

Reference abstracts of

KV 2/1329-2

This document contains materials derived from the latter file. Albeit that the content of the first section mainly concerns Wilhelm Piert, a post war English languish teacher, who was mall judged by M.I.5. servants. Whose Service still was fighting their wartime battles; as if it still concerned war. Though, they since fought a lost battle; the Home Office could not reject, on legal grounds, refusing visa to him. It should be noticed that Piert's wife was British born.

Part two is, mainly, dedicated to the intriguing file on Hans von Pescatore.

This was not the only occasion that we encounter such, negative, attitudes.

Its purpose: to be used as a kind of reference document, containing my personal selection of report sections; considered being of relevance.

My input: I have in almost every case, created transcripts of the just reproduced file contents.

However, sometimes adding my personal opinion; always accompanied by: (AOB, (with- or without brackets) in: blue, red or green colour)

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By Arthur O. Bauer

- 1 -

TOP SECRET
SCDIC/SC/15AG/SD 16

1. SOURCE

(a) Personal details

Name:	von PESCATORE, Hans
Aliases:	AGATHE
Rank:	Rittm. z. V.
Unit:	K.O. SWITZERLAND (IIIF)
Id No:	None
FFNo:	None (diplomatic mail used)
Party No:	None
SS No:	None
Address:	219, Paseo de la Reforma, MEXICO CITY (till May 39) Brother's address in GERMANY: Domink von PESCATORE, HOHENKIRCHEN bei MÜNCHEN.
Captured:	Surrendered to American representative on 25 May 45 at CHLASSO
Interrogated:	SCDIC Sub-Centre, HQ 45 Army Group, GMP, 1 Jun 45.

(b) Documents

(i) Passport No. 40153343 issued on 3 May 45 by the German Embassy at BERN, valid till 2 May 1950. The number of the previous (diplomatic) pass is shown as 2773.

(ii) Letter from the "Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft" dated 23 May 45, Reference C.2. 10098/F/re, ordering Source to report at 0800hrs 25 May 45 at the central police station Waisenhausplatz 32, BERN, with passport and identity papers.

(iii) Certificate issued by the German Embassy BERN on 3 May 45 in lieu of a certificate of domicile, showing Source as having been born at KARLSRUHE on 4 Jan 1900. The certificate is valid till 3 May 46.

(c) History and career

Source was born at KARLSRUHE on 4 Jan 1900. He matriculated at the Gymnasium at WAREN (Mecklenburg) where he studied from 1908 to 1916. He volunteered for the army in 1916 and served in the Seventh Kaverassier Regt till 1919, rising to the rank of 2/Lt in Jan 1918. Source continued his studies between 1920 - 1924 at the universities of BERLIN, WÜRZBURG and MÜNCHEN, changing from Law to Philosophy and later to Economics. In between his studies he worked as a bank clerk to defray the cost of his education.

As a result of the inflation Source found himself penniless and accepted a job offered him by the SENTERAN MAL. tobacco plantation in NE SUMATRA where he remained from 1923 - 1932. In 1932, Source went to MEXICO for a brief period and then to GUATEMALA, where he became interested in a coffee plantation. In Nov 32, Source accompanied his wife back to GERMANY for medical treatment, but returned to MEXICO in the autumn of 1933 as manager of a coffee plantation at TABACHULA in the province of OHLINAS (Mexico). Source remained there till 1937, when he opened an export and import firm at MEXICO CITY, Avenida Madero, in the name of "PESCATORE CIA".

During a business trip in EUROPE in 1939, Source found himself at the outbreak of war in GERMANY. As a result of chance meeting with MEISNER, a friend of his from SUMATRA and already a member of the Abwehr, Source joined Abt. III, Gruppe IIIF of OKW Amt Ausland Abwehr as Hilfsoffizier (Assister) on 28 Oct 39. He later became Referent "SUELEN" (ITALY and SWITZERLAND) in the same department. On 1 Jan 44, Source was appointed successor to PHILIPP as IIIF K.O. SWITZERLAND and installed as Artarat in the German Embassy at BERN. Source held this appointment till his surrender on 25 May 45.

