KV2/147-K-H-Kraemer

Please bear in mind: The purpose of this historical contribution is for studying purposes only, therefore, do not multiply it, as still Crown Copyrights being valid, partially!

photo typically taken at Camp 020, after Kraemer's arrest on 15th May 1945 and his arrival at Camp 020 on My 17th

AOB: all these Camp 020 photos are typically bearing the separation between two background cover plates.

AOB: Please notice that this jacket has been engaged with in particular in the 1970s

about the time that Mrs. MacCallum was preparing her study of the Krämer (Kraemer) files, as to re-study aspects, for what ever reasons,

Historians, often show knew light on historical aspects; in MacCallum's context: of ca. 30 years ago.

Profiling is not always the best environment, as to see matters without resentments and - their former enemy has now become an ally.

Dr. Karl-Heinz Kraemer; with wife and child, photo taken, likely, in his Stockholm residence

I spoke to name deleted of Section V (S.I.S.), about the teleprint (Fernschreib Kopien) (concerning the duplicates, bought from two men, of whom one of Czech origin; employed at the telex Office inside the German Embassy in Stockholm) message at 93a. The reference intended is not to be the letter concerning Miss Irene Ward but of the letter of the same date (see minute 274a = 13.4.45; From S.I.S. re agent 01.) and reference filed in Link Volume 3.

I did, however, take the opportunity of raising the question with (name deleted) of the interrogation when he is arrested in Stockholm (AOB: he will not be arrested on Swedish territory, but in British controlled Flensburg Germany) (They would not have had a legal mandate to arrest anyone on Swedish territory), and pointed out that that it was a matter of considerable importance to this office that this interrogation should be done by somebody well equipped with knowledge of the background. I required whether Section V had contemplated sending anybody out to Stockholm and (name deleted) said they had considered but doubted if they had anybody to send. I impressed him with the importance of consulting us before before they finally determined the method to be adopted in ~~Kramer~~ Kraemer's interrogation. A.D.B. (Dick G. White's Office?) Sgd. Herbert L.A. Hart (M.I.5. B.1.b)

The following message were originating from the time that Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer did leave together with Nina Siemsen Swedish territory, voluntary, and already had left via Denmark returning into Schleswig-Holstein.

20.4.45 From Air Attaché (Kraemer) to CinC (Commander in Charge) Luftwaffe Norway re Courier Service between Sweden and England (XXX Material) (AOB: The Germans were no longer allowed to transmitter telex messages from their office inside the Germany Embassy. They had to use special provisions via the Stockholm Post Office) (AOB: their secret telex machines among it the most advanced SFM T43 machine (Siemens); they had been able to dismantle their sensitive gear and convey the parts secretly to the German Services in Norway)

26.4.45 From S.I.S. appreciation of "K" Intelligence reports as appearing in ULTRA/ZIP/JMA, compiled by G.2. (Military intelligence) (AOB: here we encounter the delay caused by Kraemer handing over to Onodera in Stockholm, whom transmitted by means of Japanese coding machine (J25 code) - being intercepted by U.S. Service, decoded evaluated and some of it conveyed to the British Services. This causes, of course, some delay. Because Kraemer left about 20th April Swedish territory)

Further to our letter CX/38651/836/I/M dated 11.3.45 the following somewhat fuller details of the Rajgrodsky case may be of assistance to our (Camp) 020 interrogators.

The courier mentioned in paragraph 2 flew to Berlin on 'name deleted 's' behalf of Kraemer and Wenzlau on 9th December, 1944 taking with him heavily sealed documents destinated for the Auslandabwehrabteilung (Amt Amt Mil). The packets that the courier took contained a Russian code book and a long report concerning an Intelligence Line set up by the Germans with the help of the people in the Polish Legation in Stockholm. The name of the contact in the Polish Legation is given by (secret) source as Rajgrodsky. Subsequent enquiries in Stockholm revealed a) that the courier who took these documents to Berlin was source himself and and b) the Rajgrodsky mentioned was Viktor Rajgrodsky.

Reference paragraph 4. At the end of January 1944 the Germans Intelligence Service has established that the Americans were using a? person by the name Rajgrodsky who was also of the same nationality as Kraemer's agent. Kraemer had accordingly been ordered to use this individual in accordance with "Scheme 2". According to (British) source this meant that he was to be used for conveying deceptive information to the Americans. The information, that Rajgrodsky was known to be working for the Americans, was obtained by source from Erika Wendt, an employee of the German Legation.

Reference paragraph 5. I attache herewith a photostat copy of the Pahle document with Rajgrodsky's signature. This is our only copy and we would be grateful if you would return it in due course. As you will see, this document was signed in 1942 so that there is a possibility of his signature having changed slightly in the intervening two and a half years.

We have again requested our Polish liaison department to confirm that Rajgrodsky was not at any time employed by the Polish S.I.S. They assure us that he was at no time employed by them. This is really one of the most important points in the case and it would be most regrettable if it were that the Poles were withholding information from us, but at least the responsibility would not be ours.

No. of Message = the according telex number of which Section V in Stockholm received copies of; these messages had been sent from the telex room (Fernschreib Büro) in the German Embassy

Source "Hektor" actually is a cover-name for the kind of source, according Kraemer's system.

To the C. in C. Air Force Norway (kommandierenden General der Luftwaffe in Norwegen.)

Major (G.S.) von Lillienskjold (z.H. (zur Hand), thus sent by means of a courier) Major im Generalstab von Lillienskjöld.)

Subject: Courier Service between Sweden and England. Betr.: Kurierverkehr Schweden - England.

Discussion with Air Attaché in Stockholm. Bezug: Besprechung mit Luft Attaché (Kraemer) in Stockholm.

The Air Attaché is able to send you times of departure of the courier planes leaving Bromma (Stockholm Airport) with a delay of 20 minutes. (Seitens des Luftattache besteht die Möglichkeit, die Startzeiten der in Bromma startenden Kurierflugzeuge mit einer Verzögerung von etwa 20 Minuten nach dort zu geben.)

Owing to the present position, however, this information can only be obtained by the Air Attache in person or his representative. (Meldung nur durch Luftattache persönlich oder seinen Vertreter möglich.)

Since the announcement must not be made every day the Air Attache proposes that on days when there will be night patrol, a request will be made to the Air Attache before 18.00 hours with a short telephone conversation. (Damit nicht täglich gemeldet werden muss, schlägt Luftattache (Kraemer) vor, dass am Tagen wo dort Einsatz - (deutscher) Nachtjagd* besteht (von Norwegen aus) bis 18.00 bei der Luftattache mit kurzem FS (Fernschreib = telex). The telephone conversation would run thus: "Please give me news about No. 333/45", or "We again ask today for an answer to your letter No. 333/45".

FS (telex message) Würde so lauten: "Erbitten Nachricht zu Nr. 333/45" oder "Antwort auf Schreiben Nr. 333/45 heute noch erbeten".

The Air Attache's answer would be given as follows: "Reference your enquiry 333/45, six pieces 1645". (Von Lutfattache würde als Antwort gemeldet werden: Zu Anfrage 333/45 6 Stück 1645.)

In every case the last figure of the day of the month should be added to the integers of the time figures, for instance, on the 5th of any month the message would mean that one aircraft left at 21.45 hours. (Es ist hierbei von der Stückzahl jeweils die letzte Ziffer des jeweiligen Monatstages hinzuzuzählen der Uhrzeit. Es würde dieses also am 5. eines Monats bedeuten, dass ein Flugzeug um 21.45 gestartet ist. Other examples are attached. Weitere Beispiele anliegened. (see below) In view of the difficulties of telephonic communication at the Air Attache's (Kraemer's) office it would be necessary to find out in advance for any evening that communication could be obtained at short notice between the Air Attache and the C. in C. Air Force Norway of the (SFM) T 43 (one of the most secure telex machines then existing in the world).

(Wegen der bei der Diensstelle des Luftattache (German Legation in Stockholm) bestehenden FS (telex) müsste für diesem Abend sichergestellt sein, das auf kurze Anforderung Verbindung zwischen Luftattache und Kommandierenden General der Luftwaffe Norwegen auf der (SFM) T 43 hergestellt werden kann. Alle Uhrzeiten in DGZ (Deutsche Gesetzliche Zeit).

In view of the exceptionally careful observation kept on all German offices, the Air Attache asks that these announcements should only be asked for on those days when really favourable circumstances exist for a night attack. (Nachtjagd equals fighter attack at night.) (Wegen der derzeitigen ausserordendlichen starken Ueberwachung aller deutschen Diensstellen bittet Luftattache, dass die Meldung nur an den Tagen, an denen tatsächlich günstige Nachtjagdbedingungen herrschen, angefordert wird. Soweit hier bekannt, erfolgt Start der Flugzeuge z.Zt. normalerweise zwischen 22.00 und 24.00 Uhr. Um Vernichtung des schreibens nach Eingang mit Ausnahme der Anlage, sowie Bestätigung wird gebeten.

* The German Night-fighters were, as the entire German Military Services, strongly hampered by the supply of patrol (gasoline) and therefore the Luftwaffe operated only when the expected results may be worth it.

Recent Development of Hungarian I.S. Activity in Sweden and plans for collaboration with the Germans and Japanese.

1. A quite considerable influx of Hungarians and other nationals from South-Eastern Europe to Stockholm, some of whom were earlier connected with Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer), and a noticeable increase in the Hungarian Intelligence activity in Sweden make it desirable to study the trend of Hungarian I.S. activity and its collaboration with both Germans and Japanese, and examine how Krämer (Kraemer) now certainly the leading light of the German Intelligence in Stockholm, fits into the picture.

2. Owing to there being traces of the many Krämers (Kraemers), it was not until we had known Karl Heinz Krämer in Stockholm for some time that we were able to identify him with a Doctor of the same name, known to us from Ast Hamburg in 1941, and later to discover that he had been in the U.K. in 1939.

1. Krämer (Kraemer) first became known to us from PAIR in February, 1941, when he was evidently a member of Ast Hamburg; he was to visit Sofia and Istambul (Istanbul), to meet Dr. Friede of K.O. Turkey (KONO) (Dr. Friede represented the AO = Auslandorganisation. In my perception a NAZI like organisation, as to control Germans abroad, including civilians) (This journey is, however, not confirmed in the data obtained from his passport (Q1017 Q1017return), but a journey, but a journey to Yugoslavia in April 1940 and visits to Hungary in April, May and June, July and November 1940 tend to show that he was probably working on the Balkans and the Middle-East for AST (Abwehrstelle) from early 1940.)

2. In August 1941 he sent for a Hungarian, KAM-RAS, from Turkey to meet him in Sofia. (His passport shows a visit to Hungary in August and to Roumania in September; so it seems likely he was then also in Bulgaria and the copying of his passport may have been at fault.)

3. The first evidence of his association with Major Wenzlau (they were friends) is dated May 1941; Wenzel U? was then a Hauptmann (Hptm.) and also in Hamburg, though he is believed to have belonged to Nest (Nebenstelle of AST Hamburg) Bremen.

a) K LLIEIER??, using alias J. Nos Wild, in Budapest and intending to go to Hamburg in June, having failed to get a Swiss visa.

c) Gyorgy, André, (now in our hands in Cairo, having deserted). (AOB: real name Andros Gross alias André Gyorgy and many other cover-names. He became rather involved in the KLATT affairs)

d) Plessing, Baron Kurt von (also thought to be now in Cairo associated in Budapest with KMRS.?

e) Hauptmann (Captain) von Bog??my (Bogany?) or Pogamy (AOB: Bagyoni KV 2/3646 PF 603873), expected in Hamburg in May 1941; had organised relay stations in New York and Washington. (Not identified but just possibly identical with Bagyani

KV 2/147-2, page 16b (AOB: this current section is actually in a disorder and please trust my created alphabetic sequence)

h) Dr. Schmidt, Gyula (Hungarian masculine first name), expected in Hamburg in July.

5. He was also connected with the Almasy operation (1941/42 in the Sahara and Egypt):

7. He probably left Hamburg (AOB: Major Nikolaus Ritter alias Dr. Rantzau of Ast Hamburg Referatsleiter I L) ( KV 2/85 ... KV 2/88) in the Autumn of 1941 and was transferred to ~~Ast~~ Referat III Berlin (Tirpitzufer). (His passport shows no journeys abroad in October and November). In December 1941 Sonderführer (Sdf. letter lacking) Krämer (Kraemer)

(AOB: Sdf. (or Sonderführer) was a military intermediate ranking. Only provided to those whom were possessing exceptional skills, and by this means - without a military training - got a rank in the military hierarchy. For example: the lowest rank was a Sdf. (G) Gruppenführer/ Feldwebel (Uffz = NCO); .... the highest was Sdf. (B) Batallionsführer (= Major)

was to visit Madrid, Lisbon and Barcelona. (Passport confirms his presence in Portugal)

8. On April 11th he was at a conference called in Munich (München by Major Brede, Leiter I Luft in the Abwehr Amt, and on the following day was probably at a second conference in Berlin.

9. In May 1942 he planned to go to Lisbon (these trips were managed by means of regular Airline Flights as Lufthansa maintained up to the bitter end of the war) . (The journey is not confirmed by the passport entries) He probably went to Portugal later and we know he flow from Lisbon to Berlin on 31.7.42) Passport confirms he was in Portugal in July). (He is known to have been employed in the Stockholm Legation since November 1942.) (AOB: establishing as a diplomatic Air Attaché?)

Diplomatic passport No. 78/837 issued in Budapest 21.6.42. W/T expert. Head of the Turkish Section of the IInd Section of Hungarian G.S. and right-hand man of Colonel Merkli.

The earliest information concerning Bagyoni's activities abroad was his arrival in Istambul in September 1943, and soon afterwards he was said to be first assistant to Colonel Hatz, the Military Attaché. but in the Spring of 1944 it was thought that Bagyoni was the real head of Hungarian espionage and counter espionage in Turkey/ In Turkey he was also said to be concerned with a scheme for evacuating Jews from Europe; he is, however, anti-Semetic and was only financially interested in this scheme.

Colonel Hatz was recalled to Budapest under German pressure in April 1944 but he returned to Turkey on a short visit in June, having apparently convinced the Germans of his loyalty. He was appointed A.D.C. to the Minister of Ear in Budapest. In November 1944. as Chief of Staff of the 7th Hungarian Corps, he deserted to the Russians at Miskolc. (he suffered jail sentence for quite some years!)

2. Bagyoni arrived in Stockholm early in October 1944 and there he got in touch with Jewish agency representative, who reported on him as a regular member of the Hungarian Diplomatic and Consular Services to the Jews. Bagyoni told the Jewish Agency that he had been called to Budapest about July 1944 by a faked telegram and on arrival had been imprisoned by the Gestapo (Sipo-SD?); an American born German, Roberts, produced his release and visas to reach?

to reach Sweden; Bagyoni claimed to favour the allies, but feared the Russians. he next approached officials of the British Legation who were, however, forewarned that he was pro-Nazi and suspect.

3. The first evidence of the connection between Bagyoni and Karl Krämer (Kraemer) was contained in a teleprint from I Luft, Berlin to Krämer (Kraemer) dated November 15th, 1944; this contained a message, dated November 6th, which he was to pass to Bagyono - "Am well, am moving to Western Hungary Szonbathely?. If the Government is recognised shall come to your end. Sophie is to stay at your end". The same message contained a reference to Vöczköndy, whose case was to be discussed with Himmler (?) and Chef III F (= Counter-Intelligence).

4. No further mention of Bagyoni was seen in this traffic until a teleprint from Krämer (Kraemer) to R.S.H.? dated 2nd January, 1945, which contains the following points;

i) Krämer (Kraemer) has not seen Bagyoni any more, but keeps touch with him through Vöczköndy.

iii) Berlin has evidently decided that Dr. Hans Wagner then still Leiter K.d.M. (Kommandomeldegebiet) (formerly K.O. Sweden) Sweden, is to take, is to take over Bagyoni; Krämer (Kraemer) points out that this does not help, as

iv) ~~Höttle~~'s (Hoettl; Dr. Wilhelm; KV 2/412, PF 602139) suggestion from Berlin that the Hungarian authorities should run the case is equally unacceptable owing to the attitude of the Swedish Government.

v) Bagyoni claims payments of Kr. 3,000 monthly and money for his agent Somogyi in addition; Krämer (Kraemer) paid him Kr. 1,500 in December.

vi) He already had contacts with foreigners and seemed to be working for III F (German Counter-espionage)

viii) Bagyoni wants Stubaj (?) Hoettl to state whether contact should be made with the Debrecen Government through Colonel Hatz; Krämer (Kraemer) points to Hatz's part in Kgf 7. (presumably Kriegsgefangener, but the sense of this is obscure)

ix) Krämer (Kraemer) asks whether the Hungarian assistant of Major Nemeth, who refuses to obey the order of Colonel Köbör, is to be taken over by STBF (Sturmbannführer?) II ND. This man is a W/T expert.

All these questions are to be discussed in Berlin with Major Wenzlau. (AOB: about 13th April 1945 the telex (Fernschreib) lines had been cut by the encircling Russian Army of Berlin)

5. After a long interval, in which it would seen that Krämer (Kraemer) got little help from Berlin, he sent two further signals to ~~R.S.H.A.~~? (AOB: curious, he regularly communicated with the German Foreign Office (A.A.) and this Ministry transferred the messages further to Amt Mil /Mil Amt) on 13th March, 1945, which contained the following points to supplement the story of Bagyoni;

i) He was sent to Stockholm by Hoettl with III F (counter Intelligence) assignments though he did not expose details to Krämer (Kraemer).

iii) He was to keep in touch, presumably with Hoettl, originally through Vöczköndy, and later by W/T to Budapest.

iv) He agreed that Swedish monitoring made the W/T project impossible, and after Vöczköndy's departure he wanted to keep touch with ~~Höttel~~ Hoettl via Krämer (Kraemer). Himmler (or probably Schellenberg) (Leiter Amt VI (Mil Amt /Amt Mil) instructed them to discontinue contact with him.

v) Krämer (Kraemer) met Bagyoni by chance on 21st February and learnt that the Svedes were expelling him by March 3rd. Later Bagyoni telephoned and arranged to meet a cut-out on 8th March, to receive $4,000 sent by Hoettl on 21st January for Sokogny and himself; he failed to appear but telephoned to Krämer (Kraemer) on 13th March and asked for another appointment with the cut-out. The cut-out is reported to Frau Reichenbach, secretary to Major Wenzlau. (AOB: I wonder, how did they know all these informations? Have the tapped telephone lines themselves?)

From this it is clear that in spite of the threatened expulsion Bagyoni was still in Stockholm up to the middle of March.

