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/V.F.20 of 28.8.45
Reference our telephone conversation last night. herewith text of telegram received from our (Section V) representative in Stockholm:-
(a most heavily bribed Czech employed at the telex office at the German Legation) Source who supplied (illegally) (carbon) teleprints (FS) confirms that Kraemer used both secret ink and microphotography*. Evidence for use of former is personal observation when case of secret inks belonging belonging to Kraemer was sent from Chancery to Air Department on Siemsen's departure to Denmark. Evidence for use of microphotography is statement by Wenzlau who reported that Huettner of the Zeiss, assisted Kraemer in this work. This is confirmed by reports from Kraemer's maid (household maid Helen Fiedler and her girl-friend Anna Erikssen) (X1060 X1060return) that Huettner was frequently with Kraemer.
For Major P.G. Mason.
Major A. Blunt. M.I.5.
KV 2/152-1, page 121 (minute 462b)
PF602765 = KV 2/106
M.I.5/B.1.b/Major Blunt. (Copy to War Room C3 Mr. Ferguson)
This is to confirm that Captain Parnell, CSDIC (Combiner Services Detailed Interrogation Centre), has telephoned to you the information that Ohletz was able to give concerning Kraemer's connection with the Douglas group and that you are satisfied that no further questions on this subject can profitably be put to Ohletz, at any rate at any moment.
Captain Parnell also telephoned to Captain Firmston Williams, W.R.C.1.e., who is taking over the Ohletz case, and reported the following information supplied by Ohletz on the Arnhem landing (an example of microdots communications via Fullep - Horvath - towards Kraemer in Stockholm).:
A signal arrived in Berlin from the Air Attaché (Kraemer), Stockholm, addressed to O.K.L. (Via the German Foreign Office). Although it arrived before the Arnhem landing (Operation Marker Garden), it was unaccountably held up by O.K.L. (AOB: wasn't it the German Foreign Office A.A.?) and was not received by O.K.W. until after the landing.
The signal in question gave correct date and stated that a strong landing was to take place around Arnhem. It also stated that there was to be another landing between Wesel (S.E. of Arnhem) and Bocholt. (AOB: this, eventually, might be pointing at "virtual" operations after the successful capture of the Rhine Bridge passage at Arnhem) (a Montgomery penchant)
W.R.C. 28.8.45. M.N. Forrest. Major.
KV 2/152-1, page 123 (minute 460b)
From B.1.L. To Mr. Colledge, B.1.b.
With reference to the events in Stockholm last May, when Hans Schaefer, Deutsche Lufthansa representative, Harald Swallving of A.B.A.'s Freight Department and Johan Emil Mueller of A.B.A. at Bromma (Stockholm's Airport) were arrested and put on trial for espionage, I have now heard from S.I.S. that the following sentences were passed. Schaefer got 17 months hard labour, Mueller 14 months hard labour, and Swallving 14 month hard labour. These sentences seem very light indeed (than that where the British had actually aimed for; after all their efforts, they might have expected quite something differently).
27.8.45 J.R. Stopford.
KV 2/152-1, page 131 (minute 459b)
From: Captain Scott-Harston To: Lieut. Col. Stimson
With reference to W.R.C. 3a's (Dr. Ferguson's) memoranda of 7.8.45. (Question 1) and 13.8.45, Schellenberg has been interrogated thereon, with the following results:-
1. Did Amt VI have warning from any source of the British airborne landing at Arnhem?
Yes. The information was, however, received a few hours too late to be of use, as it was held up at the Luft Attaché Abteilung of the Luftwaffe.
a. What were the sources of the information regarding the Arnhem landing?
The information was acquired from Kraemer of the German Legation in Stockholm (AOB, genuinely originating from Fullep in Spain)
b. Was the information regarding the impending landing passed to Amt VI? If so, to which Gruppe (Referat)?
Yes, The information was passed to Milamt C and Schellenberg states that he includes Milamt C when speaking of Amt VI in this connection (AOB: Schellenberg was heading both branches)
c. Was the information passed on to O.K.W. i.e. what reliability did Amt VI give to the information it received, and how did it dispose of it?
This question is not altogether clear, but Schellenberg states that the Luft Attaché passed the information to the Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab (Luftwaffenführungsstab) from whence it was passed to the Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Wehrmachtführungsstab). As to reliability, the information was received too late for assessment prior to the acts to which it related, though the serious intentions of the landing were appreciated. The information had originally been passed from Stockholm at about 18 - 24 hours prior to the landing. The information was received by Milamt C some hours after the landing had occurred, and all that Milamt C could do was stress to the Staffs concerned the seriousness of the position. The information was also received several hours subsequent to the landing by the Luftwaffenführungsstab from the Luftwaffe Attaché.
d. Did the O.K.W. on receipt of the information modify disposition in order to cope with the landing?