Personal details.

Name: Hans von Pescatore
 Rank: Rittmeister z.b. Verwendung
 Party number: None
 SS No. None
 Address used: 219, Passo de la Reforma, Mexico City, till May 39

Documents.

- (i) Passport number 40153343 issued on 3 May 1945 by the German Embassy Berne, valid till 2 May 1950 (AOB, most relevant, because many people encountered huge difficulties, because their papers had been expired) The number of the previous (diplomatic) pass is shown as 2773.
- (ii) Letter from the "Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft" dated 23 May 1945, Reference C.2. 10098/F/re, ordering source (Hans von Pescatore) to report at 0800 hrs 25 May 45 at the central Police station Waisenhausplatz 32, Bern, with passport and identity papers.
- (iii) Certificate issued by the Germany Embassy Bern on 3 May 45 in lieu of a certificate of domicile, showing source as having been born in Karlsruhe on 4 January 1900. The certificate is valid till 3 May 46.


(c) History and career.

Pescatore was born at Karlsruhe on 4 Jan 1900. He matriculated at the Gymnasium at Waren (Mecklenburg) where he studied from 1908 - 1916. He volunteered for the army in 1916 and served in the

Seventh Kuerrassier Regt. Till 1919, rising the rank of Lt. in January 1918. Source continued his studies between 1920 – 1921 at the Universities in Berlin, Würzburg and München, changing from law to Philosophy and later to Economics. In between his studies he worked as a bank clerk to defray his costs of his education.

As a result of the inflation Pescatore found himself penniless and accepted a job offered by the Sebah Maj. Tabacco plantation in North-Est Sumatra ([think of the region of Medan](#)) where he remained from 1923 – 1932. In 1932 Pescatore went to Mexico for a brief period and then to Guatemala, where he became interested in Coffee plantation. In Nov 32 Pescatore accompanied his wife back to Germany for medical treatment. But returned to Mexico in the autumn of 1933 as a manager of a coffee plantation at Tapachula in the province of Chiapas (Mexico). Pescatore remained there until 1937, when he opened an export firm at Mexico City, Avendo Madero, in the name of “Pescatore CIA”.

During a business trip in Europe 1939, Pescatore found himself at the outbreak of war in Germany, as a result of chance meeting with Meisner a friend from his from Sumatra and already a member of the Abwehr. Pescatore joined Abt. III F, Gruppe III F of OKW Ausland/Abwehr as Hilfsoffizier (Auswerter) on 28 Oct 39. He later became Referent “Süden” (Italy and Switzerland) in the same department. On 1 Jan 44, Pescatore was appointed successor of Philipp as III F K.O. Switzerland as installed as Amtsrat in the German Embassy in Bern. Pescatore held this held this appointment till his surrender on 25 May 1945.



(d) Assessment.

Source, by reason of his continued absence from Germany since the age of 23, has managed to preserve a good deal of the liberal outlook acquired during his years of study. His numerous contacts with people of many nationalities in the Western hemisphere right up to the outbreak of the war long ago opened his eyes to the hollowness of Nazi doctrines, and it would probably be doing him an injustice to doubt the sincerity of his hopes for a change of mind in the German people.

Source has a keen brain and was chosen for his job mere for his academic qualifications than for his practical experience. He is not considered the type who would try to revive his previous activity, in which he found himself more or less by chance. His desire to make a hand in to reconstruction of Germany in any capacity is thought to be sincere.

Reliability: Good

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A few hours after his release, a representative of the American Embassy called on Source with the proposal that he should leave SWITZERLAND through the frontier station ANNEMASSE, where he would place himself at the disposal of the representative of the USA Special Assistant in BERN, DULLES. Source claims to have been told that DULLES expressed a desire for Source's collaboration in GERMANY, and that it meant being sent to PARIS for interrogation before being sent back to GERMANY after about three weeks. Source also states that he was assured he could leave his wife in SWITZERLAND if he so wished, and that she could follow him to GERMANY after the transport problems had been settled.