From Krämer's (Kraemer's) further observations in these telegrams, it is clear that he is very angry at having the connection with Bagyoni forced upon him; he criticises the way in which he was sent to Stockholm on an ill-prepared plan and after stating that Bagyoni is extraordinarily skilled and well-versed in intelligence work, explains how dangerous he can be owing to his knowledge of German I.S. personnel; he expresses fears that Bagyoni will desert to the allies or that he is being used as a trap for the Germans.

ii) Vöczköndy is Major Lászlo V. (known to us for a considerable Military Attaché at the Hungarian Legation Stockholm, in February 1944; had previously been "the brain" of Section xxiii of the Hungarian Minister of Defence and was then working under Andransky: he attempted after the fall of the Horty Government to usurp the function of Hungarian Minister (highest official at the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm) and on 30th October, 1944, he left Sweden to become Under secretary of the Hungarian ministry of Foreign Affairs; he returned, however, to Stockholm in December and appears to be still there.

iii) The mention of Freund and III F is not clear; the fact that Bagyoni was working for Hoettl seems seems to contradict this, though it is likely that Bagyoni knows Oberstleutnant Freund of Abw. Amt III F (correctly: it should be Mil Amt-III-F ) in the Balkans. Sturmbannführer (= Major) Hoettl was formerly in Vienna and is now at R.S.H.A. Amt - B, which deals with Italy and the Balkans. This suggests that Bagyoni's mission is not one of counter-espionage (III F). The reference to Sturmbannführer II N.D. is also thought to refer to Hoettl.

iv) Somogyi is Fernez S, who arrived in Sweden in November 1944 in a C.D. (Corps Diplomatique) car, having come through Germany and Denmark, which seems exceptional. He stated that he had bought his car from the Hungarian Press Attaché in Rome. He posed as democrat and said that he wanted to go on to Finland. Born about 1914 (Like was Karl Heinz Kraemer).

This man is most likely to be identical to Sokogyan, whose name accurse in PAIR in February, 1945; the S.D organisation (AOB:?? Amt VI / Mil Amt / Amt Mil??)

in Bucharest gave his address at thee Grand Hotel in Stockholm to Nürenberg and asked that money should be transferred to him through him.

v) Major Nemeth is probably identical with Lajos Nemethi who arrived first in Sweden in May 1944; he is listed as a Legation employee, and has since been back to Germany or Hungary; he is not likely to be identical with Nemethi of the Hungarian P.P. Colonel Köbör, whom we know to have been still at his post in Stockholm, in December gave instructions for the recall of a Hungarian I.S. officer, Major Cachi, who was directing a stay-behind W/T agent Timisoar, Roumania. This was an early suggestion of a control of the Hungarian I.S. from Stockholm.

7. Another German agent, who is known to have connections with both Krämer (Kraemer) and Bagyoni is Dr. Julius (or Gyula) Schmidt, .. .

(h) it is not established whether he is a German or Hungarian national. He is already mentioned in para. 4 (h) above, and this proves his connection with Krämer (Kraemer) from July 1941. A passport in this name was seen in Krämer's flat in April 1944 (this was "borrowed" by Section V with intermediate support of the housemaid of the Kraemer's when both Karl-Heinz and his wife weren't at home

(R1018 R1018return) ) it was No. 4157, issued in Hamburg on 22.11.40 and valid for 5 years with an Italian visa, dated Berlin 12.5.42. dr. Schmidt Gyulane was reported to be visiting Krämer in July, 1944 in Stockholm, and it seems beyond doubt these three are identical one with another and also with Dr. Schmidt, who was a somewhat vaguely described in the Hungarian primer. He should, however, not be confused with a Dr. Hans (?) Schmidt, who was probably Leiter III F (Counter-espionage) in Budapest and a German.

8. Whilst it can be safely assumed that Bagyoni is a thoroughly mischievous man and there can be no doubt that he and Somogyi were sent to Sweden by R.S.H.A. Amt VI there is at present nothing to suggest that they are to work under Krämer (Kraemer) or that either of them knows a great deal of Krämer's (Kraemer's) work or sources. For the moment the exact purpose of their despatch must remain open to conjuncture; Bagyoni's approach to the Jewish Agency and subsequently to members of the British Legation suggest that the intention is to collect intelligence concerning British activities and the U.K., and it must be remembered that Bagyoni had previously been in touch with the Jews in Istambul (Istanbul). On the other hand the connection with Major Vöczköndy suggests actively against Russia, an idea which is strengthened by the plan to contact Colonel Hatz in Debrechen. How this should be done from Stockholm, it is difficult to see.

Vöczköndy and Köbör are further known to have connections with the Japanese through the military Attaché, General Onodera, and this opens possibilities for work against Russia.

Whatever the Germans plan for exploitation of Bagyoni may have been, it was quite natural that under the circumstances Bagyoni himself should consider Stockholm a safer spot than Hungary or Germany, even though his arrest by the Swedish authorities may, by now, have proved him wrong.

9. Another interesting arrival in Stockholm is Doctor Momotara Enomoti*; he arrived on 20th or 21st January, 1945, and reported to the Japanese Military Attach130, General Onodera, who passed the news to Krämer (Kraemer) or Major Wenzlau; the latter, who is the more likely recipient of Onodera's news, had seen Enomoti in the R.S.H.A. (Amt VI) office →

* Enomoti's arrival in Stockholm had been exceptional: he crossed - via the Balkans, Germany and Denmark, in December 1944, in his own car. Please bear in mind, that for non-military purposes it was merely impossible to obtain petrol (allowances / coupons) for a private car. However, he certainly had been fit with the necessary travel papers including sufficient numbers of patrol coupons!

in Berlin on the 8th January; Enomoti was evidently not known to Onodera before and he was forewarned neither of his arrival nor of the nature of his mission in Sweden; the same applies to Krämer (Kraemer) and Wenzlau, who were partially angry about this muddle, in view of Enomoti clearly being a German agent and carrying a code supplied by the Germans, which Onodera took away from him for safe-keeping. The lack of preparation in the despatch is further emphasised by the fact that Enomoti had already got into trouble with the S.D. (AOB: likely here they might mean: Geheime Feldpolizei (GFP)) in passing passing through Denmark. Enomoti on arrival informed Onodera concerning his previous work connection with ~~Richard Klatt~~ (code-name: Max) (real name: Richard Kauder) https://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-queries.htm + https://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm (the latter link is also dealing with the Kraemer case) and and the Luftmeldekopf in Turkey, Bulgaria (Sofia) and Hungary. (These are well-known to us both Enomoti and Klatt (= cover-name) can be found in the Bulgarian and Hungarian PFs!) (KV 2/196 ... KV 2/201)

At a later interview, probably in February, Enomoti told Onodera that he also knew Dr. Thiemann? and Dr. ??? of the German Intelligence Service.

Further in the middle of February a contact man named Lohmann? visited Onodera, to discuss with him W/T practice through the present location of ANSO (I Luft H.Q.) (AOB: incorrect, as ANSO was the cover-name of Obstlt. Kleyenstueber, albeit formerly Leiter I L in Berlin, but since ca. August 1944 Leiter of K.d.M. Spain, in Madrid (formerly K.O.Spain) or Montenegro which have now been identified as Madrid and Barcelona. ??this time Enomoti asked Onodera to return his codes but Onodera refused as the position was still unclear.

In his talks with Onodera, Enomoti referred to Klatt as Max, whom he had seen in Vienna (where Klatt had been arrested by Tiemann!) on his return journey from Budapest (on this route to Berlin and final destination Stockholm). He stated that he is working for Max on his present mission.

The purpose of Enomoti's mission was, according to his original statement to Onodera, to work against Western Powers from Stockholm chiefly through Indians, whom he had known in D (?) and whom he would fetch over (D" may be Delhi, now India)

Towards the end of March, 1945, Enomoti revealed further details of his past activity and present plans to Onodera, who informed Major Wenzlau. Onodera described him (Enomoti?) as an outstanding expert on the Near-East with a wide acquaintanceship in British India. He describes Enomoti's former collaboration with the Spanish Minister in Turkey ~~Marquis deNanpo?illet Prat~~ (Pratt Y Souzo Marquis de Nantoulett), and states that Enomoti has re-established contact with Pratt, who is now the Spanish Minister to Finland, and at present living in Stockholm. Pratt had been in Finland since May, 1943. During his work with Klatt in Budapest, probably in 1944, Enomoti had friendly contacts with the Andriansky Group, which was working with Klatt. Andriansky is doubtless Major Istran Andriansky an important member of the xxiii section of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, who in 1943 was working with Major Vöcsköndy ... , an association which makes it all the more remarkable that Onodera was not warned of Enomoti's arrival. Klatt was said to be in Vienna, where he had certain of Andriansky's people at his disposal, e.g. Ferber with a W/T set in Barcelona. Kovats without W/T set ... . It should be noted that the latter two are associates of Krämer (Kraemer) from 1941; all are to be found in Hungarian P.P. Kovats was already known to us as having arrived in Portugal in September, 1944, and in December was thought to be in Madrid.

Enomoti has promised Klatt to do his best to establish a network from Stockholm to work against the U.S. ..., and if this is done, Klatt will supply Enomoti with a W/T set for contact with →

the U.S. ..., Vienna (Wien) and Barcelona from Stockholm. To accomplish this, Ferber in Barcelona has a woman of Japanese-Mexican origin who is to go to America for the Germans; Enomoti does not yet know details concerning her.

In return for his services, Enomoti is to receive all the Spanish and Portuguese reports for the Japanese I.S.

For the moment all that we know of Enomoti's activity in Spain and Portugal is that he was in August 1944, intending to visit Portugal with his secretary. the Hungarian Maria Oberländer.

Whilst resident in Bulgaria, after expulsion from Turkey (about August 1944?), he visited Russia (By then Japan and Russia were not yet at War to one another).

i) One is forced to conclude from Enomoti's long association with the Luftmeldekopf (Sofia or Istambul?), and his own statement, that he is working now for Richard Klatt (Richard Kauder), that his mission to Sweden is under the auspice of I Luft (former designation); this means it even more peculiar that the I Luft representative in Stockholm (Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer) were told nothing about him. Knowings we do, that the authenticity of Kraemer's reports has been open to doubt in Berlin, this might be taken as a further display of lack of confidence.

(AOB: these guys were playing a kind of chess, but they were neglecting the circumstances in which Germany currently lived within. Ministries were preparing to move out of Berlin or even had left Berlin already; as it was foreseeable that the Russians were due to encircle Berlin. But British Secret Service servants were judging without, apparently, being aware of what happened actually in the Berlin administrations)

ii) It is most interesting to find the names of two of Kraemer's former associates connected with Klatt's organisation (Klatt had been arrested in the meantime in Vienna / Wien in January or early February, by Tiemann), and this fact might be the cause of a certain amount of professional jealousy on Kraemer's part, particularly in view of Klatt being not a German, but a Hungarian. (Richard Kauder actually was Jewish!) He found refugee in Hungary, as since July 1943, Hitler ordered that Jewish people were prohibited from Serving Germany (Stockholm the Edgar Klaus case).

iii) It always seemed likely that Minister Pratt's departure from Turkey would not put an end to his intelligence activities for the Germans, and in Helsinki he is excellently placed, though up to now he reports have been received about him. It remains to be seen whether he will continue to perform his duties from Stockholm or whether his apparent fear of the Russians in Helsinki will be overcome by his enthusiasm for intelligence.

iv) Up to late March, Enomoti seems not to have contacted Bagyoni; there appears , however, to be a good chance of their collaborating, and in thinking of Pratt's (Spanish Minister in Helsinki) possible plans for Finland it may help to remember that Somogya was en route to Finland, according to his own story.

v) It is quite clear from this case, and that of Bagyoni above, that the Hungarian Intelligence Services, or at any rate the greater pro-Nazi part of it, has the definite intention of continuing its activities from abroad after the fall of Budapest and Russian occupation of the whole Hungary. It may be presumed that these activities are intended to be prolonged into the post-war period, and with the fall of Germany and the resultant stoppage of financial support from the Abwehr, it can be expected that the tendency will be towards an increase in collaboration with the Japanese. The choice of a base for Japanese continued Hungarian operations, is distinctly limited, and it is probably owing to Vöczköndy's association with Sweden and the fear of a changed regime in Spain combined with the presence in Sweden of General Onodera, that Stockholm has been selected in preference to Madrid or Lisbon.

20.4.45 (AOB: about the period that Karl Heinz Kraemer was leaving Sweden by means a ferry to Denmark, together with Nina Siemsen; though without his wife and child, whom stayed in Sweden for the time being)

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (US military Intelligence, G-2 is still commonly used within NATO)

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a document discovered by the Document Section, 12th Army group, 'T' Force, attached to Third US Army, in a bundle of teletype messages in the offices of the Chief of Signal Troops (Nachrichtenkommandantur XII (Wehrkreis XII, Wiesbaden) Markt Strasse 10, Wiesbaden on 1 April 1945.

2. 12th Army Group state that other material concerning the same source Josephine, is being transmitted to you this date.

I refer to your telephone message of 29th (minute 254a) March, 1945 regarding a ~~Kramer~~ (Kraemer) message to Berlin in which Kraemer stated that a reliable agent had reported that 01 returned from Moscow on 16th March, 1945; that the agent had a short talk with 01 and hoped to see him that week end.

On attempting to check the arrivals from Moscow on 16th March I was informed that the few records which are kept seldom show more than the last port of call outside the U.K. I have been supplied with a list of Russians who came from Russia of 18th March on a Repatriation Delegation, but this obviously of no value.

In view of the pending action which in contemplated to put a stop to Kraemer's activities in Stockholm, and in view of the opportunity for interrogation which your representative will probably have (AOB: all in vain, the tricks didn't have a direct impact, as Kraemer was not arrested. Let us not forget: he was an accredited Military Attaché and thus possessing a Diplomatic Status; those people will not be arrested - but being made 'persona non grata'!) (being not aware of the latter matter of fact, should be accredited to be a lack of their education), and also in view of the fact that the probability is that the journey to Moscow by 01 is more than a figment of Kraemer's imagination, we do not feel that the work involved in trying to identify 01 as one of the people who arrived in the U.K. on 16th March is warranted. One of the difficulties would be that a search would have to be made, if it could, to check up on all people who arrived in Service machines apart altogether from those who were here by R.A.F. Transport Command or by B.O.A.C. (British Overseas Airways Corporation)

1. Thank you for your S.F. 84-Japan-2/ADB dated 17.2.45 which has been a god-send.

2. Naturally all UTRA (Most Secret Source; which became famous since about 1974 and lifted the Secrets about Bletchley Park) material is given to DMI with safeguards and he keeps it in his safe and is reluctant to show it to anybody, and probably has no authority to show it to me since my position here has never been regularized and is still rather that of an liaison officer to the R.C.M.P. (Royal Canadian M.P?)

3. I have written to DMI today giving him the gist of what you have said and drawing his attention to the fact that your source is similar to that from which his information came. I have asked him tactfully whether there are any other odds and ends of a similar nature tucked away in his safe and and if so whether he will be good enough to let me have them if they have the slightest European flavour. You will remember that I felt the original source was probably in the U.K.

4. I am asking DMI to let me have a copy of the original which he showed me in this case, and if he does so I will send it to you as you may wish to try to have all the material coming from this source sent to you direct - I gather the source is probably Australian or American, but it may be added to in the near future having regard to the fact that a Canadian Y Unit went to Australia recently. I any case am almost certain that there were indications that in this case the source from which DMI received the material was Brisbane.

1. In August or September 1944 your contact in the Swedish Police reported to your representative in Stockholm that Kraemer had been meeting an employee of A.B. Aero-Transport. One meeting was particularly noticed when on 7.2.44 he met the employee in his car. It would be interesting to know the name of this contact and the names of any contacts that may have had amongst the crews of Aircraft visiting the U.K. The link-up between Kraemer, this employee of A.B.A. and Carl Flormann should be borne in mind.

2. At the beginning of 1944 Kraemer was in constant touch with H. Swalling, of the Swedish airline A.B.A., whom he met twice a week. What was the purpose of these meetings, and had Swalling any contacts with aircraft crews or other individuals visiting the U.K.?

3. Who is Irene Ward, whose address, c/o The Parents' National Education Union, 26m Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W.1, was found among Kraemer's personal papers. (these were "borrowed" and copied and returned to Kraemer's private safe, which the support of the maid of Kraemer's household) Please notice (S1019 S1019return).

4. For what purpose did Kraemer have in his possession in May 1944 a large number of American ten-dollar bills?

5. Who were Hans Schaefer's (Dr. Hans Schaefer was the German Lufthansa Airline representative in Sweden) contacts at Bromma airport (The Stockholm Airport), Stockholm? Had he any contacts amongst the crews of Norwegian and Swedish planes leaving that airport for the U.K.?

6. a) Who are Josephine, Hector and Juliette? Their main menace! No individuals but cover-names for the kind of information source.

7. On the 12th October 1943 Thomson (The German Minister in Stockholm) sent a telegram from Stockholm to Berlin (Message 2800) (T1020 T1020return) in which he stated that Kraemer was not prepared to reveal the identity of the source of information sent on October 11th (1943). Kraemer explains that he is in a key official →

position in M.A.P. of Irish origin and related to Minister of Law, and that his work concerned American supplies to the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. Who is this individual? Our own enquiries led nowhere.

j) 3572 (Abwehr administrative designation of a particular employee or agent the first number says something of the particular area/K.O.

Please be also aware, that all KV 2/xxxx serials are running - with progressing PDF page numbers - reversed in time (thus backwards).

Whereas the minute serials are running in a correct succession - as the flow of events were recorded and responded upon in the increasing minute numbers (serials).

Many thanks for your PF 66365/B.1.a (M.I.5)MR (= Michael Ryde) of 24th March. I have consulted Lt.Colonel. Wilson who tells me that none of the three Norwegian officials mentioned in your letter, is known to him, nor does he think it likely that they would have any information about the Gothenburg traffic. Wilson goes on to say that if there were no Swedish passengers from Leuchars during the period in question, he is inclined to agree with you that the source is unconscious one.

It does not look as if we can take the matter much further, but I assume you will have in mind our continuing interest if there is any further information.

We have received information this morning that the Swedish Police are intending to expel Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) and arresting at least two or three of his contacts in Sweden. Our representative asked the Swedish Police not to take any action before he had reported their intentions to London. The Swedes agreed to this. (AOB, Karl Heinz Kraemer left Swedish territory about 20th of April, free with a ferry to Denmark; nothing where S.I.S. had hoped for matured)

After consultation with Captain Guy Liddell I have just sent a signal to our representative on the following lines:-

(a) Provided Krämer (Kraemer) discloses fully all he knows, the Swedes should tell him that he will ot be expelled to Germany until the cessation of hostilities.