The information was (finally) received too late for this purpose.
Camp 020. 18.8.45.
KV 2/152-1, page 132 (minute 459a)
War Room C.1(b) Major Forrest.
This report is extremely interesting from various points of view, and there are several points in it which I should like amplified.
1) In paragraph 1 Ohletz (Obstlt. Milamt-C Leiter Ost) mentions Graf Douglas (Swedish Army C.i.C.) as a source of Kraemer. I should like all possible details about Douglas and, in particular, how Ohletz came to know that he was an agent of Kraemer. (AOB: these men are far to simple informed: it was Graf von Toggenburg whom was actually - in direct touch with Graf Douglas. The latter might even not have known Kraemer personally. And, Kraemer obtained information on a secondary basis, thus indirectly.) Did Kraemer tell him that he was, or did Ohletz identify him by entirely independent means? His present account seems to imply the latter, but it happens to be very important that the matter should be quite clear.
2) At the end of the passage on Josephine, Ohletz refers to Kraemer's journeys to Switzerland. Can he tell us at all what contacts Kraemer made there. The latter has told us he had contacts with Japanese (Okamoto) and with certain Poles in Berne (Bern), and it would be of great interest if Ohletz confirmed this.
3) In paragraph on Hektor (Hector), Ohletz refers to his going sour (bitter). Can he give any further details about this, e.g. does he mean that Hektor merely stopped working, or that he was politically disgruntled (displeased), or that he was actively disloyal, or merely that the liaison broke down owing to some mechanical difficulty?
I will show the report to Section V (S.I.S.) who may have some further questions to add.
B.1.b./AFBlunt. 17.8.45 Sgd. A.F. Blunt
KV 2/152-1, page 133a (minute 458b)
Extract from translation of statement by Schellenberg on 20.8.45.
Question: Did you have sources of information amongst the men in de Gaulle's and Bidault's entourage?
Answer: Wirsing (Gieselher) was always well in the picture as regards the political line of action which we suspected Bidault to have. I assumed that this knowledge was based firstly on his very extensive reading (Gieselher-Wirsing was an international journalist from profession; as well as newspaper publisher and had lived, for some, time in the US, before the war between Germany and the US broke out) - (he was positively a living "Who's Who") - and for the rest of the of the Foreign Office reports examined by him (likely obtained via Schellenberg's Amt IV). Wising also learned a lot about the French situation from Kraemer, during Kraemer's stay in Berlin, during evening discussions on politics. But, according to Wirsing, Kraemer could only generalise on such topics.
KV 2/152-1, page 134b
Extract from translation of statement by Schellenberg on 20.8.45.
Question: Did Amt VI (Schellenberg was the founder and Leiter of the entire office) receive any results from the Finnish deciphering department?
Answer: I believe that Kraemer, in Stockholm, through collaboration with the Japanese Military Attaché Onodera, got old of two Russian codes, which were supposed to have come from the Finnish service. It involved (according to the evaluation of the deciphering department) in one case - at least so I remember - a basic principle which was considered to be not very valuable but nevertheless interesting. They were still working on the other code, and and here it was supposed a key which was perhaps still in use and employed by the Russian army was involved. However, the evaluation was not yet (thus never - as Germany did surrender in the meantime) completed. The foregoing was recounted to me by Ohletz (Milamt C), and it is possible that Kraemer mentioned it to me as well. I cannot remember any other cases particularly not in connection with Amt VI.
KV 2/152-1, page 146 (minute 457y)
Extract from Translation of statement by Schellenberg on 13.8.45.
Question 1: Did Amt VI have warning from any source of the British airborne landing at Arnhem?
Answer: Yes, but the message itself, which was sent by teleprinter (FS) (kk?) (Blitzfernschreiben) from Kraemer in Stockholm was held up at the Attaché's office (AOB: In my perception - not as noticed before situated in the OKW, it had been receipt at the German Foreign Office (A.A.) logically; as it was located at the (diplomatic) Legation and not at the K.O. which obeyed to the Milamt) (But the matter wasn't considered being trustworthy enough at "das Auswärtiges Amt" and therefore was (delayed) at first instance) owing to a technical hitch, so that no real, that is to say, effective warning reached the general Staff (conveying the message to the OKW). Nevertheless importance was attached to the message in spite of the delay. It was never established who was responsible for delaying the transmission (toward the Milamt) of the message.
AOB: I went through the entire KV 2/152-2 series, which mainly covers Nina Siemsen's note book entries; which, in my perception, do not make sense in our regard.
As to open the new KV 2/153 series, it does make sense to create a new according web-page.
Next link will be activated in due course.
By Arthur O. Bauer