Source agreed to the proposal. Source amplifies his reasons for acceptance by stating that during his short visit to EUROPE and GERMANY he considered it a matter of course, as a reserve officer, to place his services at the disposal of GERMANY, despite the antipathy he felt for the National Socialist outlook on life. As long as there was a war, and GERMANY was involved in it, he felt compelled to stand by his country, whatever mistakes had been committed, particularly as

the final catastrophe seemed inevitable. Now that GERMANY had surrendered, the Reich had ceased to exist and Source felt free to make his own choice, particularly as MEISNER refused to recognise the DOENITZ government and Source no longer felt bound by the oath of allegiance.

On the 24 May 45, the Swiss police suddenly confronted Source with the name of his chief informer (BOSSHARD). Source states he refused to identify him, but felt very anxious about his safety, and on arrival in MILAN informed DULLES in case the latter should be interested in BOSSHARD.

The American offer had in the meantime been extended to three other persons, including MEISNER and PIERT, all of whom have "western" ties. As the German military attache Lt Gen HORN conferred with Col. MASSON regarding the circumstances of the transfer. Col. MASSON and the Swiss Ministry of Justice therefore gave the assurance that the American proposal was quite authentic and that the transfer would not take place without a corresponding assurance having been received from the Allies.

Source arrived at BERN station in the early morning of 25 May where, together with his colleagues MEISNER, PIERT and WOLFRAM, he was received by two higher officials of the Swiss federal police. The latter declared that for safety's sake the transfer would take place at CHIASSO. On arrival at CHIASSO, all four were met by an American representative and taken to MILAN.

A few hours after his release, as representative of the American Embassy called on Pescatore with the proposal that he should leave Switzerland through the frontier station Annemasse, where he would place himself at the disposal of the representative of the USA Special Assistant in Bern, Dulles. Pescatore claims to have been told that Dulles expressed a desire for Pescatore's collaboration in Germany, and that it meant being sent to Paris for interrogation before being back to Germany after about three weeks. Pescatore also states that he was assured he could leave his wife in Switzerland if he wished, and that she could follow him to Germany after the transport problems had been settled.

Pescatore agreed to the proposal. Pescatore amplifies (**Benachdruckt**) his reasons for acceptance by stating that during his short visit to Europe and Germany he considered it a matter of course, as a reserve officer, to place his services at the disposal of Germany, despite the antipathy he felt for the National Socialist outlook on life. As long as there was a war, and Germany was involved in it, he felt compelled to stand by his country, whatever mistakes had been committed, particularly as the final catastrophe seemed inevitable. Now that Germany had surrendered, the Reich had ceased to exist and Pescatore felt free to make his own choice, particularly Meisner refused to recognise the Doenitz government and Pescatore no longer felt bound by the oath of allegiance.

On the 24 May 45, the Swiss police suddenly confronted Pescatore with the name of his chief informer (Bosshard). Pescatore states he refused to identify him, but felt very anxious about his safety, and on arrival in Milan informed Dulles in case the latter should be interested in Bosshard.

The American offer had in the meantime been extended to three other persons, including Meisner and Piert, all of whom have "western" ties. As the German Military Attaché General-Leutnant Horn conferred with Colonel Masson regarding the circumstances of transfer. Colonel Masson and the Swiss Ministry of Justice therefore gave the assurance that the American proposal was quite authentic and that the transfer would not take place without a corresponding assurance having been received from the allies.

Pescatore arrived at Bern station in the early morning of 25 May where, together with his colleagues Meisner, Piert and Wolfram, he was received by two higher officials of the Swiss Federal Police. The latter declared that for safety's sake the transfer would take place at Chiasso. On arrival at Chiasso, all four were met by an American representative and taken to Milan.