(b) Should the Swedes be reluctant to take this step, in view of the fact that Krämer (Kraemer) has probably involved Swedish nationals in espionage, the Swedes should be requested to tell Krämer (Kraemer) that he has been black-listed by the United Nations for his activities at Hamburg and elsewhere and that his one hope of avoiding reprisals lies in a full statement. (neither occurred)

(c) Should he still remain obdurate, the Swedes should imply that ways of means will be found by the Allied intelligence services so that, after expulsion from Sweden and return to Germany, he will be arrested by the Nazi authorities as a traitor for having been in contact with the British Intelligence Service (neither happened too, this way) (Note: we have already had reports showing that some German suspect Krämer of being in touch with intelligence services of the United Nations( (Bluffing).

3. We are telling the Swedes that we will of course give them every assistance, and have asked them to place at the disposal of our represenative the interrogation reports of the arrests contacts so that we may comment at each stage before the next interrogation. (neither occurred too)

4. Our Swedish Police contact is being asked officially to make every effort to discover Krämer's (Kraemer's) contacts in the U.K. and methods of communication. (Note; If there are any actual as opposed notional sources). (Neither of this matured, forgetting the diplomatic status Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer possessed as an officially accredited diplomat)

I hope that at long last we may now be able to dispose to our advantage of the ubiquitous Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer). I will keep you informed as to future development. (AOB: all in vain, as those servants weren't acquainted to deal with the diplomatic status of Karl Heinz Kraemer)

With reference my letter of 25th (minute 251a) March under reference CX/12736/28/V.S.6 or (V.S.7) we have now received a veracity check from 21st Army Group on the Krämer (Kraemer) report.

21st Army Group comment that the 6th British Airborne Division was in the Ghent area until the end of February when it left for the U.K. They state that Krämer's (Kraemer's) report that the direct assault would be made between Emmerich and Wesel is too far north and that more correct estimate would have been Rees and Orsoy. They also state that the troops given are correct with the exception of the Canadian Paratroopers.

I do not know what to make of this new appreciation. It appears probable that the 6th Airborne Division was in the area by Krämer (Kraemer) until a few weeks before the date of Krämer's (Kraemer's) report. I saw in the Sunday times that Canadian Paratroopers did take part in the Airborne operations. This has also been confirmed by SHAEF Rear in a signal to us dated 27th March.

Please inform as soon as possible Mr. Hart or Major Blunt or Major Ryde that a message just received from our representative in Stockholm states that Kraemer informed Berlin about 19 March 1945 that a reliable agent reported the 01 rpt 01 returned from Moscow on 16 March: agent had short talk with him (01) and hoped to see him that week-end (presumably Mar 17-18).

On getting your CX/12736/28/V.S.7 (V.S.6) of 25.3.45 I asked our Ops. Section to go carefully into facts about the 6th Airborne Division. The exact position of March 16th was that the Division, - about 16,000 men and equipment - was at Bulford, not far from Old Sarum, but it is true that about 1,000 ground elements were in Belgium, round about Brussels. These thousand men had been left there since the Rundstedt offensive (Ardennes Offensive / Battle of the Bulge 16 Dec. to first part of January 1945) It seems quite clear that Air Vice Marshal Brown at Old Sarum, who is in charge of the transit arrangements for the 6th Airborne, could not possibly have spoken of that Division on March 16th as having been in Belgium, and the other Air Vice Marshal Brown in Belgium is almost equally unlikely to have done so. As you know the whole air lift of the 6th Airborne Division for the recent attack was done from this country, apart from the thousand men who were left in Belgium in December.

I do not therefore really think this ought to cause us to change our former appreciation of this message. It may well be that the Germans learnt from informants and line-crossers in Belgium of the presence of some of the 6th Airborne Division men in the Brussels area and wrongly concluded this was a basis for his invention.

Thank you for your letter PF 66365/ADB of 23.3.45. Information which we have received today from S.H.A.E.F. (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) Rear conflicts with the information in your letter under reference.

Their veracity check on Krämer's (Kraemer's) information asserts that this report as stated is correct except for the fact that only a part of the 6th Airborne Division was in the general area Brussels-Antwerp, the remainder being in the U.K. S.H.E.F. Rear also state that they have been unable to confirm that any Canadian paratroops were in fact taking part.

If S.H.A.E.F. Rear's veracity check is accurate, you will, I am sure, agree with me that the whole of the theory that either of the Air Vice Marshal Browns could not have given such inaccurate information falls to the ground. The Air Vice Marshal Brown at Grave or; for that matter, that one at Old Sarum may have stated that the 6th Airborne Division was in the given area.

When you recall the date of Krämer's (Kraemer's) information, the 16th March, I still feel that we are not justified in assuming that Krämer (Kraemer) invented or intelligently deduced this information. He may have done, but when you recall that Krämer (Kraemer) is reported to have given Berlin prior warning of the Arnhem Airborne landing and as far back as February 20th received information that the 6th Airborne Division was to take part in the British 2nd Army offensive with the special task of securing a bridgehead East of the Rhine in the Emmerich-Wesel area, I consider that there is at least a 50-50 chance that he has one real well-placed source, apart for his many others (the majority of whom are probably notional).

The Japanese translator was rather well acquainted with the Japanese German diplomatic jargon.

Als Dr. Enonomotti in Ankara tätig war, arbeitete Herr Klatt im Sonderauftrag des O.K.W. (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) in Sofia. Herr Klatt wahr wahrscheinlich beauftragt mit dem Nachrichtendienst im nahen Osten und Indien. Zu seiner Zeit har D. Enomotti dem damaligen spanischen gesandten oder Generalkonsul Pratt in der Türkei dienstlich kennen gelernt,, welcher durch einige diplomatische Verbindung Meldung deutscher V-Leute an Herrn Klatt vermittelt hat. Bei Herrn Pratt arbeitete ein deutscher Herr als Verbindungsmann, dessen Namen Dr. E leider vergessen hat. Dr. E. ist ein hervorragender Fachmann, dessen Namen Dr. Enomotti leider vergessen hat. Dr. Enomotti ist ein hervorragender Fachmann für den nahen Osten, und hat grosse Bekanntschaft im britisch Indien. Dr. Enomotti E. hat Herrn Pratt und den deutschen Verbindungsmann in Arbeit gegen Syrien, Palestina und Indien unterstützt. Solerweise ist der Bekanntschaft zwischen H. Pratt und Dr. Enomotti bestanden (entstanden).

Wegen antibritischer Tätigkeit sollte Dr. Enomotti die Türkei verlassen, hat in Sofia die persönliche Freundschaft mit Herrn Klatt vertieft. Klatt und Enomotti sind nachher nach Budapest versetzt und Klatt hat dienstlich, dagegen Enomotti freundliche neue Verbindungen zu der Adrianskygruppe aufgenommen. Herr Klatt ist zur Zeit in Wien tätig und verfügt über einige Adrianskyleutre. Z.b. sind in Iberien verfügbar:

Dem Herrn Ferber steht eine Dame von japanisch - mexikanischer Abkunft zur Verfügung, welch in deutschen Auftrage nach Amerika fahren soll. Ihre Persönlichkeit um der Name sind Dr. Enomotti leider nicht bekannt. Nach dem persönlichen Wunsch von Herrn Klatt hat Dr. Enomotti ihm versprochen, irgendwie ein Netz von Stockholm aus mach USA aufzubauen, was besonderes Herrn Klatt interessiert. Wenn das Ziel erreicht würde, würde ein Funkapparat für Enomotti von Klatt zur Verbindung zwischen Stockholm. USA, Wien und Barcelona besorgt. Zum Ausgleich für seine Verdienste kriegt Enonomotti alle Meldungen von Iberien für japanischen Nachrichtendienst. Herr Enomotti hat neulich die Verbindung au dem für Finnland akkreditierten und vorläufig in Stockholm wohnenden spanischen Gesandten Pratt aufgenommen, und sucht Hptm. (Captain) Bagyoni seinem Hungarischen Freund und V-Mann Herr Dr. Enomotti ist sehr ehrlich und wünscht nur Patriotisch in dieser Angelegenheit teilzunehmen. Aber diese Angelegenheit ist noch nicht angelaufen. Vielleicht hat Dr. Enomotti mit diese Geschichten ohne Erlaubnis von Herrn Klatt erzählt. Selbstverständlich macht diese Geschichte für Sie Unannehmlichkeit, bitte, beschimpfen Sie nicht Herrn Klatt. den ich will nicht deutsch-japanische Kameradschaft verletzen.

I think that the time has come to limit the amount of veracity checking we do of this material. Cholmondeley is at the moment engaged on checking a long schedule of messages, which is involving an enormous amount of work, and I am hesitant to pass him yet another schedule.

The checks which we have done have all shown that this Kraemer information is hopelessly wrong*. We have checked so many reports attributed to the Z. V-Mann with the same result that I suggest it is a waste of time and energy to continue to do it indefinitely.

I propose, subject to our agreement, to check only messages from those sources which have so far produced insufficient material for us to form any definite views as to their reliability or otherwise.

* What is in someone's current mood - is often not easily to determine: notice for instance KV 2/147-2, page 68 and others. That Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer had stressed, for so long, the British Secret Services might have been felt, for them, hardly bearable. All attempts to counter Kraemer successfully, since early 1943 failed, up to about 20th April 1945; when he left Sweden by a ferry to Denmark. He left quite freely as a "persona non grata".

Please see your note at 190a (223a) and 195a in PF 66365 (Kraemer's file series) Link Volume 3 (= KV 2/146) and the attached letter (240a) from Charles Cholmondely regarding Air Vice Marshal Cole Hamilton and Squadron Leader Heap.

The information as to the number of gliders in the U.K. is attributed to A.V.M. (Air Vice Marshal) Groom is, on checking, found to be entirely wrong, as also is the information alleged to have been supplied by him regarding the strength of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bomber Groups. In spite of this it seems fairly certain that the Norwegian Air Attaché did meet A.V.M. Groom* when he visited Belgium and Holland at the beginning of this year in the capacity of Chief of Staff of the Royal Norwegian Air Force.

The same remarks apply to the information attributed in the Kraemer messages No. 531* to Group Capt Gillam. The information is inaccurate, though the probability is that he also met the Norwegian Air Attaché.

This does not get us very far, and the only way of clearing the question up would seem to be to have both A.V.M. Groom and Group Capt. Gillam interviewed and ask if they can remember exactly what information they gave the Norwegian Air Attaché on the particular subjects. Is it worth asking Cholmondely** to go over to Belgium to do this?

Incidentally the information regarding the numbers of gliders in the U.K. is not specifically attributed to the Norwegians and A.V.M. Groom may be able to throw some light on other possible channels of leakage.

* KV 2/157-2, page 6; 530 W + 531 W (translated messages which originated from "stolen copies" of the telex (Fernschreib) office inside the German Legation premises, in Stockholm)

Just as a curiosity, I have searched several files before I came across the aforementioned references

These telegrams had been directed towards the German Foreign Office in Berlin, by means of cable-trunks; and from there had these been forwarded to Amt Mil/Mil Amt, likely still in the Bekaerstraße, in Berlin.

530 W "Z" V-Mann reports and 531 W "Z" V-Mann reports on strength of 9th U.S.A.A.F.

Reference your teleprint CX/12736/28/V.S.7 of 22.3.45 (minute 241a) we have obtained the following appreciation.

Para. 2. The 6th Airborne was in this country on 16th March, and not in Belgium.

There is an Air Vice Marshal Brown, and he is Commandant of the School of Air Support at Old Sarum.

Our Operations Section's comment is that the enemy must know these particular Divisions have been out of the line and therefore likely to be used in the coming offensive, and that most if not all the details given can be accounted for as intelligent guess work. Air Vice Marshal Brown's photograph, I gather, has appeared recently in the illustrated press, so it seems possible that his name has been linked to this information to add colour. he is in fact not involved in the operation at all.

I will try to find out what form and under what heading his photograph appeared in the illustrated papers, but I doubt if this will be possible.

P.S. I have found out that the 6th Airborne Division was on March 16th at Bulford. Air Vice Marshal brown at Old Sarum must therefore have known that the Division was not in Belgium and could not have been the source of the information attributed to him. I gather from you that there is another Air Vice Marshal Brown who was in Belgium. He presumably must have known that the Airborne Division was not in Belgium and also hardly have been the source of the information.

Seemingly a never ending story but at least the next telegram should, nevertheless, be considered.

We have just received the following Telegram from our representative (S.I.S. Section V) in Stockholm. Air Ministry Security department have been informed of contents and it has been suggested that they should of course take no action without prior consultation with you. We are informing SHAEF and 21st Army Group.

1. Kramer has informed his Headquarters (first the German Foreign Ministry (A.A.) and they then, when appropriate, informed his Head Quarters (AMT Mil/Mil Amt) (whether then still situated at the Bekaerstraße in Berlin? Likely is was sent to there, as they should have been informed, where particular sub-sections had been moved to) that reliable agent reported on March 16th.

2. AVM (Air Vice Marshall) Brown has confirmed presence of 6th British Airborne Division in general area Brussels Antwerp.

Division is to be used in conjunction with Montgomery's Army Group in forcing crossing of Rhine in Area of Wesel.

3. Rhine Crossing will be effected by combination of Air Landing and direct assault between Emmerich and Wesel.

4. Air Borne Operation in this area will be undertaken by 2 to 3 Anglo American Airborne Divisions. These are 6th British Airborne Division, 17th American Air Borne Division and Canadian Paratroop.

AVM Brown presumably stands for Air Vice Marshal Brown. I do not know here if such an individual exists. If not, he may be identical with Air Vice Marshal Groom who has appeared in several previous messages. You will also recall that Brown appeared as an entry in Kramer's notebook* of meetings he was to hold in Berlin on 7.3.44 (see our CX/??? of 13.4.44) He was evidently the subject of a discussion with Berta, a known subsource of Kramer's.

* This proves that the since spring 1943 they still were able to "borrow" papers from Kraemer's private safe at his residence, by means of Kraemer's household maid (V1024 V1024return)

KV 2/147-2, page 84 (minute 241z) XXX Material = gathered from the telex Office inside the Legation premises of Stockholm

1. Auf welchen Plätzen im Raum Stockholm liegen Flugzeuge der Marineaufklärungsgruppe Lindaraengen.

7. Auf welchen Plätzen sind KW (Kurzwelle = Short Wave) - Peiler (HF/DF)/Adcock - Anlagen / und wie viele?

2. Meldungen möglichst vervollständigen: a/Rufzeichen, b/ Start und Landezeichen, c/Flugzeugmuster nur einmal für jedes Rufzeichen?

3. Erbitten Bestätigung dass a/ die Engländer in Leuchars, b/ die Amerikaner in Metfield, c/ die ABA - Kuriere in Prestwick landen.

5. Verbleib der am 14. und 27.2 in bromma gelandeten Amerikaner ? Auf Kurierstrecke nicht wieder aufgetaucht.?

6. Fliegen Kurierflugzeuge weiter innerhalb Schweden und eventuell nach Finnland?

7. Werden neben Landemeldungaustausch zwischen Leuchars und Bromma auch Startzeiten ausgetauscht und auf welchen Nachrichtenweg?

8. Befinden sich ausser dem Funkfeur (W/T beacon) "SIM" Yttermalung? andere Navigationsmittel an der Schwedischen Grenze, etwa in Höhe Lillehammer / Anflug Baken UKW?

9. In februar Differenzen gegenüber hier erfassten Flugbetrieb. Dortige Zahlen bedeuten geringer. Unzuverlässige Arbeit des V-Mannes ? Oder Meldung von Flugzeugen innerhalb Schwedens ?

I spoke to Anthony Blunt today about the latest Krämer (Kraemer) message concerning Source 27. The following is a translation of this message:-

"833. a.W. Please read its content yourself, as I would prefer to consider the genuine German message copy next:

Bei Meldung 27 kann, soweit sie Sektor Frankreich betreffen, von hier aus nicht Überprüft werden, ob eventuell Pressemeldung. Dortige Stellungnahme, wonach "Nachrichten aus Quelle 27 vielfach den Eindruck machen, dass sie persönliche Kenntnisse des V-Mannes bringen ohne Rücksicht auf die Quelle seinen Wissens muss diesseits dahingehend ausgelegt werden, dass Ansicht vorherrscht, 27 sei einer Berichterstattung nicht korrekt. Da jetzige Beurteilung von 27. zu führen/ s. Gespräch Otta/Hasso (= Kraemer) am 16/12 und Ota / Pandur (Major Wenzlau) v. 31/12/ im Gegensatz steht, und V-Mann scheinbar nicht mehr positiv beurteilt wird, wir im scheinbar nicht mehr positiv beurteilt wird, wird im Interesse der Konzentration auf andere Aufgabengebiete Arbeit des V-Mann 27 nicht mehr forciert werden. Schwerpunktmässig liegt bekanntlich Erkundung hier auf Farmland (U.S.A.) und Golfplatz (= England). Auf Grund der Anweisung von Senior (once Admiral Canaris, later Heinrich Himmler) und Otte (likely Referatsleiter at Amt Mil) ist politischer und ND (Nachrichtendienstlich?) und Osterkundung als besonders vordringlich forciert worden, demgegenüber dürfte Bearbeitung Quelle 27 für alle Beteiligten nur noch zeitraubend sein.

If, as we now believe, Garnier (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm) is only notionally Source 27 Krämer (Kraemer) is certainly playing is hand very neatly and is obviously on the point of discontinuing the use of this unsatisfactory "source". What I cannot understand is why 27 in particular should be singled out by Berlin as an unsatisfactory and inaccurate source when his reports are no worse than the drivel produced in the majority of the others.

It is rather interesting to note that the latest directive from Berlin urges priority on political and Eastern Intelligence.

I spoke to Shanks of S.I.S. this morning and received from him the following literal translation of the Kraemer message in question:-

843 Please digest this translated message yourself, as I would like to focus upon the genuine German message text.

Am 2 oder 3.3. wird 01 für 10 Tage nach Moskau fliegen zur Unterstützung Tedders

From the above it is clear that '01', if he in fact exists, might be either an Englishman or an American, which raises the possibility that he might be Col. Turner. This would explain Liversidge;s suggestion that we should check up on Turner's whereabouts at the time.

I write as promised to give you information about the suspected leakage of information to the enemy in Sweden.

As you know, we have for some time been running a service of the MGB's specially fitted between this country and Sweden. Special intercepted material in sweden, of which you know, contains a reference to this traffic. The reference is:

3579 learned from source from the port of departure yesterday afternoon that the resumption of the traffic may be expected on 14.2.45".