(iii) The strict supervision of the Swiss police was a constant danger, in that it was found impossible to replace any person discovered owing to difficulties raised by the Foreign Office. This meant that many enquiries which would have yielded good results were not followed up owing to the risk involved.

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(AOB, I suppose this became a problem after, say, mid 1943)

(v) As a final handicap Source mentions his own personal lack of conviction in a German victory coupled with his antipathy towards the Nazi ideology.

Source tried to overcome these difficulties by granting a considerable amount of latitude to his subordinates and by creating a good relationship with the Consulates. Social contacts were also fostered wherever possible.

Source's main task of estimating the broad structure of the enemy intelligence set-up in SWITZERLAND was based on the following sources of information :-

(i) Telegrams and WT traffic decoded by the OKW decoding department ("CHI").

(V)As a final handicap Pescatore mentions his own personal lack of conviction, in a German victory coupled with his antipathy towards the Nazi ideology.

Pescatore tried to overcome these difficulties by granting a considerable amount of latitude to his subordinates and by creating a good relationship with the Consulates. Social contacts were also fostered wherever possible.

Pescatore's main task of estimating the broad structure of the enemy intelligence set-up in Switzerland was based on the following source(s) of information:-

(i) Telegrams and W/T traffic (think of Rado's "Rote Kapelle") decoded by the OKW/Chi.

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-2-

TOP SECRET
CSDIC/CMF/SD 96

1. SOURCES

(a) Personal Details

Name	: PESCATORE, Hans von	PIERT, Willy
Alias	: None	None
Rank	: Rittmeister	Obergefreiter
Unit	: VI Z SWITZERLAND (formerly III F SWITZERLAND)	
ID No	: None	252/45
FP No	: None	None
Party No	: None	In 2,200,000 series
Home Address	: bei Dominik von PESCATORE, HOHENKIRCHEN bei MÜNCHEN	bei WEISS, MITTENWALD, Gries 3
Captured	: Surrendered to American representatives at CHIASSO, 25 May 45.	
Secret No	: M45/848	M45/849
Interrogated	: CSDIC, CMF, 17 - 30 Nov 45	

(b) Historics and Careers

Of. CSDIC/SC/1546/SD 16 para 1.d., and CSDIC/SC/1546/SD 17 para 1.d.

(c) Assessments

PESCATORE has a keen analytical brain, but tends to be long-winded; his deafness has also impeded interrogation. He professes anti-Nazi sentiments, it is thought quite sincerely, and has been cooperative except for a slight reluctance to give information about agents he presumes to be still at liberty. Because of his work as evaluator Referat III F 2 (ITALY and SWITZERLAND) of the Abwehr in BERLIN, before being appointed Referat III F in SWITZERLAND, he has a wide knowledge of counter-intelligence information about the Allied I.S. in SWITZERLAND during the war, and he has provided the bulk of the information on this subject. Unfortunately he has a poor memory for dates.

Reliability : Good.

PIERT is intelligent and cooperative, except that he seems to share PESCATORE's reluctance to denounce agents employed by him. Although he has given a certain amount of information under this heading, the possibility that he has held something back cannot be excluded. He has not the wide background knowledge of PESCATORE, and most of his information is concerned with the agents he controlled.

Reliability : Good.

(Interrogated by A.G.)

1 Sources.(a) Personal Details:

Name	: Pescatore, Hans von	Piert, Willy
Alias	: None	None
Rank	: Rittmeister	Obergefreiter
Unit	: VI-Z Switzerland (formerly III F Switzerland)	
ID	: None	252/45
FP(Feldpost)	: None	None
Party No.:	: None	In 2,200,000 series
Home address	: bei Dominik von Pescatore, Hohenkirchen bei München	bei Weiss, Mittenwald Gries 3
Captured:	Surrendered to American representative at Chiasso, 25 May 45.	
Secret No.:	M45/848	M45/849
Interrogated	CSDIC, CMF, 17 - 30 Nov 45	

(b) ...(c) Assessments

Pescatore has an analytical brain, but tends to be long-minded; his deafness has also impeded interrogation. He professes anti-Nazi sentiments, it is thought quite sincerely, and has been cooperative except for a slight reluctance to give information about agents he presumes to be still at liberty. Because in his work as evaluator Referat III F 2 (Italy and Switzerland) of the Abwehr in Berlin, before being appointed Referat III F in Switzerland, he has wide knowledge of counter-intelligence information about the Allied I.S. in Switzerland during the war, and he has provided the bulk of information on this subject. Unfortunately, he has poor memory of dates.

Reliability : Good.

Piert is intelligent and cooperative, except that he seems to share Pescatore's reluctance to denounce agents employed by him. Although he has given a certain amount of information under his heading, the possibility that he has held something back cannot be excluded. He has not the wide background knowledge as Pescatore, and most of his information concerned with the agents he controlled.

Reliability : Good

2. VI Z SWITZERLAND (till Jun 44 III F SWITZERLAND)

(a) History and Organisation

III F work originally began in SWITZERLAND before the war with independent officers directly responsible at first to Gruppe III F of the Abwehr in BERLIN and not to KO SWITZERLAND. During 1941 an order was issued placing all Abwehr officers working in SWITZERLAND under the KO, which up till then had been concerned with Abt I matters only. Gruppe III F in BERLIN (Oberst ROHLEDER) objected that the combination of III F with the I Referate of the KO would unnecessarily expose the III F officers, whose work did not run counter to the Swiss espionage laws in the same way as that of the I officers, who were concerned with offensive intelligence and might have to make enquiries about internal matters concerning SWITZERLAND. In the end a compromise was reached according to which III F personnel were placed under the KO Leiter for admin and discipline, but were responsible for intelligence matters to BERLIN. The

arrival of PESCATORE to take over all III F work, on 1 Jan 44, prevented differences from becoming too acute, as he was on terms of close personal friendship with MEISNER, the KO Leiter.

PESCATORE's appointment was due to a personal visit by Admiral CANARIS to SWITZERLAND at end 43. At that time there were two main sections of III F in SWITZERLAND, and a small section at ZURICH. These were technically Referate, but were always known as III F BERNE, III F GENEVA and III F ZURICH. Organisation was as follows:

2VI Z (RSHA Amt VI sectie Z) Switzerland (till Jun 44 III F Switzerland)

(a) History and Organisation.

III F work was originally begun in Switzerland before the war with independent officers directly responsible at first to Gruppe III F of the Abwehr in Berlin and not to KO (**Kriegsorganisation established in neutral friendly states**). During 1941 an order was issued placing all Abwehr officers working in Switzerland under the KO, which up till then had been concerned with I matters (**espionage**) only. Gruppe III F (**counter-espionage**) in Berlin (Obst. Rohleder) objected that the combination of III F with the I Referate of the KO would unnecessarily expose the III F officers, whose work did not run counter to the Swiss espionage laws in the same way as that of the I officers, who were concerned with offensive intelligence and might have to make enquiries about internal matters concerning Switzerland. In the end a compromise was reached according to which III F personnel were placed under the KO Leiter for admin and discipline, but were responsible for intelligence matters in Berlin. The arrival of Pescatore to take over all III F work, on 1 Jan 44, prevented differences from becoming too accurate, as he was on terms of close personal friendship with Meisner, the KO Leiter. (AOB, **they knew each other from the time they both were engaged in agriculture in North Sumatra, Dutch-Indies, say, about 1930**)

Pescatore's appointment was due to a personal visit by Admiral Canaris to Switzerland at the end 43, At that time there were two main sections of III F in Switzerland, and a small section at Zürich. These were technically Referate, but were also known as III F Bern, III Geneva (**Genf**) and III F Zürich. ...

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The three sections did not work under a single head, and CANARIS after his visit appointed PESCATORE as Referent III F SWITZERLAND to control the work over the whole country. There was no change in personnel, except that PHILIPP was recalled to BERLIN at end Dec 43 before PESCATORE took over.