I am told that 3579 is a German agent at Bromma (Airport of Stockholm) airport, and that the A.B.A. Air Service flies from Leuchars. It is suggested that you will be able to find who the passengers were on the A.B.A. plane which left the U.K. about the 12th or 13th February.

There were vessels concerned - "Hopewell", "Gay Viking"and "Nonsuch". They were unable to move from the Humber during the last quarter of 1944. We moved them to Aberdeen on the 7th Jan. 1945, and they left for Sweden on 13th Jan. 1945. A collision took place leading to the "Gay Viking's" being scuttled, and "Hopewell's" returning to Gothenburg with a double crew. "Nonsuch" arrived at Hull on the morning of the 7th February, discharged her cargo and reloaded, and left Hull on the 15th February for Sweden. Bad weather forced her to return to Hull on the 17th February 1945. "Hopewell" left Sweden on 16th February, and arrived at Hull on the 18th February.

We are, naturally, closely interested in the matter, and I shall be grateful if you keep us in touch with any developments affecting the security of these operations. No doubt you will let me know whether you require any further information from us.

I confirm telephone conversation with you yesterday on the above. His official position is that of Head of the Foreign Department in Sandbergs Bokhandel A/B, Sturegatan 8, Stockholm, and his private address is Grev Turegatan 64, Stockholm.

We have established beyond all possible doubt that Klose is a German agent. The Abwehr officer with whom he is in contact is Karl Heinz ~~Kramer~~ (Kraemer), Eins Luft, Sweden, whom he either sees or telephoned at least once every day. While we have long known that Kraemer is engaged in espionage against this country it is only the last three months that we have discovered the extent to which this is being done and we are convinced there is leakage of information from this country to Stockholm which finally finds it way to Kraemer.

Obviously, owing to the nature of his correspondence, Klose is in an excellent position to provide such a link with the U.K. and although I fully realise that the job will be a big one I feel that the only course is to apply the most stringent watch on all correspondence between Klose and the various firms with whom he is in contact in this country. I attach a list of firms in this country with whom we know Klose to be in correspondence.

Herbert Hart is fully conversant with the Kraemer case, so perhaps you would discuss with him and let me know what action you propose taking. I personally think that the best plan would be to control this traffic for a limited period only.

Interest continues to be centred around the activities of German agent, Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer). Further information as to Krämer's (Kraemer's) background has been obtained from the interrogation of Peter Riedel (vide VS/1487) (W1026 W1026return). His account is as follows:

Krämer (Kraemer) is a very shrewd Intelligence Officer, who works very hard and gets on well with the rest of the members of the Legation (Kraemer actually was accredited as a Military Attaché) he works exclusively for Abwehr Eins Luft (AOB: about mid 1944 he was a member of Amt Mil. But as a Diplomat his communication went first through the German Foreign Office Ministry (A.A.) and they transferred the messages vice versa. These circumstances weren't well considered / understood by the two British Secret Services), passing Intelligence to Berlin principally on air matters such as R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. Battle Order, production, etc, a small amount of political information and also general Intelligence on France and Italy. Krämer (Kraemer) is supervised in his work by Major Heinrich Wenzlau, (AOB: typically a military vision, albeit, that Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer was about the rank of a Lieutenant, intellectually he stood far ahead of Major Wenzlau. They cooperated already for quite a long time and they came good along. Practically, Kraemer did his own job, call it in some form of cooperation. The disciplinary aspect was different, because Kraemer was, for whatever reasons, employed by the German Foreign Ministry) Eins Luft, who replaced Major Friedrich Busch (Kraemer's great enemy; rivalry between military and diplomats) (KV 2/529, PF602057) in the beginning of September 1944. Prior to that, however, Krämer (Kraemer) operated on his own without control from Sweden.

Riedel is unable to say where Krämer's (Kraemer's) sources of information are to be found or who they are, but Josephine and Hektor are cover names for sources most frequently quoted in Krämer's (Kraemer's) teleprints (Fernschreiben) to Berlin (Foreign Ministry) Riedel also learnt from Busch who, quoting Krämer (Kraemer) stated that Krämer (Kraemer) "had a man in London whose job it was to pass information to the Americans and also send the same information to Kramer (Kraemer). The method used was to be as follows. First the information was passed to the Swedish Legation in London, whence it was transmitted to the Swedish Foreign Office in Stockholm. There it was decoded by the head codist, whom Kraemer claimed as an agent, and the relevant material was extracted and passed to Kraemer. Riedel cannot remember the name of the codist but added that Busch considered the latter part of the story as rubbish, as he himself knew the head codist personally and did not think him capable of such an act. Riedel emphasised, however, that Kraemer's reports from England were in his hands only a few days after the date of information.

Riedel believes that the quality of Kraemer's Intelligence reports is of such high grade that some of them are even passed to Hitler himself. Despite this, however, Kraemer was suspected by Berlin (Amt Mil) of fabricating a certain quantity of his material and every effort has been made by them to discover the extent to which this was being done. For instance, Riedel himself was asked by the head of the section TLR-Rü - viz: that section dealing with American aircraft industry - if he considered Kraemer's reports to be genuine.

In addition to this Arno (cover-name) Kleyenstueber former head of Eins Luft/Fremde Luftwaffe West, came to Stockholm to investigate this aspect of Kraemer's Intelligence but was soon over by Kraemer and was convinced either of the genuineness of his reports or else of the folly of exposing the fact that they were false. Similarly, Wenzlau who was also asked to check up on Kraemer's material when he joined Eins Luft Sweden, allowed himself to be convinced by Kraemer who was, incidentally, an old friend of his. Riedel added that Kraemer's chief in Eins Luft, Oberstleutnant von ~~Devitz~~ (Ohletz; KV 2/106 PF 602785; Mil Amt-C), is a very ambitious man and is in Riedel's opinion probably hand-in-glove with Kraemer, so that even though he may have proved that Kraemer is fabricating some of his reports, he would not reveal this. Riedel himself is quite convinced that Kraemer invents part of his Intelligence reports. Ine one particular instance he →

was asked by Kraemer for the loan of the current Air Force Order of Battle, and some time later observed-to-Berlin message which was obviously based on this report. Apart from this Kraemer studied very carefully Allied newspapers and technical journals and also Geheime Kommandosachen. (gKdos matters were the designation of top secret German documents, it contained generally internal documents, then directly secret intelligence matters). Kraemer should not have been permitted access to this latter (gKdos) material but was on good terms with those who handled it and experienced no difficulty in obtaining free use of it. Berlin suspected this and Riedel's own chief, Oberingenieur Dietrich Schwenke, told Riedel in 1943 to keep an eye on Kraemer particularly to see if he had access to Geheimsachen material. Schwenke also informed Riedel that he believed Kraemer might be working for Great Britain.

Riedel is equally convinced that Kraemer's source in England and the Swedish Foreign Office are genuine and the material they provided of the highest value. In substantiation of this he quoted three instances:

1. Just after the parachute landing at Arnhem a furious telegram arrived from Berlin to Major Golcher, the Air Attaché, demanding to know why Kraemer's on a parachute landing, which had been sent by telegram, had not been teleprinted. Apparently Kraemer had reported (forecasted) a parachute landing some 15 hours before it took place, although Riedel is not sure whether Arnhem was mentioned. (AOB, dealt with later, here the following facts: Kraemer got notice about what due was to happen via a channel originating in Madrid. Kraemer did inform, logically as being a Diplomat, the German Foreign Office in Berlin, by means of a "Fernschreib" (teleprint) message Berlin. Here, likely due to "un-believing the matter" Amt Mil had been delayed informed. as well. Maybe, they also doubted the relevance, and when it all went through, the actual landing had already been taken place!

2. Riedel saw a report on Swedish/English and Swedish/Russian relations. This was just after a very secret mission visited Stockholm from Russia and concerned the eventual effect should Sweden enter the war, etc.

3. Ernst A. Hepp told Riedel that there was a very heavy leakage from the Swedish Foreign Office, Stockholm, to the German Legation, Stockholm.

Although the above account is only very brief one, it confirms in a broad sense what we have long known and suspected about Kraemer and is borne out by a very reliable source (AOB: likely pointing at by Section V "borrowed" documents taken out of Kraemer's private safe at his residence, with the intermediate support of the Kraemer's household maid). The fact that Kraemer operated without control from Sweden is confirmed by another source, who states that he was dependent upon K.O. Sweden (now K.d.M. Sweden) only for funds and communications. (Meant the telex (Fernschreib) facilities of the German Legation)

The report on Kraemer's source in London has also been confirmed by a reliable source (think of British Intelligence interventions around Kraemer's being in Stockholm) and the implications are at present being investigated.

Apart from the above account of Kraemer's activities, Riedel under interrogation supplied the following details concerning his own life. It must be remembered that this is Riedel's won version, in which he has attempted to whitewash himself as far as possible. ...

Reference or friend Krämer (Kraemer); you may be interested to know that it is almost certain that Source "Z" V-Mann is merely a contradiction for Zuverlässiger V-Mann. It is thus written in the latest batch of teleprints that we have received and also contacted to Zufer (incorrect assessment!).

This theory would explain the very large quality of the material and diversity of subjects sent out under this reference compared with other sources. So far as I can see from Ryde's appreciation however, this source seems to be the least ~~Zuferlässiger~~ Zuverlässiger of the lot.

Time and again really hardly understandable, that those men, combating their main enemy - weren't able (capable) to speak German language, necessary to understand truly their language!

Shanks telephoned the following two messages, which I presume he will be sending us in writing.

Kraemer informed his Headquarters (AOB: German Foreign Office (A.A.) or Amt Mil; I suppose meant is the latter receiver) that a reliable agent had said on February 20th, that the 6th Airborne Division was located in the area East of Antwerp with Headquarters in Antwerp. Principals units at Breda, Turnhout and Eindhoven. The Division is intended to take part in the british 2nd Army offensive with the specific task of securing a Rhine bridgehead in the area Emmerich Wesel. Probably times of attack not known.

The units previously withdrawn from the front line may return in order to take part in Montgomery's offensive North of Venlo (~~Venloo~~). The general direction of the expected offensive is towards Wesel. The inclusion of the Guards Armoured Division in the British 2nd Army which was reported by Eisberg 1 on 16.2.45 in now confirmed.

1. The 6th. British Airborne Division is at Bulford, but was till recently in Belgium, though far South of Antwerp. It is in fact intended for an Airborne landing connected with the present offensive. The area Emerich Wesel is in fact that point at which the main attack on the Rhine is going to be made, but that is pretty evident from the present movement, and could hardly be news to the Germans.

2. The first sentence is obvious. On the mention of Wesel the same comment applies as in message 1. The Guards Armoured Division is actually in the middle of the British line, and the germans presumably know it.

It is unlikely therefore that these two messages tell the Germans very much that they did not know before, but they may in spite of this, of course, constitute a leakage.

I attach a translation of two Krämer (Kraemer) messages concerning operations on the Western Front which were the subject of my telephone conversation today with Anthony Blunt.

The first of the two messages is obviously the only important one and apart from inaccurate location of the 6th Airborne Division iy is, I understand, an accurate prediction. While it is true that such a report could be put down to intelligent guess work or deduction, it is worth noting that whenever Krämer (Kraemer) reports on impending operations he is always fairly near the mark.

You will notice that the first message is an amplification of part of the message contained in my letter CX/12736/28/V.S.6. of the 21st February, 1945. The source in that case was alleged to be Zuckerhut (Finland) 2.

A reliable agent reported on February 20th that the 6th British Airborne Division is located in the area east of Antwerp with Headquarters in Antwerp and principal units at Breda, Turnhout and Eindhoven. This Division is intended to take part in the British 2nd Army offensive with special; task of securing the Rhine Bridgehead in the area of Emerich - Wesel. Probable time of attack not yet known.

Eisberg 2 (Switzerland) reported on February 19th that units previously withdrawn from the front line might be returning to take part in Montgomery's offensive North of Venlo.

The general direction of the expected offensive is towards Wesel. The inclusion of the Guards Armoured Division in the British second Army reported by Eisberg 1 on February 16th is now confirmed.

With reference to your A.C.M.B. 288/D.2. of 15th February, the correct information is as follows:-

"Out of the 17½ million tons (not 70½ million tons) of British Shipping at the outbreak of war, up to the 31st January, 1945, (not end of 1943) 11 (not 11½) million tons have been lost (Marine risks losses not included). from the outbreak of war up to the end of 1944 more than 5 million tons have been salvaged, and in the same period 4½ million tons have been built"

I have read your excellent report on the appreciation of "K" (Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer) Intelligence and must express my gratitude to you for your invaluable contribution to the Krämer (Kraemer) case.

The appreciation of the American "K" Intelligence (AOB: = The Americans intercepted the W/T communications between General Onodera in Stockholm and, say, Tokyo in a code known as J25. Not Britain did so but it were the Americans. Therefore they also decrypted this communication, and informed Britain about what should be their concern), which I spoke to you this morning, is only preliminary and general assessment. It appears that a number of these "K" reports are based on published material and are on the whole accurate. The remainder, however, while they do certain a little accurate secret information, are on the whole inaccurate. Thus, these reports are not considered by the Americans to be a menace to their security. A detailed report on this will be with us shortly.

Even on this limited appreciation it is obvious that the "K" Intelligence, where it relates to the U.S.A., is not nearly such high grade material as when it relates to the U.K. This is disappointing as I had for the contrary in order to support the Turner-Cervell theory.

On the subject of your appreciation of "K" Intelligence I should like to make one comment: on page 11 you state that the Czech is an official in the Swedish Foreign Office etc.*

* AOB: to what I know - this "bribed" Czech was employed in the telex (Fernschreib) Office inside the German Legation (S.I.S's Section V managed this). The German Legation communicated directly with the German Foreign Office in Berlin. They possessed secret telex machines; of which, I suppose, at least of 3 different types. One type noticed was the SFM T 43, in those days one the most secure machines, as it used punch-tape mixing - providing true "One-Time-Path" provisions, whereas all others systems maintained existing code-wheels. They maintained, from the German Legation, via the Swedish Postal Services, access to the trunk between Sweden and Germany and Berlin. The Czech was bribed for a lot of money, and likely, a colleague too. They provided copies of all concerned telex (FS) messages in the original German language, and exceptionally, towards the end of these file series, we even encounter the German language copies! Thus the Swedes did not received these original papers first.

Please be always aware, that all KV 2/xxxx serials are running - with progressing PDF page numbers - reversed in time (thus backwards).

Whereas the minute serials are running in a correct succession - as the flow of events were recorded and responded upon in the increasing minute numbers (serials).

Draft letter to Major General Sir Stewart Menzies (Known also as: "C") KGMG, CB, DSO, MC.

I think quite by chance we have come across another piece of information which tends to increase our suspicions that Cervelll is the source of the J.M.A. (Japanese Military Attaché = Major General Onodera, in Stockholm) "K" (Kraemer) Intelligence.

The circumstances (which are very peculiar) are these. On thge 29th January 1945 Cyrill wrote to us from Canada saying that a Swede in the R.C.A.F. was (in Mills view0 wrongly suspected of being concerned with a suspected leakage to the Japanese.

The leakage, (or rather alleged leakage since the information was inaccurate) was to the effect that there was one Canadian parachute battalion in Canada and was intended to go to Australia in January 1945. D.M.I. Ottawa had learnt of this "leakage" from Brisbane who had passed to him an Ultra message Tokyo Manilla, dated 24th November 1944 which ran (approximately) as follows:-

Spy Report Swedish Air Attaché (Swedish-Bakan) one parachute battalion now in Canada is due to go to Australia in January 1945.

Now it is clear, I think, that this is simply a verbatim relay by Tokyo to Manilla of part of the J.M.A. "K" message No. 9759 of 20.11.44 from Stockholm to Tokyo which contains this identical information and adds that four other Canadians battalions are in the U.K. but does not give the description of the source pointing to Crevell which has been added by Tokyo to enable Manilla no doubt to appreciate its veracity. The interval of four days before receipt and relay by Tokyo certainly certainly seems reasonable enough. (AOB: this might indicate, that not the communication between Stockholm and Tokyo had been intercepted and deciphered, but the retransmission between Tokyo towards Manilla! In this respect - the propagation and directive transmission might have been the true reason that these signals weren't detected instantly; however, another circumstance might also have influenced the phenomena, that these diplomatic communications weren't decrypted due to the type of codes which they actually employed)

We are, of course, puzzled by the words Swedish-Bakan and feel that this must be a corruption. I wonder if you could possibly get the experts at G.C and C.S. to advise on any possible alternative interpretation of the symbols or groups concerned. It would be too much, no doubt, to hope that it is merely? a complain to Britain! All we know about Bakan literally taken is that it is a small town in an obscure Soviet republic bordering Afghanistan.

Please refer to your 1022/1085 of 29th January 1945 (minute 185a). Much to my own and no doubt to yours surprise I can solve little puzzle for you, and incidentally can inform you that you have provided us with some information of considerable value.

The position is this, We know that on the 20th November 1944 the Japanese in Stockholm, who send a great deal of information (some true, some false) about the U.K. to Tokyo, informed Tokyo that of 5 parachute Battalions formed in Canada 4 were then in the U.K. and the remaining 1 was to leave for Australia in January 1945. The words underlined are clearly the same as what was according to your information sent on four days later from Tokyo to Manilla/ You can see therefore (1) that this information originated in the U.K.; (2) it was erroneous though not controlled information; (3) it reached the Japs via Stockholm; (4) the wretched and wrongly persecuted Haag @ Johannson has nothing to do with it.

What interest me, however, is that Tokyo in relaying this information said that the source is a Swedish Air Attaché. Now on quite independent grounds we had already reached the conclusion that the source of this similar information (some of much greater importance and security) than this was the Swedish Air Attaché (AOB: please, bear in mind, that Karl Heinz Kraemer himself was an Air Attaché himself) here (U.K.) here and this therefore is valuable nail for the coffin which is being assembled for him. (AOB: often those Crown Servant weren't, in this respect, too well educated / trained, as an accredited diplomats cannot be simply detained at will, but made persona non grata only)

As for Bakan both Guy (Liddell) and I feel that this may be a corruption and are putting it to the experts. It may even be connected with the name of our suspect (Karl Heinz Kraemer) here.

If and when you tell D.M.I. Ottawa about this you will of course bear in mind the Ultra origin of our evidence for our conclusion.

AOB: please notice the quite many red date stamps during the course of the 1970s. These likely originate from Mss. MacCallum whom did a historical survey, and she uncovered quite some essential facts, which had been 'weeded' (removed) during they created the KV 2/xxx serials in the 1950s.

27.4.45 From S.I.S. request for information re French Diplomat (Garnier?). 287a.

From our representative in Stockholm we have received various bits of background information which may be of assistance to (Camp) 020.

Since his last visit to Berlin in March (1945 by regular Lufthansa Airline) Krämer (Kraemer) took life very easily and usually worked from 11 to 5. As late as April 13 he was still talking confidently of plans for his summer holiday as though nothing was likely to happen. At the same time, however, he was expecting the war to end within a week or two.

Shortly after the middle of April he stated that he might have to leave Sweden in a hurry for Denmark, believing that the Swedes would not tolerate his presence in Sweden any longer (persona non grata). (Kraemer's wife stayed for the time being in Stockholm with her young child)

The news of President Roosevelt's death was greeted with tremendous joy by Krämer (Kraemer) (as did many Germans in Germany) and he threw a large party to celebrate it.

It is interesting to note Krämer's (Kraemer's) hours of work dropped of so much, although the amount of intelligence he supplied has somewhat increased. This would tend to indicate that the majority of his information was in fact fabricated.

1. At the meeting in Major Blunt's room with Wood and Falke (S.I.S. Section V in Stockholm Sweden?) yesterday the handling of the Kraemer case at Camp 020 was discussed.

2. It was pointed out that Kraemer has alleged that "Josephine" is in fact Onodera, and that all information received from Onodera was labelled as coming from the source "Josephine". In fact we know that all information given to Kraemer by Onodera was attributed to "Source 26", and S.I.S. are prepared to allow this information to be used.

3. S.I.S. are also prepared to allow Camp 020 to start showing Kraemer some of the teleprints in our possession. They have agreed to select a few which they suggest should be reproduced in the first place.

4. With regard to the cover names Kraemer has so far mentioned, it was pointed out that he has not mentioned Eisberg. He has mentioned two Doctors, and this point needs clarifying. he has also mentioned two cover names hitherto unknown to us, namely Berkman (Bergmann?) and Praetor (Praetorius, Ast-X; KV 2/170 + KV 2/171).

5. When discussing his finances Kraemer has made no mention of the fact that he was supplied with a large sum in dollars from time to time. The fact that we know this can be blown to Kraemer.

6. In connection with the attached report from B.1.L., it was suggested that the newspaper report, of which a copy is attached, giving details of Schaeffer's (Lufthansa representative in Sweden) admissions should be shown to Kraemer. At present Kraemer has not admitted his connection with, or knowledge of, Schaeffer's activities. (the latter was a personal friend of his)

7. Attached is a copy of S.I.S. report on the "Stockholm Side of K.H. Kraemer's Espionage Organisation" in which Camp 020 will no doubt, be interested, and you may think it advisable for them to see the B.1.L. comments on A.B. Aerotransport.

With reference to the preliminary report from Camp 020 on Krämer's (Kraemer's) interrogation, as a general comment I would say that Krämer's (Kraemer's) statement of the exchange of information with Onodera seems very far-fetched, and that the likelihood of such an arrangement being satisfactory to Krämer (Kraemer) is small. However, to some extent this opinion is based on our limited evidence of Japanese espionage against this country.

It would have been possible for the Germans in Stockholm to obtain the type of information they required from the U.K. through either Cervell's reports to the Swedish Air Ministry or the A.B.A. people working for the Germans.

At the moment I think it is fair to say that we have no evidence to show that either or both or neither of these lines were used. My Section's interest is to know whether the A.B.A. personnel were being used, and I rather think some of our agents' information goes to show that they were, though not to prove it.

In paragraph 8, sub-paragraph 4, of the (Camp) 020 Report. the name of the Swedish friend in A.B.A. is given as Smallving. It is in fact Harald Swallving, who has recently been arrested by the Swedes for espionage and subsequently released.

The information on Carl Florman, Managing Director of A.B.A., supplied by S.I.S. is to the effect that he was in touch with Kleyenstueber (Leiter K.d.M. Spain) and Busch (Kraemer's enemy!!), mentioned in paragraph 9, and Wenzlau is stated by S.I.S. to have known Florman as a source of information for the German Intelligence Service. There is no information from the Section's agents to show whether or not Florman was in any way connected with the German Intelligence Service.

This case is now rapidly working towards the climax. As a result of vigilance (caution) over a period of months and a general check on Krämer's (Kraemer's) activities, the Swedes decided to arrest some of his contacts on April 16th. We were informed that the following persons were due to be arrested:-

c) Fru (Frau) (Mme) Signe Sophie, Carlstedt, Swedish subject of Linnegatan 41, Stockholm

d) Ferencz Bagyoni (KV 2/3646) Hungarian, well known for his Intelligence activities in the Balkans (AOB: I doubt it a bit, at least not instantly)

f) Albert Hilding Kindberg, Director of Kindberg & Co. of Ericsbergsgatan 6A, Stockholm

Johannes Klose and Fru (Frau) (Mme) Ulla Larsson were listed as possible candidates for arrest at the same time. Unfortunately, the Swedish authorities have adopted a very uncooperative attitude, stated that Schäfer had been arrested and refused to disclose details or inform us whether further arrests had been made or not. We are, therefore, still without information of the remaining arrests. On April 25th we learnt that Nina Siemsen, Krämer's (Kraemer's) secretary had left Stockholm for Copenhagen. We know that she also was supposed by the Swedish authorities and was due to be arrested shortly.

The fact that the Swedish authorities have refused to supply us with further information and have allowed Nina Siemsen to proceed, apparently unhindered, to Denmark indicates that they are endeavouring to hush this case up by allowing the principal persons to escape and arresting only minor personalities. (AOB: hence, not playing according the wishes (imaginations) of the British Secret Services, whom also operated rather illegally on Swedish Territory!) The reason for this is obviously that too many influential Swedes are involved and that if the case is pursued, it will come to light that there has in →

many cases been quasi-official cooperation between the Germans and the Swedes on a high level. This would naturally be most displeasing to the Swedish authorities, and might, if pressed, cause the fall of the Swedish Government. Any such scandal would be made even more embarrassing to the Swedish Government at the present time owing to the storm of public indignation that was aroused in connection with the Lönnegren-Paulson case. Unless the Swedish authorities are forced to change their attitude, (e.g. owing to a Press campaign, etc.,) this interesting case may well degenerate into an anti-climax. (Were they threatening?) (AOB: what would have happened with S.I.S. Section V, in the case of Helen Fiedler Kraemer's housemaid and her girlfriend Anna Erikssen whom "borrowed" on behalf of the British Secret Services documents, lasting for years, from Kraemer's safe at his private residence; would have been blown?) (W1027 W1027return) (these 'children might have had their fanaticises', but those heading the Services possessed clearer brains, such as possessed 'Sir Stewart Menzies', for example) We have had several indications that Krämer (Kraemer) himself is planning to leave Sweden for Denmark it is hardly likely that the Swedes will put any difficulties in his way. (They weren't aware of Kraemer's diplomatic status) There is always the possibility, however, that if Krämer (Kraemer) his departure from Sweden until Denmark is occupied, he may make a full confession of his activities:- (Ongoing fantasies, as Kraemer did leave, together with Nina Siemsen, about 20th April for Denmark; he was arrested about a week after Germany unconditionally surrendered on 8th May 1945 in the vicinity of Flensburg)

Krämer (Kraemer) is well aware of his being closely watched by the Swedish Police and has evidently obtained information through one of his contacts that the Swedes may not tolerate his presence in their country much longer. (considering him: persona non grata)

The recent appearance of a new source of information in Krämer's (Kraemer's) material may possibly have a bearing on the above. This new source is described as "Generalstab Gastland (= Sweden)", i.e. the Swedish General Staff. Krämer (Kraemer) previously exercised considerable care with the identity of his sources and this rather blabant disclosure of a Swedish source of information may have been put over purposely so as to induce the Swedes to hush the case up. believing that high Swedish officials were, in fact, involved. This is naturally only a hypothesis, but Krämer (Kraemer) with his lengthy intelligence experience is not incapable of thinking along these lines. It should be pointed out that:-

2) the cover-name "Gastland" has appeared in numerous easily identifiable contexts.

On April 20th the Swedish authorities decided to close down the German (Legation) internal teleprinter service, i.e. between the various offices of the Legation and their lines from Stockholm to Berlin and from Stockholm to Oslo. From this it is evident that intelligence material will now have to be sent either by W/T or normal diplomatic channels. At first sight this looked as though it was a measure taken by Swedes against the Germans, but on analysis this proved to be only an appearance; we had received a report that on April 19th the teleprint (FS) the teleprint service between Stockholm and Berlin was going to be stopped for three days as the Berlin end of the line was being moved to Silberstadt. As Silberstadt was presumably invested by the Russians shortly after that date, the teleprinter (FS) was certainly useless to the Germans after April 19th. Presumably only slight inconvenience has been caused by the discontinuance of the interior lines. The question of communication has been discussed in general by the Germans in Stockholm, in particular W/T communication. It has been suggested →

that the equipment used by F.A.T. 304 (Front Aufklärungstrupp 304) should be used for this purpose. It will be recalled that F.A.T. 304, situated in Tromsø, Norway, is on the point of disbandment. This in turn brings the interesting question of the future of Sonderführer Walter Ivan, Leiter F.A.T. 304. Ivan was at the time a member of the notorious Bureau Cellarius (in Finland) that operated in the Baltic. His name has recently been mentioned in connection with Estonian Group of agents, who are to be run by Major Heinrich Wenzlau. It would be most interesting if Ivan were to resume his Baltic activities. Under the present circumstances he would probably choose Stockholm as a base for any such operations.

We have in our possession now a certain amount of information about Krämer's (Kraemer's) various contacts, although from the welter of details we have not succeeded in ostablishing how his lines to the U.K. France and Italy, and possibly the U.S.A. operate. The possibilities at present are as follows:-

I) Communication to the U.K. via Klose, who, as previously reported, is in charge of the Foreign Section of the Sandbefrgs Bokhandel and maintains extensive correspondence with the U.K. in connection with his business.

II) Through the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The possibilities are as follows:-

a) Peter Riedel stated that he believed the chief codist, Count Sten Mauritz Lewenhaupt, was an agent of Kraemer's and was in a position to separate his telegrams from the remainder before they were decoded. This presupposes either a conscious or an unconscious source in one or more of the Swedish Legation or Consulates abroad.

b) It has also been reported that Marion Santesson, previously employed in the Swedish Consulate in Hamburg, and now employed in the Commercial Department of the Swedish Foreign Office, was one of Krämer's (Kraemer's). This has not been confirmed.

c) Karin Groa Svanström. a contact of Krämer's (Kraemer's), was employed in the Cipher Department of the War Office in Stockholm in 1941 and in 1942 was employed in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She was last reported in Germany in 1943 but is believed to have returned to Sweden in February of that year.

III) Certain of Krämer's (Kraemer's) messages have obviously been derived from information passed unconsciously been derived from information passed unconsciously by Baltic diplomats in the U.K. to their representatives in Stockholm. This is a possible source of causual information of a vague political nature.

IV) Wiktor (Victor?) Rajgrodzki is known to have been closely associated with Kraemer's agent Kinberg. He may have been sent on an espionage mission to the U.K. His case is at present under investigation in the U.K.

Information about the U.K. and the U.S.A., especially air intelligence, may be obtained in Stockholm from U.S. and British Airforce personnel. Countess Czernin is in a position to obtain a certain amount of information through these channels.

It is known that Krämer (Kraemer) maintains contact with Ulla Larsson an employee of the Swedish Admiralty. He has been seen exchanging notes with her under suspicious circumstances. There is no doubt that this is an intelligence contact, not merely an amorous one. The Swedish Admiralty is doubtless in possession of some material appertaining to Allied dispositions, etc.

The position of Major Heinrich Wenzlau vis-a-vis Krämer (Kraemer) is not clear, though it is known that they have been working together in the intelligence field for some years, nor is there much information available about Wenzlau's organisation (Amt Mil, formerly Ast Hamburg, likely Referat I L)

Technically, he is in charge of matters appertaining to the "O" Division of the old Abwehr organisation, as opposed to the "W" of which Krämer (Kraemer) is in charge. This is substantiated by his dealings with the Japanese Enomoto Monotaro, recently arrived in Stockholm, the Hungarian Ferenz Bagyoni and with Finnish and Estonian activities in general. This is apparently contradicted by Krämer's liaison with the Japanese Military Attaché, Onodera Makato, and his active interest in Bagyoni's case. The explanation of Krämer's (Kraemer's) interest in the above is certainly that Onodera's activities are principally directed against Great Britain and the U.S.A. and therefore fall within Krämer's (Kraemer's) sphere,

There is no evidence to show that Wenzlau runs any organisation or network of agents, notional or otherwise, any way comparable to Krämer (Kraemer). In fact, the greater part of his intelligence appears to be derived from liaison with Finnish and Baltic organisations. He is known, among others, to be in close contact with Reino Hallamaa, Chief of the Finnish Cryptographical Department, from whom he was able to obtain various codebooks.

Wenzlau does not appear to have come to the adverse attention of the Swedish authorities. This, however, may well be a purposeful oversight on their part, knowing that he is working against Russia - which is not at variance with their own policy. Wenzlau has three chief sources of information - the Finnish General Staff, a Swedish-Finnish source, and the Japanese military Attaché whose reports are forwarded to Wenzlau through Krämer (Kraemer). The identity of the Swedish-Finnish source is not certain. There are two possibilities so far:-

a) Otto Kumenius, a professional intelligence officer, known to have been in contact at various times with Germans, Finns, Swedes, Japanese and the Allies.

b) Ruth Ingrid Charlotte Jansson/née Stede, who worked for the German Intelligence in Finland until 1944. She is known to have maintained her connection with the German Intelligence in Stockholm and has been reporting on Finnish and Baltic matters. She is now under arrest in Sweden.

There have been reports that Rudolf Schmidt representative of Daimler-Benz at present in Sweden, has been supplying Wenzlau with information about Swedish Airforce, etc. These reports are, however, not substantiated by the material Krämer (Kraemer) forwards to R.S.H.A. (Amt Mil) Berlin, no details of the Swedish Airforce having appeared in this. On the other hand, it may be possible for him to obtain technical details of Allied Airforces, plane construction, etc., which have appeared in Krämer's (Kraemer's) reports. Schmidt is employed in a workshop at Bromma airfield outside Stockholm, supervising the building under licence of aero engines.

Wenzlau has requested to R.S.H.A. (Amt Mil) to transfer to the Air Attaché's office in Stockholm a certain Unteroffizier (N.C.O.) Behner. Behnmer owns a textile factory at Oberlungwitz, Saxony (Sachsen), and a stocking factory in Malmö with a Stockholm office at Hamngatan 26. He also has good connections with the German-Estonian, Klaus Scheel, who works on the Baltic Refugee Committee and has contacts with the British and American Legations. Among Wenzlau's contacts in Stockholm appear the following:-

i) Kommandör-Kapten Sven Ivar Wibom, Swede, director of Noriska Instrument A/B., and also of Svenska Radiobolaget (vide VS/1479), who appears also to have been in contact with Alexander von Bentheim of I/Luft.

ii) Wilhelm Berreth, owner of A/B. Nordchemiska of Wahrendorfgatan 8, Stockholm (vide/1479).

iii) Carl Lassman or Lasmanis, believed to be a native of Libau (Germany), at present living at Erik Dahlbergsgatan 39, Stockholm.

iv) Carl August Wicander, of whom we have records as far as back as 1938, at which time he was touring Africa together with Felix Lassman (Lassmann?) (possibly identical with above). Boith were believed at that time to be in the pay of the Italian S.I.S.

v) C.L. David, who is well known in Denmark for his notorius pro-German sympathies. David is director of Aarhus Ojefabrik, Adams T?ransport and Accumulator-fabrikken A/S.

The link between Heinrich Wenzlau and the Hungarian I.S. Officers at present in Stockholm is maintained principally through his secretary Frau Reichenbach, who is in direct contact with Ferencz Bagyoni. Frau reichenbach uses the cover name of Zobi. She has been Wenzlau's secretary since 1944, at which time she replaced Baroness von Schlotheim, now secretary to the Air Attaché, Major Heinrich Golcher (AOB: Dr. Karl Heinz Krämer actually was the accredited Air Attaché. Maybe he had a function at K.O. Schweden)

Apart from the information that Peter Riedel (X1028 X1028return) supplied about Krämer's (Kraemer's) background, etc (vide VS/1490), he volunteered some details of personalities connected with German Airforce Departments, which have proved to be reliable. Peter Riedel was also in contact with the Japanese. This association was first started while Riedel was Assistant Air Attaché to the German Embassy in Washington. Later when he returned to Germany he was made into some sort of Technical Supply Liaison Officer with the Japanese in Berlin. Riedel maintained contact with the Japanese naval personnel in Stockholm and went so far as to say that the→

only liaison with the Japanese there was with himself. This is not correct, as we know that Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) maintains liaison with the Military Attaché, General Onodera, both personally and through his secretary Nina Siemsen. Moreover, the Japanese Naval Attaché, Mishina Iori, is of little significance from an intelligence point of view. Riedel also stated that he had been in contact on one occasion with Sato Tasuya, who had come to ask him about U.S. arms production, etc. Von Heimann used to contact Onodera when he was in Stockholm and was believed to be on friendly terms with him. This was doubtless fostered by the fact that both spoke Russian.

Access was recently obtained to various notes made by officers of the German Legation Air department. These provided very interesting information regarding Countess Czernin (vide para 1e above). It appears that, apart from working for the Hungarian and Swedes and possibly the Americans, she is also an Amt VI agent. Among her contacts figure the German agent Karin Lannby and the suspects, Helena Heather von Toggenburg, Fru (Frau?) Annemarie Robson, Riedel's mistress, and journalist, Dr. Heinz Pentzlin.

Major-General Lars Rafael Meländer, head of the Second Section of the Swedish General Staff for several years before the war, is mentioned in these notes as a new co-operator. There have been indications previously that General Meländer was in touch with, if not working for, the Bodenorganisation.

Further information of interest has been received concerning Johannes Klose, a contact of Krämer's (Kraemer's) (vide previous report). He was born in Guben on 24.6.1889 and has worked in Graudenz, Frankfur-am-Main, Antwerp and Berne (Bern). He was appointed to his present post of Chief of the Foreign Section of Sandbergs Bokhandel in October 1914. His attendance at his bookshop has been very irregular. He was absent between 15th and 20th January and as soon as he returned was contacted by Krämer (Kraemer). Klose was again away from 1st to 19th February and again Krämer (Kraemer) called upon him as soon as he returned. Since that time contact has been made regularly two or three times a week/ Klose's secretary is a certain Margit Millner. It has been noticed that she frequently visits him in the evening and apparently does a considerable amount of typing for him on these occasions. This contact also maintained while he was away from work in February (1945). It is perhaps relevant that Margit Millner lives on the opposite of the street from Nina Siemsen's flat.