The three sections did not work under a single head, and Canaris after his visit appointed Pescatore, as Referat III F Switzerland to control the work over the whole country. There was no change in personal, except that Philipp was recalled to Berlin at the end of Dec 43 before Pescatore took over.

During 44 III F SWITZERLAND suffered several casualties. ENGELBRECHTEN was removed at the request of the Swiss authorities in early summer, and was followed after about two months by HEEERLEIN. The loss of these two meant that both GENEVA and ZURICH had to be covered from BERNE; the successor of ENGELBRECHTEN at GENEVA, LANGMANN, had not the experience of the latter, while at ZURICH HEEERLEIN had been the only III F representative; he had no Abwehr staff or agents, as the Consul in ZURICH did not wish to be compromised. HEEERLEIN had in any case been so timid and cautious that he had achieved little success himself as informer.

During 44 III F Switzerland suffered several casualties. Engelbrechten was removed at the request of the Swiss authorities in early summer, and was followed after about two months by Heberlein. The loss of these two meant that both Geneva ([Genf](#)) and Zürich had to be covered from Bern; the successor of Engelbrecht at Geneva ([Genf](#)), Langmann, had not the experience of the latter, while at Zürich Heberlein had been the only III F representative; he had no Abwehr staff or agents, as the Consul in Zürich did not wish to be compromised. (AOB, rather often behaved Foreign Office ([Auswertigesamt](#)) Diplomates hostile against German Intelligence interests; not only here but nearly everywhere). Heberlein had in any case been timid and cautious that he had achieved little success himself as informer.

It was in connection with these arrests that PESCATORE approached the Swiss I.S. with a view to exchanging information (see para 2 c). Through Oberst GRIPP, the German Air Attache, he offered them a few of the deciphered texts of the RADO traffic, hinting that more could be provided if they were interested. He proposed an exchange of the deciphered traffic against the interrogation reports of the arrested persons. The Swiss reply, however, was in the negative.

It was in connection with these arrests that Pescatore approached the Swiss I.S. with a view to exchanging information .. Through Obst. Gripp, the German Air Attaché, he offered them a few of the deciphered texts of the Rado traffic, hinting that more could be provided if they were interested, He proposed an exchange of the deciphered traffic against the interrogation reports of the arrested persons. The Swiss reply, however, was in the negative.

Mme DUEBENDORFER. Cover name "SISSY". A German Communist of long standing, she had fled to SWITZERLAND from FRANCE when German action against the Russian Rote Kapelle organisation was imminent. She maintained liaison with "LUCIE" or "TAYLOR" (see below) and communicated the information to RADO. Arrested by Swiss in raid on stations at end Dec 43. From what he had heard of her, PESCATORE considers that she may well have refused to give information during interrogation by the Swiss. He regards her as the type of woman who would probably resume her former activities at the first opportunity.

Mme Duebendorfer. Cover name "Sissy". A German Communist of long standing, she had fled to Switzerland from France when German action against the Russian Rote Kapelle organisation was imminent. She maintained liaison with "Lucie" or "Taylor" .. and communicated the information to Rado. Arrested by Swiss in raid on stations at end Dec 43. From what he had heard of her, Pescatore considers that she may well have refused to give information during interrogation by the Swiss. He regards her as the type of woman who would probably resume her former activities at the first opportunity.

"LUCIE" or "TAYLOR"

Identity not certain, but believed to have been the former Czech Press Attaché HERMANS. Ran a network of agents in GERMANY from SWITZERLAND (probably BERNE). No direct contact with RADO, but passed information to him via DUEBENDORFER above. A fertile channel of valuable information from BERLIN; his work was highly appreciated by both MOSCOW and the German CE service. Information included the following: -

- German OB in the East.
- Operational plans of the OKW.
- Reconstruction of destroyed or mangled German divisions from other formations (Very accurate).
- Views of Operational department of General Staff (OKH) as to the Russian Command's appreciation of the German OB (Accurate).