One of Klose's closest friends is a certain Sven Strömgren of Regeringsgatan 109, Stockholm. Strömgren returned from India about middle of 1943 after having lived there for some years. He was arrested in India on suspicion of working for the Germans and was allowed to return to Sweden through the intervention of the Swedish authorities.

There is no evidence of Pierre Albert Garnier being in direct contact with Krämer (Kraemer). On the other hand, Garnier is known to work in close collaboration with (Referent) Jean G.H. Hoffmann, pastor of the →

French Evangelical Church in Stockholm. Hoffmann, like Garnier, is known to be extremely anti-Communist and is, in his turn, closely connected with Johannes Klose. Hoffmann has been employed by Garnier as a source reporting on religious and political matters. He has, however, been seen in suspicious circumstances at the notorious Regnbågen Restaurant, and itr is not felt that his work has been wholly on behalf of the French. Hoffmann was able to visit Finland frequently during the German (military) occupation and he took care never top break with his local Vichy contacts. His wife is an Alsatian and is apparently not at all anti-German.

It is interesting that there are several German nationals, some with long residence in Stockholm, employed in book-shops. These are:-

a) Otto Curt Müller, born Leipzig 14.11.1893, employed in the Nordiska Kompaniet, Hamgatan 18020, since August 1920.

b) Wilhelm Adolf Ohrt, born Breslau 17.12.1897, appointed Chief of the Foreign department of Nordiska Bokhandeln, Drottninggatan 7-9, in September 1920.

c) Johan Adolf Werner, born Würzburg 24.6.1882, employed in the Foreign Department of Nordiska Bokhandeln since 1917.

d) Franz Julius Ceasar Emil Heinrich Satowm born Körchow i/M 30.3.1884, appointed to this post in Linståhls Bokhandel, Odengatan 22, on 2.1.1923.

e) Martin Curt Wagner, born Leipzig 17.9.1893, has been working with Fritzes Bokhandel, Fredsgatan 2, since 1920.

Owing to their long residence in the country, these persons have valuable local contacts. This fact has not been overlooked by the German Intelligence; Ohrt is known to be a German agent, Curt Müller and Wagner are strongly suspect. A more recent arrival is Hans Georg Gottfried Nickels, born Stockholm 30.12.1903, who came from Germany to work for Nordiska Bokhandel in November 1942. He is posted to Stockholm with a view to post-war intelligence work (?).

8. There have been reports that the town of Ribbersborg near Malmö is being used by the Germans as a base for clandestine passages between Denmark and Sweden. Ribbenborg is a small bathing-place just outside Malmö with a suitable landing quay. It is interesting to note that the residence of Mark Molda, German Consul in Malmö, is only about 5 minutes walk from the quay. As there has been rumours that Mark Nolda is preparing to desert to the Allies, information as to this organisation may shortly be forthcoming.

Fräulein Güttler, previously reported as having deserted the German Legation in October 1943, is now known to have been in Lodz (then named Litzmannstadt), Poland at the time of the Russian occupation and to have supplied the Russian Intelligence with a full list of Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei) and S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst) agents in that locality. Some of this information was published in →

the Swedish Press and caused considerable consternation among members of the German Legation, who presumed that she was working for the Russian while she was employed there.

Presumably owing to the difficulty of returning to what remains of Germany, desertion is somewhat démodé and suicide is coming to the fore. Frl. Alice Fischer of the German Legation was the first to try this experiment. She threw herself into a pond somewhere in Stockholm, but was fished out rather the worse for wear and is now in the Karolinska Hospital. Frl. Fischer has had some twenty years' of experience of Abwehr work and was known to be in charge of the finances of the K.O., and later (since late Spring 1941) the K.d.M. Schweden. Fischer is in possession of valuable information, having been in charge of payments to agents over a period of years; consequently the Germans were considerably worried at the thought of her being open to contact with outside persons at the hospital. Fischer was born on 11.2.1904 and is highly unpopular with all female and most male employees in her office.

The case against Robert Paulson (vide previous reports) is still on trial. It is becoming increasingly embarrassing to the Swedish authorities. It has come to light that he sent over 500 replies to queries put to him by the German Legation between November 1940 and December 1944. The German Legation usually requested details, data, place and birth, etc., of various persons living in Sweden or passing through the country. Paulson's defence has now stated that this does not in any way incriminate Paulson, as such dealings had been authorised by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had even received a copy of each reply given. We also learn from reliable source (also illegal information?) that much of the information especially in connection with Finland, has been hushed up by high Swedish authorities. This has an interesting bearing bearing on the case of Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer), as there are indications that many of his sources may have been obtained with the official sanction of the Swedes earlier on in the war when it appeared that Germany would win. The part played by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in both the Paulson and Krämer (Kraemer) cases is interesting. It may indicate that the instigator of this cooperation with the Germans was the same person in each case. Suspicion has lately been centred round Count Sten Mauritz Carl Lewenhaupt, chief of the Coding department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is well known for his pro-German sympathies.

On March 23rd, 1945 the Swedish Courts sentenced Einar Sixten Hageman, a Civil Defence Chief, to hard labour for life having been proved guilty on a charge of espionage (AOB: on 9 February 2023, I did a search on "Einar Sixten Hageman" and got no response at all in English, German and Dutch languages on Google. I therefore suppose that "Einar Sixten Hageman's" case was cleared not too long after the Germans did surrender) against Sweden on behalf of Germany. Hageman had been supplying the German Legation with information about officials of Swedish national organisations, associations, etc., since 1941. He is said to have passed some 4,000 names yearly to the Germans, for which he received 20,000 Swedish kroner.

It appears that a Swedish employee of the Press Attaché's office in the Swedish Legation, a certain Genander, is working for the Swedish Intelligence. Little is known of Genander's activities, though there have been reports that before the war he was stationed in Lodz and was working for the German Intelligence Service there under business cover.

A report has recently been received that Dr. Felix Kersten is a member of the Sipo and S.D.

(AOB: nonsense! Again their apparent lack of proper understanding of the German systems) Felix Kersten was also Himmler's private 'masseur'; and Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler was: Reichsminister des Inneren (German Home Office) und Chef der Deutschen Polizei ...; thus also Chief of all Police Services under German jurisdiction. But, Dr. Felix Kersten, as Himmler's masseur, he had later in the war, a rather intensive contact with Heinrich Himmler personally; and therefore - possessed some influence. Whatever this might, actually, have constituted)

Investigation of this background appears to substantiate this allegation. Kersten is of German origin and was born about 1900. He arrived in Finland in 1918, claiming variously to be a Balt coming from Leningrad or a German coming from Germany. He took part in the Finnish War of Independence and remained in Finland becoming a Finnish citizen in 1926. During this time ha had become a proficient masseur, and he later proceeded to Paris where he succeeded in obtaining an appointment as doctor to Queen Wilhelmina (Dutch Queen up to about September 1948) He was in France in 1940 and was interned by the Germans for a short time. On being released he proceeded to Berlin, where he became one of Himmler's personal doctors. (?) As a result of this he was able to buy an estate outside Berlin. In 1943 he accompanied Himmler on his visit to Finland. Here he appears to have entered the political arena; he made friends with the Finnish President, Rytti, and with Kivimaki, Finnish Minister to Berlin then in Helsinki. In the autumn of 1944 Kersten appeared in Sweden and took up residence at Linnegatan 8, where he maintains a small but distinguished clientele. Kersten is said to have had considerable influence over Himmler and was, among other thinks, able to obtain the release of several members of the Swedish Match company, who had been arrested by the Germans. This may well have been done to ensure his continued residence in Sweden and generally to ingratiate himself with the Swedish authorities.

We now learn that the acrobat, Anita Kittner, previously reported to be a German agent (vide VS/1474) is short of pay of Eberhard Schrott, German consul in Göteborg. Schrott is known to be a member of the Sipo and S.D. and has previously been suspected of having been connected with the Sipo and S.D. (really?) in Denmark. Anita Kittner is of Norwegian extraction, usually resident in Denmark, and at present holds German nationality. She was reported in January 1945 to be working for the German Censorship in Copenhagen (checking mails).

Certain adverse information has been received concerning Johannes Müller, Roman Catholic Bishop in Sweden. Müller is German by birth, but is believed to have acquired Swedish nationality. During his residence in Sweden he is reported to have introduced several German priests, one of whom is Pastor Josef Gerlach, whose →

pro-Nazi public utterances in Uppsala have been the cause of considerable comment in Sweden. Should Müller at any time have been induced to work on behalf of the German Intelligence, his status would him with excellent facilities for this, as he is granted extra territorial rights and has the right to diplomatic communication with Rome and Germany, although himself not officially a diplomat.

Since his arrival in Sweden in January 1945, more information has come to light concerning the activities of Dr. Enomoto Montaro. Enomoto is known to have been closely connected with Luftmeldekopf Sofia (station Schwert) and the well known German (Jewish Austrian) agent Richard Klatt (real name Richard Kauder) @ Max. Enomoto has obviously been more loyal to the Sipo and the S.D. (incorrect/ill understanding, as all the British Secret Services lacked sufficient information about the actual German organisations!) (correctly it should have been described as Amt Mil or formerly Military Abwehr) than he has to the Japanese.

(AOB: When a foreigner would make travels by means of his own car, he must, of course, have been backed by some Referat within the R.S.H.A. apparatus; Amt Mil (Amt VI?) is the Referat with the most influence to solve all the huge many difficulties! What to think of permits crossing the various borders in the Balkans - then entering German controlled territories - passing through it - and - then passing through Denmark into Sweden? Most significant the many times Mr. Enomoto had to refuel his car. Towards the end of 1944, where everywhere existed a shortage in obtainable fuel /petrol. At least for every occasion Mr. Enomoto necessitated a legal - valuable - permit/document. Only with the very profound and sound reasons such an endeavour could successfully be fulfilled! Schellenberg's Amt VI must have had their reasons, maybe under cooperation of the German Foreign Affairs Ministry (A.A.)

This is apparently still the case, as neither the Japanese in Berlin nor Onodera Makato were officially informed of his arrival in Stockholm. On his way to Stockholm Enomoto spent several days in Berlin and was seen in the R.S.H.A. by Wenzlau.

Berkaerstrasse building, the building with bending around a corner; this was at least in 1944, but likely earlier too, the main Amt Amt / Amt Mil building

(AOB: Wenzlau, as well as Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer, were actually engaged at Amt Mil, which most offices were then still situated at the Bekaerstrasse 32 .. 38, in Berlin)

But there did not existed a strong barrier between Amt VI and the Amt Mil organisation.

The white square building right of it was, in wartime days an air raid shelter as well as the safe depot.

In particular in Germany, GoogleEarth is being forced to "shadow-off" (mask) quite many premises by additional virtual trees - due lo legal objections.

This can clearly be recognised as threes then seemingly are eliminating the entrance of daylight entirely, which will hardly being the case, regularly.

There also appears to have been a certain lack of coordination within the R.S.H.A. itself, as neither Krämer nor Wenzlau were officially informed of his mission.

AOB: again: AMT VI consisted of several sections (Section), which each-one operated with quite different objections, which not necessarily had to be shared with other Referatsleiter. Or, Ribbentrop's Foreign Ministry had been involved (Japan was yet a friendly Nation ). Or, I do not directly see the connection, but above Schellenberg as Leiter Amt VI, stood Kaltenbrunner being head of the entire R.S.H.A.; or it might have been that Reichsführer SS - Heinrich Himmler - himself had been involved. It is known: that Heinrich Himmler had some interest in Buddhism himself, as we know via Dr. Felix Kersten, Himmler's masseur; and some others.

One of Enomoto's principal objectives in Sweden is evidently a W/T network between Stockholm, Madrid, Barcelona and Vienna; later Enomoto is to be responsible for the communication between Stockholm and prospective agent in the U.S.A. who will be sent from Spain. At all these places contact with members of Klatt's organisation would be made.

AOB: in my perception nonsense. They may not have possessed an up-to-date information about Klatt (Richard Kauder) whom had been arrested (by Tiemann) in Vienna (Wien) somewhere in January 1945.

https://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm

To implement this scheme, Enomoto brought with him from Berlin a code book, which he later left in custody of Onodera. After having established W/T communication, it is intended for Enomoto to work against the Western Powers from Stockholm. It is not clear exactly how he is to work, though there are indications that Hungarians will be used and possibly certain Indian (now Republic of India) nationals will be brought out of Central Europe ostensibly as refugees. Enomoto is known to have worked closely with Marquis Pedro Pratt, Spanish Minister Designate to Helsinki, who has been resident in Stockholm since the Finnish Armistice (with Russia, who did occupy Finland since) (AOB: Klatt (Richard Kauder) was on very friendly terms with Pedro Pratt in Turkey). Pedro Pratt was known to have placed himself and his diplomatic communications almost entirely at the disposal of the German Intelligence service in the Balkans. It is interesting to note that when Enomoto had arrived in Stockholm, Pedro Pratt made immediate overtures to get into touch with him. The possibility that Pratt will resume his activities in Scandinavia cannot be disregarded.

Enomoto is also maintaining close contact with another of Klatt's agents, with whom he was previously associated in the Balkans, namely the Hungarian, Ferencz Bagyoni (KV 2/3646) who was reported to have been sent to Stockholm to supply deceptive information to the Allies.

(AOB: Since Edgar Klaus' information (May/August 1943 from Stockholm) that the Russian's might be interested in peace with the Germans - Hitler forbade all Jewish persons being engaged/employed by the German Services, including the Abwehr. A way out was found to move Klatt to the Hungarian Secret Services in Budapest, but still passing on information - and maintaining still camouflaged contacts - with the Abwehr. Thus Hungarian contacts were damn normal to Klatt)

Major Onodera, at the request of Heinrich Wenzlau, supplied certain details of Enomoto's past as far as they were known to him. About February 20th Onodera reported that a Verbindungsmann by the →

name of Lohmann (the name of (the) "Kommissar" in Fritz Lang's film "M" of about 1931) https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kommissar_Lohmann had come to the visit Enomoto, presumably at the Legation, to discuss W/T communication between Stockholm, Madrid, Barcelona and Vienna (Wien). (AOB: do these men really consider that Enomoto travelled all the way up for this irrelevant endeavour?) Information from other sources shows that on February 19th Egon Friedrich Heymann visited the Japanese Legation in what is described as a mysterious fashion. Heymann is in Stockholm correspondent of the "Hamburger Fremdenblatt", "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" (AOB: the latter Newspaper stood under direction of: "Giselherr Wirsing" https://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm also the author of the famous curious "Egmont Briefe". Not well known: Gieselher Wirsing was also, towards the end of the war - the Chief Editor of the Unique German magazine "Signal" published in many European languages, but not in Germany!), and the "Leipziger Nachrichten", and is believed to have succeeded the journalist, Paul von Toggenburg. he was born on 31.1.1903 and is first recorded as having arrived in Sweden in September 1944. He left again for Berlin on October 4th, returning on the 17th. His present address in Stockholm is Furusundsgatan 16. He is previously known to have been working in Italy and his family is now believed living at Lugano (Switzerland). There are also reports that he has accumulated considerable capital in Switzerland. Heymann is in contact with a certain Dr. Johannsen of the Hamburg Stock Exchange, with whom he has maintained suspicious correspondence evidently referring to W/T communication. It is to be presumed that Heymann and Lohmann are identical.

Further information has now been obtained concerning Fru (Frau?) Signe Brusewitz (vide VS/1492, para 12). She is employed as a translator at the Japanese Legation, Stockholm, and is mainly concerned wit the preparation of a daily summary of world news for Onodera. Her only son, Sven Ichiro Brusewitz, works in the Swedish Foreign Office, and she also has two daughters, one of whom is mentally defective and the other suffers from infantile paralysis.

Fru (Frau?) Brusewitz comes from a wealthy Gävle family, and on her marriage accompanied her husband to Tokio (Tokyo), where he represented the Göteborg firm Dieden. Herr Brusewitz, however, was a spendthrift and after squandering the family fortune eventually committed suicide in Switzerland. Fru (Frau?) was left bankrupt but fortunately had some training as a typist and therefore, took up a position with the Japanese Legation. Her attitude towards the Japanese is described as one of slightly contemptuous indifference. She has often expressed anti-German feelings.

a) Kohgo Eiichi, Stockholm correspondent of "Nichi-Nichi", has apparently dismissed his former secretary, Frau Kerstin Rheyneclaudes, and acquitted a new one. Her name is Guillia Kilmann-Gadd, Swedish, living at Wittstocksgatan 8, Stockholm. She is evidently known to other Japanese journalists as her name appears in the notebook of Sasaki Rimiti (AOB: how do they know this; legally?). Kilman-Gadd was at one time acting as a kind of hostess to all foreign journalists at the Press Room of the Grand Hotel, Stockholm. She is undoubtedly a valuable acquisition to Kohgo in view of her numerous contacts in the Press World, etc.

b) Fru (Frau?) Lehammar, who worked temporarily as a secretary to General Onodera in January 1944, now appears as secretary to Saito Masami, "Domei" correspondent in Stockholm. her address was last reported as Odengatan 45 IV, Stockholm.

20. Agneta Topelius, previously reported to be "Ashi" correspondent in Stockholm, is known to be the secretary to the actual correspondent Watanabe Shinichiro. Her full name is Margareta Suber Topelius, and not Agneta. Her present address is Odengatan 23, Stockholm 23, Stockholm; she is a Swedish citizen and an authoress by profession.

21. We now learn that Otto and Edgar Klaus, previously reported, are one and the same person. His full name is Edgard Johannes Klaus. (It was due to Edgar Klaus that Klatt (Richard Kauder) was forced to leave is Luftmeldekopf in Sofia and, they managed to link Klatt onto the Hungarian Secret Services in Budapest)

22. Fritz von Twardowsky, referred to in VS/1492, para 6d, is not identical with the person of the same name who was German Consul in Istambul/ The latter Fritz von Twardowsky is at present interned in Turkey. (AOB: towards somewhere in April 1945, all were shipped on the Drottingholm to Lisbon. Most remained in Portugal up to after Germany's unconditional Surrender on 8 May 1945) he is undoubtedly related to the Swedish one, possibly a cousin.

We received information from two agents of ours that the following members of the Swedish Air Line A.B. Aerotransport had recently been arrested on a charge of espionage by the Swedes in Stockholm:- Harald Swallving and Johan Emil Müller of Bromma (Stockholm) Airfield, and Walter Rüter of Malmö Airfield. and that in addition Hans Schaefer, representative of Deutsche Lufthansa in Stockholm, had also been arrested. (almost all had been arranged by supplying the Swedish authorities with information which the British S.I.S. Section V had obtained by their illegal approach of Kraemer's private safe inside Kraemer's private residence, it is like: one thief is steeling from another thief; but according Swedish law, both were criminal offences!) So far we know, Swalling was released but the other three are still under arrest, and Schaefer and Müller have already been brought to trial.

We have been supplying S.I.S. with the necessary information on the three A.B.A. people over a period of eighteen months (AOB: about similar the period, that S.I.S.'s Section V got access to Kraemer's private safe and private room in his residence, supported by Kraemer's household-maid (X1030 X1030return) having obtained), having obtained (by criminal means) this from two of our agents to provide a basis for S.I.S. of the people involved. During this period it has been fairly clear that Schaefer has been obtained his information from these people, who assisted him in his espionage activities against this country.

He states that he obtained his information about passengers from Müller and information about freight from Swallving; Müller has admitted passing information to Schaefer and being fully aware that the information he provided was being passed on to the German Intelligence. Müller says that up to the beginning of 1942 he delivered his reports orally to Schaefer and subsequently he gave him written reports twice a month.

You will see that Schaefer has admitted to reporting to Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) among other people. This admission, which was referred to in a Swedish paper, may be useful in the interrogation →

of Krämer (Kraemer), who I observe denies having obtained information from Schaefer, though he admits that Swallving gave him information about the ball-bearing traffic from Sweden to the U.K.

A copy of the translation of the newspaper article is attached. Unfortunately I do not know the name and date of issue of the newspaper, but these could no doubt be obtained.

These arrests by no means clear up the position in A.B.A. As you probably know, Carl Florman, the Director, has long been an object of suspicion; and S.I.S. have reported that his cousin Bertil Florman was in close touch with Hans Schaefer and lunched with him almost every day. In addition , we have had from our agents adverse information on the following:-

Of these, our attention from this country's point of view has been attracted to Andreasson, who is still flying between Stockholm and the U.K., and to a lesser extent to Naslund, who is in the same position.

The suspicious relationship between these various characters in A.B.A. and Schaefer and the Germans is somewhat complicated and very difficult to put briefly, but we would very much, like to know whether anything can be extracted from Krämer (Kraemer) about them, whilst at the same time the information obtained from the interrogations in Stockholm of the people in whom we are interested might provide suitable material for the extraction from Kraemer of the full story.

As I explained to you, we have a lot of information in this Section on all A.B.A. personnel and organisation, and perhaps it might be useful to you to come in and have a look at it when you have time.

AOB: I don't know how to judge the apparent crossing line over first letter section; reducing its relevance or did it originate from some kind of folding?

Director Hans Schaefer, head of the Swedish branch office of the Deutsche Lufthansa Co. and Johann Emil Müller. Aircraft Controler of the Aerotransport Co., were arrested for espionage concerning air traffic at Bromma to and from Britain, and were brought up for trial on Wednesday for the first time.

The City Prosecutor, Mr. Otto Meijer, developed his case against the two prisoners. Among other things he established that Schaefer undertook some time in 1940 to report to Colonel Petersen, at that time the (German) Air Attaché in Stockholm, any matters of interest to the German authorities of which he could obtain knowledge in the course of his duties at the Bromma airport.

Following on this undertaking Schaefer has since been giving his information also to Dr. Hans Wagner (The K.O. Schweden Leiter) during the whole time, and since the beginning of 1942 to Dr. Karl Heinz Krämer (AOB: at least after Dr. Kraemer became the Air Attaché at the German Legation, I doubt that this happened already in early 1942) Both of these men were engaged in the German Military Secret Intelligence (actually: Amtsgruppe Ausland/Abwehr im O.K.W.) in Sweden.

Schaefer obtained his information to a certain extent from Müller. Müller has been helping Schaefer from 1941 till the middle of April, 1945. Schaefer, according to his own statement, had not received any remuneration whereas Müller had received 7,000 kroner for his collaboration. The Prosecutor considers it clear that the information given to the German authorities concerned matter affecting the nation and its communications with a foreign power, which, if imparted to another foreign power, might impair the friendly relations with such a power and interference with provisions for the people of the nation.

The Prosecutor therefore urged that Schaefer and Müller were liable under the Ppenal Law, Chapter 8, par. 14 for espionage, also under Chapter 8, para 29, reserving a further charge under a more severe clause until later. He pointed out that the examination was not yet concluded and that further indictment might be brought against the prisoners during the course of the trial.

Schaefer was then questioned more closely as to his activities. He admitted that he had given secret information regularly to the Air Attachés at the Legation and also to certain diplomats.

Mr. Meijer, the Prosecutor, was of the opinion that Schaefer had attempted to map out in detail the traffic to Britain. Müller began his work for Aerotransport at Bromma (Stockholm Airport) in 1940. Here he met Schaefer whom he already knew. In the spring of 1941 Müller and Schaefer had discussed the British planes at Bromma, and later on in the summer Schaefer had asked Müller "to tell him sometime when a 'plane arrived". At first Schaefer had received verbal reports two or three times a week.

Schaefer said he had received the money with which to pay Müller from Wagner (Leiter K.O. Sweden). Müller never asked to give a receipt for the 200 kroner which he received about the first of each month.

Schaefer asserted that the information he had given to the Germans had been statistical value only. No one had asked him to keep quiet about what he saw at Bromma, he said, and by the then Air Attaché. Colonel (Obst.) Petersen, had been very active in questioning him. "It was just like an interrogation by the Police. I was his subordinate and was obliged to answer", said Schaefer.

Ref. the above, now in the U.K., below is a summary of the circumstances of their arrest.

SCI, SHAEF Mission to Denmark, with the assistance of 65 FS Section - arrested Kramer (Kraemer) c/o Karl Berg, Hafendamm 11, Flensburg; and Siemsen c/o Amtsgerichtsrat Walter Berg, Marcenhölzungsweg 33, Flensburg on the night 14/15 May 1945. They were not interrogated.

Illing and Sewigh were also arrested on the same night at 72 Bismarckstrasse, Flensburg by the same units.

Illing, German naval officer, told plausible story of naval service as signals officer having worked in Roumania and Bulgaria during war, local knowledge bearing this out. Sewigh disclosed Illing was in fact Abwehr officer of Ast Stettin.

Sewigh, German officer, born Petersburg 4 Dec 1915, father Swedish, acquired Estonian nationality and became naturalised German in Oct 1940. Served as a volunteer in Finland from 2 Dec. 1939 until wounded 11 March 1940. From Jun 1940 worked in Kone lift constructions firm in Helsinki and arrived in Germany Sep 1940. In 1941 conscripted into German army, served with Dolmetscher (translator) Kompanie in Berlin till 1941, a Murmansk area until 1943, and afterwards with Pz. Jäger Abt. II, Kolberg until Jul 1944. Then posted to Abwehr as officer of Ast Stettin. Repeatedly claimed that he had been posted to Abwehr and not volunteered for it. (Please bear in mind: that in the first months after the Germans surrendered - Abwehr and Amt VI /Amt Mil personnel were considered being Criminals of War; because the real circumstances weren't correctly understood, due to the really "ill training" in this respect on the Allied side. Afterwards, Abwehr and Amt VI personnel had been regarded as normal prisoners of war)

I have been reminded by the Home Office that the period during which Siemsen can be kept in this country will expire on 15.6.45. I am told by Section V (S.I.S. special operational Section whom operated, for instance, in copying documents out of Kraemer's private safe in his own residence in Stockholm!) that Siemsen made a full statement regarding Kraemer's activities to the Swedes while she was detained in Sweden. (AOB: this might indicate, that Siemsen had been interned as not possessing a diplomatic status as did possess Kraemer being the German Military Air Attaché, before she was allowed to leave Sweden territory together with Karl Heinz Kraemer, on or after 28 April 1945) You may therefore think it desirable to interrogate Siemsen at an early date more especially if Kraemer himself is proving troublesome.

With reference to B.1.b's (Mr. Stamp's) memorandum of 19.5.45., and in particular to the questionnaire attached thereto, the following items of information have so far been extracted:-

Krämer (Kraemer) was in the German Government Service (legal branch) from 1938, prior to starting a diplomatic career. He was recruited for the Abwehr (Referat Eins Luft) on 3rd September, 1939 in Hamburg by Oberstlt (Obstlt.) as an Unteroffizier (NCO).

Krämer (Kraemer) signed the usual contract with the (Military) Abwehr at the end of September, 1939, before Major Ritter in the General Commando, Hamburg.

Krämer (Kraemer) states that during the war he visited all European countries with the exception of Russia, Poland and the Baltic States, and Roumania, through which he only travelled on his way to Bulgaria. The journeys undertaken were in some cases in connection with his diplomatic duties, in others on behalf of the Abwehr, and thirdly for purely personal reasons.

Krämer (Kraemer) visited London from approximately 5th July - early August, 1939. He stayed in furnished rooms at 9, Sussex Place. He states this visit had no connection with his subsequent Abwehr activities. He came to England to visit the German Chamber of Commerce and the German Embassy to which he was expecting to be attached shortly as a step in his diplomatic career. After a holiday in France, he was intending to return to London in August to take up his post, but he fell ill and shortly afterwards, the outbreak of war put an end to this project.

(AOB: this is an early indication that Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer wasn't intended to become engaged at the German Military Abwehr; but was, due to his academic background, intended for a Diplomatic Career. Don't forget, as to what I learned from, at least M.I.5, underwent a similar career-structure as within the German military Abwehr. Ranks succeeding Colonel weren't hardly encountered, as was the case in the German Military Abwehr careers. And Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer - a graduated academic - was better off in the German Foreign Office (A.A.) becoming a Diplomat, which could progressing sky-high, whereas the Abwehr and British "Civil Crown Servants" possessed quite limited career prospects.)

Krämer (Kraemer) states that his appointment on the 1st November, 1942, to Stockholm as Legation Secretary on 1st November, 1942 to Stockholm as Legation Secretary and representative of Eins Luft Abwehr, had no previous precedent, and that he therefore had no predecessor in the post.

Before going to Sweden, Krämer (Kraemer) was paid according to his successive ranks as Unteroffizier, Feldwebel, Sonderführer (Sdf. and Leutnant.)

(AOB: quite dubious: Sdf. (G) Gruppenführer / Feldwebel) ; (Sdf. (Z) Zugführer/Lt. (Lieutenant))

This indicates that those in England had not a sound idea what it actually was about.

On his appointment as Legation Secretary in Stockholm, his salary was 2,000 - 3,000 RM per month (having a 10% increase during this period).

In addition to his salary, Krämer (Kraemer) received expenses from the Abwehr in Berlin, accounting to roughly 2,000 - 3,000 RM per month. he obtained authority from Obstlt. Hansen to obtain advances →

(AOB: not entirely correct, as Hansen moved from FHO (late 1942), on demand of Obst. Piekenbrock, as to become his successor. Obst. Piekenbrock himself wanted to become a General. For it you must follow a course and training as to obtain a General's Patent; but first, he must also command a Division on the Eastern Front, in Russia. I am in the possession of a copy (scan) of Obstlt. / Obst. i.G. Georg Alexander Hansen's private pocket diary, over the year 1943! And I know - he was in the "Führer Hauptquartier" (Wolfschanze) / Nikolaiken (Atlas) (East Prussia), when General Paulus' 6th Army surrendered to the Russians (de facto 2 February 1943). (AOB: I discovered in Hans' private pocket diary that he took over Piekenbrock's office on 1.1.1943) - becoming Leiter I, at the Tirpitz Ufer in Berlin; which he apparently did.)

→ , on the submission of periodic accounts for upkeep of car, office equipment, etc.

At the end of 1944 (Hansen had been executed in September 1944 at Plötzensee Prison, on a most cruel way, as he was sentenced to death after his involvement in the assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler, on 20 July 1944.), Eins Luft (not entirely correct as it concerned Amt VI (Amt Mil / Mil Amt), since the Abwehr was forced to merge within the SS controlled Amt VI/Amt Mil) paid over to Krämer 3,000 Swiss francs for →

→ use in case of emergency. He also had £100 and 40,000 Swedish Kroner in reserve. These sums were under his own control at the Legation.

By the end of January (1945) his salary was not being paid, and he drew on his reserve for the next three months of about 10,000 - 14,000 Kr.

On leaving Stockholm (on or about 28 April 1945) he left the balance of his foreign currency in the Legation, and about 10,000 - 14,000 Kr. out of his personal savings, was left with his wife and family (young daughter) for their upkeep.

Krämer (Kraemer) states that he obtained no direct assistance from the Swedish authorities, though he imagines his connection with the ~~Abwehr~~ Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Ministry) and Amt VI/Amt Mil) was well-known to them.

He made use of the teleprinter (FS) (there existed a link, via Swedish cable trunks then via the Baltic Sea to the Isle Rügen and from there to the Auswärtiges Amt Berlin (German Foreign Office), but this was at the disposal of the whole Legation and the fact that he could make journeys monthly to and from Berlin was in accordance with general diplomatic procedure. The Swedish Government were aware that there were two offices in Stockholm dealing with Abwehr and (separately) S.D. activities. under Finke (the latter was likely representing Amt IV, foreign Sipo and S.D.). The Abwehr K.O. (Kriegsorganisation; before mid 1944, thereafter K.d.M.) (K.O. was established in most friendly states /Legations; like acted S.I.S. abroad) organisation was under (Dr. Hans) Wagner and the S.D. under Finke.

Krämer (Kraemer) states that the main source of his military information was the Japanese military attaché in Stockholm (Lieut.General Onodera). A mutual exchange of intelligence was established between Onodera and Krämer (Kraemer).

a) Measures and calibres of American and British weapons, e.g. ranks, guns, anti-tank guns, etc.

i) Disposition of Angl-American airforces in Europe, as far as known. (RAF Commands and Groups - USAAF Commands).

j) Organisation of an American TAC and a British fighter group (83 Fighter Group). Cooperation between air and ground forces.

k) Raw material situation in USA (calculated yearly output of iron, steel, coal etc. and other war material).

a) Disposition of Anglo-American ground air forces in England, France, Italy and the Far East and Pacific. Armies, Corps, Divisions. RAF and USAAF roughly in Europe, but details as to groups and squadrons in Far East.

c) French Army and Air Forces, Disposition of Divisions, HQ., strength Newly formed divisions.

d) Information regarding raw material in Great Britain. Details about British aircraft industry (production, type, quantity).

e) Weekly report about events in Far East and Pacific war, with data about latest formed divisions, air groups, own and enemy losses.

f) Disposition of Anglo-American airborne units - numbers of divisions or brigades.

k) Information on fighting forces in the Arctic. Strength, divisional numbers. Intentions of Soviet and Anglo-Americans.

l) Political and military data on Chino-Japanese War. The problem of Yuan and the attitude of the Japanese Government.

m) Information on internal conditions in England. Home policy, the Cabinet, Churchill, food conditions, social problems, Britain's foreign relations, particularly with USSR.

Krämer (Kraemer) received his information from Onodera at personal interviews and passed it on to Abwehr I Luft Berlin by teleprinter (FS) (The Legation possessed several Secret Telex (Geheimschreiber types) of which, at least one SFM T43, one of world's most secure 'true one-time-path' machine as it used dual punch-tape readers) diplomatic bag or personal contact. He obtained the information required by Onodera from Berlin in the same way. On his visits to Berlin his source of information was (Obstlt. / Obst.) Hansen until the latter's death in July, 1944. (AOB: Hansen was captured in the early morning of 22 July, but trialled in August and executed/cruelly murdered on 8th? September 1944. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Alexander_Hansen ) Thereafter he contacted Ohletz (KV 2/106, PF 602765) and went further details to the Luftwaffenführungsstab, which this office obtained through the Army Section of the Wehrmacht.

Krämer (Kraemer) states that he does not know the source of the information supplied by Onodera which was in any case of uneven value, Onodera appears to have been the focal point of information for all neutral countries in Europe.

Whilst in general the exchange of information between Krämer and Onodera was on a 50/50 basis, Krämer (Kraemer), in addition paid Onodera between 14,000 and 20,000 Kr., as it was considered that the information furnished by Onodera was of greater value it is possible that the money was handed over in payment for one specific piece of information, i.e. the Russian code-books mentioned above).

Onodera experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining funds from Japan and through Switzerland. It was therefore agreed that arrangements should be made for Onodera to receive money through the German Legation in Stockholm, the money having been paid in the first place by the Japanese Government through the German Embassy in Tokio (Tokyo) or the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. Krämer estimated that in all he paid over to Onodera more than 20,000 dollars under this arrangement.

Smallving. A Swedish friend, in the ABA, Stockholm/ He informed Krämer (Kraemer) about the ball-bearing traffic from Stockholm to the U.K.

Grundbeck. By birth Austrian-Hungarian, now a Swedish business man. He was well-known in English and American circles and obtained economic data on the British Isles (aircraft production, steel and shipping), and also regarding Finnish and Russian activities in Sweden. He died in February 1944.

Voelzkoendy (Vöczköndy) Hungarian Military Attaché in Stockholm, gave account of conditions in Finland.

Krämer (Kraemer) states that he had no information from Schäfer, shose contact for this purpose was (Leiter Dr. Hans) Wagner of the Kriegsorganisation (K.O. Schweden).

Questioned with regard to cover names of various Abwehr officials, Krämer (Kraemer) has given the following information:-

Anzo " Kleyenstüber (formerly Leiter I L in Berlin) (Leiter August 44 - May 45 Leiter K.d.M. Spain, in Madrid)

Egmond (Egmont!) " Krämer (Kraemer) thinks this is cover name of a Service Department in Berlin (AOB: actually it was created by Dr. Giselherr Wirsing, backed by the Leiter of Amt VI Dr. Schellenberg: https://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm

Name used to cover all reports concerning strategical and tactical information given by Onodera. Later Hansen (first since early 1943 Abwehr Leiter I, then Leiter Mil Amt / Amt Mil, until 22 July 1944) sometimes alluded (suggested) to Krämer (Kraemer) himself as Josephine.

Cover name for information obtained from Onodera via Switzerland (during the course of the war this person did pass away)

Krämer's (Kraemer's) closest contacts were with Hansen (Leiter I), Metzner?) Piekenbrock (Hansen succeeded Obst. Piekenbrock on 1st January 1943) and Ohletz (KV 2/106)(also at Amt VI/ Amt Mil) He had met Schellenberg (Leiter Amt VI) on two occasions. (https://www.cdvandt.org/schellenberg-survey.htm) but never worked for Amt VI. He had also met Canaris, but had no personal dealing with him.