From the speed and regularity with which the information reached SWITZERLAND from BERLIN, it was supposed that a diplomatic courier of a neutral state was being used as the channel.

"Lucie" or "Taylor".

Identity not certain, but believed to have been the former Czech Press Attaché Hermans. Ran a network of agents in Germany from Switzerland (probably Bern). No direct contact with Rado, but passed information to him via Mme. Duebendorf above. A fertile channel of valuable information from Berlin; his work was highly appreciated by both Moscow and the German CE service. Information included the following:-

- German OB (**O**ber**b**efehl) in the East.
- Operational plans of the OKW.
- Reconstruction of destroyed or mangled divisions from other formations (Very accurate).
- Views of Operational department of General Staff (OKH) as to the Russian Command's appreciation of the German **O**ber**b**efehl (Accurate).

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
Dear Sissy, as an old Communist you will understand why we must know who your sources are. Please trust us as we trust you. If necessary, you can advise us direct without ALBERT (= DORA) knowing".

To the chagrin of MOSCOW (and the Germans) DUEBENDORFER remained inexorable and declined to state who the source was. PESCATORE deduced that his employer "LUCIE" was HERMANS, former Czech Press Attaché, for the following reasons. He believed that it was a diplomat on the strength of several deductions made by Gruppe III F 2, and also because of a signal sent by MOSCOW to RADO, towards end 43, in which RADO was ordered to create an alternative site for his WF stations. RADO replied suggesting the use of a Legation or Consulate to avoid the constant threat of discovery of the sets on private premises. He went on to suggest approaching the British via "LUCIE". MOSCOW replied saying that official approach to the British was quite unnecessary as "LUCIE" was already in unofficial contact, and was not to be thought of. This led PESCATORE to assume that "LUCIE" was a diplomat. In addition to this, as already stated, it was thought that the reports sent from BERLIN, because of their speed and regularity, must be handled by diplomatic courier.

Dear Sissy, as an old Communist you will understand why we must know who your sources are. Please trust us as we trust you. If necessary, you can advise us direct without Albert (=Dora) knowing".

To the chagrin of Moscow (and the Germans) Duebendorfer remained inexorable and declined to state who the source was. Pescatore deduced that his employer "Lucie" was Hermans, former Czech Press Attaché, for the following reasons. He believed that it was a diplomat on the strength of several deductions made by Gruppe III F2, and also because of a signal sent by Moscow to Rado, towards end 43, in which Rado was ordered to create an alternative site for his W/T station. Rado replied suggesting the use of a Legation or Consulate to avoid the constant threat of discovery on private premises. He went on to suggest that official approach to the British via "Lucie". Moscow replied saying that official approach to the British was quite unnecessary as "Lucie" was already in unofficial contact, and was not to be thought of. This led Pescatore to assume that "Lucie" was a diplomat. In addition to this, as already stated, it was thought that the reports sent from Berlin because of their speed and regularity, must be handed by diplomatic courier.

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However, the same signal mentioned above led PESCATORE to believe that if "LUCIE" was a diplomat it appeared that he did not have diplomatic premises of his own, else RADO would have suggested using them as a site for the W/T station. As the Czechs had no diplomatic relations with SWITZERLAND it appeared at least possible that he was a Czech. Supporting this assumption was BERLIN's theory that a Czech was possibly the source of leakage in the OKH (PESCATORE does not know why BERLIN arrived at this theory), and another signal from MOSCOW to RADO, which ran: "Who is the Czech? X (name forgotten) or LUCIE or both?" This, PESCATORE deduced, was an indication that the term "a Czech" had been used in a signal from RADO and MOSCOW was not certain who was meant, and that as it was queried whether "LUCIE" was meant he assumed MOSCOW knew that he was in fact a Czech. Again, another signal asked RADO to approach "LUCIE" for his views on KOPECKY, who was suspected to be working for the British I.S., and was the former Czech representative at the League of Nations, and was taken to be a further indication that "LUCIE" was a Czech himself.