Kapt.Lt. Obladen (a very smart and commercially successful businessman; whom had lived also in the U.S.)

Major Ritter (Dr. Rantzau) (KV 2/85 .. KV 2/88)(Leiter I L, until February 1941)

Obst. ~~Piekenbrook~~ Piekenbrock (Formerly Leiter I, until late 1942, on 1st January 1943 Hansen succeeded Obst. Piekenbrock)

Obst. Rohleder (Joachim; since 1938 Leiter III-F, later Amt VI (?)(or Amt Mil ? Chef section III - F) (KV 2/2136)

Obstlt, von Freytag-Lohringhofen (Leiter II; committed suicide after - the failed assassination attempt on Hitler on 20th July 1944)

Major Wenzlau (Kraemer and Wenzlau cooperated already in 1942 in Portugal on behalf of Ast Hamburg)

Kapt. z. See ~~Meissner~~ (Korv.Kpt. Hans Meisner) (K.O. Leiter Switzerland) (KV 2/281-KV 2/282)

11. Krämer's (Kraemer's) Activities at the Time of the "Putsch" of 20th July, 1944. (failed assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler)

Krämer (Kraemer) states that he became convinced that Germany had lost the war at the time of the Stalingrad disaster, and Hansen, his chief, being of the same opinion, became involved in the July, 1944 "Putsch", when the attempt was made to assassinate Hitler.

Krämer was himself involved in this "Putsch to a certain extent. He was in Berlin on 17th July, 1944, and received a message from Hansen to go to Stockholm at once, as something was "in the air".

Had the attempt on Hitler's life been successful, the plan was for ? negotiations to be entered into with the Allied nations and Krämer would have been employed to make contact with the Anglo-American representatives. Krämer (Kraemer) thinks that most of the leading Abwehr officers were involved in the "Putsch" including Hansen, Engelhorn, Weise and Wessel Freiherr von Freytag-Lohringhoven, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wessel_Freytag_von_Loringhoven, and meetings were often held in Hansen's (conspirative?) flat to discuss plans. (AOB: Hansen didn't live at a flat, but possessed a small house in Rangsdorf, Grenzweg 1! When ever possible, the family lived in Michelau, in Bavaria)

With reference to question 13 on the questionnaire above referred to, Krämer (Kraemer) estimates that he knows 60% of the persons mentioned and is at present supplying information about them, which will be forwarded in due course.

With reference to the case of Nina Anna Siemsen, I have instructed the Governor of Holloway Prison that the secretary of State has, for special reasons, directed the detention of this woman for a further period of fifteen days from the expiry of the original period authorised by the Immigration Officer under paragraph 2 of the Arrival from British or Foreign Territory Order, 1943. viz until 15th June.

As you are aware there is no power to detain beyond the 30 day period under the Order and in the circumstances, we hope it may be possible to complete enquiries before the 15th June.

Please digest the above text yourself; it is evident that Kraemer lived rather luxury.

German Diplomatic Passport No. 2121 issued Berlin 27.12.44 and valid for one year, in the name of Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer, secretary at German Embassy in Stockholm

Permit No. 220, issued 5.5.45 for Kraemer to enter building of Marinekriegsschule Muerwik (Mürwik).

Permit No. 3 for DKW-car "A.30131" stating that Kraemer is driver of this Foreign Office car. Dated 14.5.45, Flensburg.

Police registration from in German, stating that Kraemer has moved to Hafendamm 11, Flensburg. c/o Berg, on 6.5.45.

Visiting cards of Kraemer as Doctor of Law (Jura) and Secretary at German Embassy in Stockholm.

Certificate re demobilisation of Unteroffizier (NCO) Heinz Koehler. living at Hafendamm 11, Flensburg, stating that he has personal coupons valid until 30.4.45 and asking civilian authorities to provide him with tobacco and other coupons. On back, notes of coupons issued by Flensburg authorities on 9.5.45.

One bill from travel Bureau of Grand Hotel, Stockholm, dated 28.4.45. (AOB: thus he did not leave Stockholm about 20th April)

Piece of carbon paper used once, with notes in German of taking place of interview between Edward Ward of BBC and German Foreign Minister of 11.5.45 (= Lutz von Schwerin-Krosigk)

The first definite trace we have of Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) in connection with intelligence activities dates back from February 1941, at which time he was a member of Ast Hamburg.

He has travelled extensively in Europe having paid numerous visits since 1939 to Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Switzerland and the Balkans. It is highly probable that all his travels prior to 1941 were also connected with intelligence activities. His visits to the U.K. in July 1939 is therefore significant, In 1942 he appears to have been employed in an Abwehr capacity in Berlin, presumably Eins Luft.

Krämer (Kraemer) began work in Stockholm early in 1943 using the cover of Legation Secretary. Little information is available about this period although it is reported that he paid almost weekly visits to Berlin, and we know that by June 1943 both Josephine and Hektor sources were working. The greater part of our information of Krämer (Kraemer) dates from approximately November 1944 at which he began to receive copies of intelligence reports that were being sent to R.S.H.A. (AOB: actually Amt Mil / Mil Amt) Berlin by teleprint (FS) (AOB: nonsense as already these kinds of communication had been maintained for rather long time) from the Air Department of the German Legation in Stockholm. This material showed that he had at his command numerous sources operating outside Sweden, but later, however, we came to the conclusion that the majority of these were notional. His most prolific source is a person he describes as Zuverlässiger Vertrauensmann (a reliable source) whom we know now believe to be identical with Josephine. This source reports on a wide range of subjects giving the impression that it is an organisation and not one single source.

Hektor another of his sources, at present unidentified appears to work in conjunction with Josephine under Quelle 10., who is believed to be an official in the Swedish Foreign Office. Any lines that Krämer (Kraemer) has to the U.K. are doubtless run through Quelle 10 →

Krämer (Kraemer) also receives from two ~~organisations~~ (covered sources) known as Zuckerhut and Eisberg, the former covering principally France and Switzerland and the latter Italy. The existence of these organisations is confirmed from other sources.

Veracity checks have been made on the greater part of his intelligence reports, as a result of which it was discovered that, with a few notable exceptions, the material was entirely inaccurate. (AOB: this view wasn't always appreciated by those whom had to judge veracities. (Z1032 Z1032return) Much of his intelligence is derived from a subtle combination of intelligent deduction, reading the Foreign Press and technical publications and anticipation of Berlin's requirements. The fact that Krämer (Kraemer) fabricates a large part of his information has been admitted by more than one of his colleagues (AOB: were they, perhaps jealous?). It appears that in several instances Krämer has departed from somewhat ingenious fabrication of information and attributed it to sources who actually exist and who might well have actually supplied the information in question. Perhaps the most notable of these is Pierre Albert Garnier, a member of the French Delegation (Legation!) in Stockholm whom Krämer (Kraemer) claims as an important source using the symbol "27". (Someone at S.I.S. nearly " broke his neck" on his suspicion against Garnier: https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm)

During his stay in Stockholm Krämer has never really worked in close conjunction with the Sipo and S.D. →

(AOB: again a clear proof that these guys did not understand the German organisation structures; again a proof of their ill, insufficient, training and education!! Sipo and S.D. were police related entities, of which R.S.H.A. Amt III dealt with internal German police affairs; whereas Amt IV dealt with Foreign police related affairs of Sipo and S.D.) (However, Military Intelligence was covered or dealt with by Amt Mil / Mil Amt and Amt Mil had been in some way linked with Dr. Schellenberg's Amt VI) https://www.cdvandt.org/schellenberg-survey.htm

→ and has more or less maintained his lone wolf status. In November 1944, however, he was joined by his ex-assistant Major Heinrich Wenzlau.→

(AOB: please bear in mind: Kraemer got hardly a military training and at the end he got a virtual rank of a Lieutenant; whereas Wenzlau was a Major and thus in a far superior military position. However, Kraemer and Wenzlau cooperated already well in Portugal where they had been sent to on behalf of Ast Hamburg. And, Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer possessed an academic degree in Law and actually possessed the Diplomatic Status of a Military Attaché. He actually was employed first by the German Foreign Ministry (A.A.). But he also was engaged with Amt Mil the successor of the German Military Abwehr. He declared that he earned a double salary: first as a diplomat and secondly for his contribution to the Abwehr/Amt Mil. (C1033 C1033return).

→ The two have worked in close conjunction for many years before on intelligence work. Wenzlau's last appointment was Leiter, Eins Luft, Lisbon. Since his arrival Krämer (Kraemer) has concentrated more on the "West" territory and Wenzlau on the "Ost" territory. Wenzlau has worked in close conjunction with the Finns, Hungarians (the latter country had also connections with Kraemer) and the Japanese since his arrival in Stockholm.

As for Krämer's (Kraemer's) personal background the following may be of interest. He was married in Sweden in 1941 on one of the early visits to that country. →

(AOB: the wording of this text might give the impression that he married in Sweden in 1941; but among the list of his belongings which were separated from him when he entered Camp 020, there was a wedding-ring with the inscription of 24.12.38) (D1034 D1034return) (Please notice that the initials in scripted in the ring was E.P. and the next sentence provides that her maiden name being Pontow. Considering the bits together, it is not unlikely that Kraemer did marry Miss Pontow on 24.12.38, and that they (the British) weren't correctly informed).

He lived well in Stockholm (E1036 E1036return) and as is reported to have accumulated a nest of egg of several thousand dollars for his own personal use. He appears to be a jovial personality, likes parties and has a flare for running several love affairs at the same time. There have been reports of sinister behaviour towards his wife and children but they are probably not true.

His departure for Denmark at the beginning of May (at least on or after 28 April) was a politically unwise move on his part as our evidence shows that the Swedes would not have dared to expel him had he merely threatened to compromise any of his more important Swedish friends. His departure can only be attributed to panic. His wife and children are still in Stockholm.

We suggest that you endeavour to extract from Krämer (Kraemer) information regarding the following subjects as soon as possible; they are in order of preference:-

2. Information revealing the identity of his source in Swedish Foreign Office (not believed to be notional).

3. Information elucidated an entry in his notebook that he made prior to his visit to Berlin in March 1944 which read "Wunsch Flormann". We are anxious to ascertain whether this refers to Carl Flormann, senior, of the A.B.A. and if so what the mission was that Krämer (Kraemer) fulfilled on his behalf etc.

AOB: How did they know what was inside Kraemer's private notebook? This was an in Sweden totally illegal operation, lasting from Spring 1943 up to the bitter end. They "borrowed" documents out of Kraemer's private safe at his private residence! This had been made possible by making a copy of Kraemer's safe lock. Essential was that it was made possible by Kraemer's household maid. (F1037 F1037return)

4. Any information that could compromise Swedish personalities, preferably high ranking ones, or reveal in any way his collaboration, with the Swedish Police, Airforce officials, F.O. (Foreign Office) etc.

We feel it might be advisable if subject were lead to think, a) that he had double-crossed by the Swedes and that the greater part of our information on him had been derived from information supplied to us by the Swedes, and b) that he is liable to be treated as a war criminal. (AOB: actually nonsense, as they had themselves not sufficiently informed about the true status of the Abwehr related matters)

You will shortly be receiving a copy of the summary of Karl Heinz Krämer's (Kraemer's) contacts in Sweden as opposed to his contacts and organisation abroad.

Attached is a copy of a questionnaire which we had prepared for our representative in Sweden at a time when his arrest by the Swedes seemed probable (all in vain).

P.S. A report has just been received from our representative in Stockholm stating that Krämer is in possession of a letter written in French stating "Mon cher Pierre". This would appear to indicate that Krämer (Kraemer) has been writing to Pierre Albert Garnier and consequently Garnier is a real and not a notional source. https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm

Please be also aware, that all KV 2/xxxx serials are running - with progressing PDF page numbers - reversed in time (thus backwards).

Whereas the minute serials are running in a correct succession - as the flow of events were recorded and responded upon in the increasing minute numbers (serials).

++ - SSD (Dringlichkeitstufe) - WABA serial number 6896 date 25/2 receipted 2245 ==

Betr: (Betrifft) Vierte Englische LLD (Luftlandedivision) (Parachute Operation) -

Fruehere Angaben Ueber 4 (Former information of 4. (4th) Angl. (Anglo) LLD (Luftlandedivision) werden nach Angaben

mit General Gale ~~bezeigt~~ (Bezieht). Darin ergaenzt, ~~dasz~~ (dass) 4 Engl. LLD bis 10.3. (10th March 1945) In England zusammengezogen werden soll

RSHA (Amt) Mil B/ S Nr. 13062/ 2.45 Geheim (Secret) Gezeichnet (signed) von Dewitz Obstlt.

It was obtained by S.I.S. Section V in Stockholm whom paid at least a Czech employed at the telex (FS) Office in the German Legation in Stockholm

This man got very well paid for their stealing the message-copies which they (he) delivered to the British, since January 1945.

Frühere Angaben über 4 (4th?) engl. LLD. (Luftlandedivision) werden nach Angaben von 0% (cover-name?). der sich auf ein Gespräch mit General Gale bezieht, dahin ergänzt, dass 4 engl. LLD bis 10.3. in England zusammengezogen werden soll. Weitere Erkundungen laufen.

AOB: this has all to do with the expected British (Montgomery) air operations between Emmerich and Wesel.

268. To Burg (= Berlin) for Babette Siebelius. (Babette Siebelius and Siebelius Mate) we the most frequent addressees. From Camoes (actually was Ostro, real name Paul Georg Fidrmuc; most famous in Lisbon) ref/ message Babette Thor 10318/4 para 1: Banco = Barcelona and Metro = Madrid papers destroyed. It has only been ascertained that names of the assembly places were "Lock Broom, the place Ullapool, and in addition Loch Ewe, and port of Thurso is not used for assembling. Ref. Babete Thor 10318/4 para 2: The total figure of landing craft also includes LST, LSI and other LS vessels, Urgent enquiries are being made about distribution, also about para 3, auxiliaries. By District Craft are to be understood, among others, Coast Guards, River Patrol and small Trainings Ships. Distribution will follow.

Our representative in Stockholm informs us that all confidential papers belonging to the various departments of the German Legation were burnt on April 19th 1945. A list of the destroyed material was dispatched to Berlin by courier post. We entertain some hopes of ultimately receiving the list. The burning was undertaken as a result of a friendly hint by the Swedes, who indicated that this would prevent future complications (presumably embarrassment to themselves) and the necessity for arresting German Legation personnel should they be requested to do this by the Allies. Sweden's official friendship with defeated Germany has not evidently come to an end.

On April 20th the Swedish Government ordered the Germans to close down their various teleprinter (Telex) (FS) lines, i.e. Stockholm - Berlin, Stockholm Oslo, and internal lines between various branches of the Legation. This, on the face of it, was a measure to assist the Allies, but on investigation we learnt that already on April 18th the Germans had begun dismantling their teleprinter machines and shipping them to Oslo, having obviously had prior warning from Swedish authorities. (AOB: among it, most significantly, were several types of Geheimschreiber machines) Moreover, the Berlin end of the teleprinter (FS) was moved to Silberstadt (because the Russians besieged Berlin and penetrated towards the centre of Berlin, consider the Reichstag and the political centre of this vast city) about this time and would have been out of order for a considerable while in any event.

The appears to have been apprehension (worry) among the German Legation personnel as to their ultimate fate in Sweden, but Major Golcher assured them that they would not end up under barbed wire as he knew the Swedes would have behaved "like gentlemen".

Link (cover name?) gave the following information at a meeting in the afternoon of the 26th April 1945 (AOB: Nina Siemsen and Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer were still remaining in Stockholm) at the apartment of a certain Nilson-Mansson at Brantig 45 III, telephone 61 15 28 which according to all indications is rented by the Swedish Security Service.

~~Siemson~~ (Siemsen), who has already left for Germany (AOB: she might have left Stockholm, but she and Kraemer both were onboard a ferry heading for Copenhagen on about 29th or later, into the direction of Flensburg in Kraemer DKW car), has admitted everything; this is why there was such a quick response to the (British) protest.

~~Schafer~~ (Schaefer) is admitting all charges against him and says that he acted under pressure, because he was told that if he did not send reports in answer to questions put to him he would be sent to the eastern front (for most male Germans quite a trauma) This statement is now being investigated. We (the British S.I.S.?) said that this was very probable and corresponded with the actual state of affairs because the German Security Service used every method in their work.

Bagyoni (KV 2/3646) about whom we (S.I.S.) have reported (to the Swedes?) previously and who belongs to Horthy's Hungarian Security Service, was also arrested on the 25th April. According to Link he was telling so much at first the stenographer could not keep pace with him; and in addition be supplied so much evidence about Kraemer and Wenzlau clique and their espionage that no further proof was necessary in order to make the arrest.

Link thinks that the Allied demand for extradition will be made too late; the arrest of the really guilty ones therefore impossible, because they must be set free on account of the diplomatic poste which they held/ For this sane reason they still hesitate to arrest ~~Kremer~~ Kraemer and his companions. (AOB: are they really so stupid in not understanding the Diplomatic rules?)

It is interesting to note that the Swedish Security Service has the cipher key to the old teleprinting (FS) machine (Siemens SFM T52 b/c, but not concerning the SFM T52d and T52e as well as the SFM T43!) https://cryptocellar.org/pubs/sturgeon.pdf (thanks to Paul Reuvers of the Cryptomuseum.com) and therefore in a position to show ~~Schafer~~ Schaefer deciphered text from 1942/43 which Schaefer acknowledged without any contradiction. (AOB: this wasn't simple as, in my perception, the way they did obtain it, should have been severely covered)

Received : 11.5.45 AOB: I suspected this aspect already for quite a long time, as always, paper qualities in respect to its colour remained so equal, that there was only one way: typing it over.

Typed : 14.5.45

Please see the attached American appreciation of some of K Intelligence reports (AOB, interception by the U.S. of, likely, the Japanese J25 code used in communication between Tokyo and Manila, curiously, not intercepted from the communication between Stockholm and Tokyo), and also of some other Japanese M.S.S. (Most Secret Source) intelligence. I notice S.I.S. ask for the return of these documents, but perhaps we ought to retain for the K (= Kraemer) files at least a copy of the general conclusions. The results are very much in accordance with our conclusions.

Our experience taught me, that due to the very many 'bookmarks' employed in this and the foregoing webpage, that I should limit the extend of each htm (html) webpage.

Which should, Deo volente, be created after this current page has been published.

The actual new hyperlink will hereafter be noticed soon below, so that everybody can conveniently continue the preceding documentation.