Having arrived at the assumption that "LUCIE" was both a diplomat and a Czech, PESCATORE reduced the possibilities of his identity by process of elimination, and came to the conclusion that he was probably HERMANS, the former Press Attache to the Czech Legation in BERNE, who had remained in the Capital after the Legation had closed down. On the other hand he did not exclude the possibility that it might not be the Czech honorary Consul in ZURICH, JOCKL, who also vaguely believed in Gruppe III F to be concerned with espionage, though PESCATORE does not know why.

However, the same signal mentioned above led Pescatore to believe that if "Lucie" was a diplomat it appeared that he did not have diplomatic premises of his own, else Rado would have suggested using them as a site for the W/T station. As the Czech had no diplomatic relations with Switzerland it appeared at least possible that he was a Czech. Supporting this assumption was Berlin's theory that a Czech was possibly the source of the leakage in the OKH (Pescatore does not know why Berlin arrived at this theory), and another signal from Moscow ([Moskau](#)) to Rado, which ran: "Who is the Czech.? X (name forgotten) or Lucie or both?" This, Pescatore deduced, was an indication that the term "Czech" had been used in a signal from Rado and Moscow was not certain who was meant he assumed Moscow knew that he was in fact a Czech. Again another signal Rado to approach "Lucie" for his views on Kopecky, who was suspected to be working for the British I.S. and was the former Czech representation at the League of Nation ([Völkerbund](#)), and was taken to be a further indication that "Lucie" was a Czech himself.

Having arrived at the assumption that "Lucie" was both a diplomat and a Czech, Pescatore reduced the possibilities of his identity by process of elimination, and came to the conclusion that he was probably Hermans, the former Press Attaché to the Czech Legation in Bern, who had remained in the Capital after the legation had closed down. On the other hand he did not exclude the possibility that it might not be the honorary Consul in Zürich, Jockl, who also vaguely believed in Gruppe III F to be connected with espionage, though Pescatore does not know why.

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"OLGA"

Real name unknown. Probably a sub-source at a German HQ. Used to report on German OB in the BALKANS.

"Olga" (AOB, Whether she was the ominous, German born: Ursula Kuczynski, Communist and Moscow trained and highly decorated "Olga", I cannot judge in this brief context. She lived also in Shanghai and had a relation with Sorge)

Real name unknown. Probably a sub-source at a German HQ. Used to report on German OB in the Balkans.

This list, apart from revealing sources of information not hitherto known, and the fact that the Polish, British and Vichy French I.S. were supplying material to the Americans, and, what was more significant, the Swiss, also gave considerable help in the deciphering of other signals, and contributed greatly to the elucidation of the a/m carbon papers. The latter were sent to BERLIN where they were read with the aid of experts, often under considerable technical difficulty, as a carbon sheet might have been used ten or twenty times. Some of them remained partly or totally undecipherable. They all consisted of reports by Gen LEGGE, the Military Attache, to "G-2, WASHINGTON", and dealt with the following subjects:-

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German OB and locations in FRANCE (From the Swiss Military Attache).

Operational plans in the UKRAINE (Probably from a Swiss or Allied agent at OKW. Spring 42.)

German losses on the Eastern front, estimated at two million.

Proposal to create an American I.S., apart from normal diplomatic intelligence, on the lines of the Allied I.S. (This before Dec 41).

Changes in the German Command on the Eastern front: the dismissal of Feldmarschall von BOCK and of (?) GUDERIAN.

Records of conversations between HITLER and BRAUCHITSCH shortly after the temporary set-back near MOSCOW in autumn 41. HITLER urged BRAUCHITSCH on to a final effort to capture the city, while the other objected that this was impossible.

German OB and locations in France (From the Swiss Military Attaché).

Operational plans in the Ukraine (Probably from a Swiss or Allied agent at OKW. Spring 42)

German losses on the Eastern front, estimated at two million.

Proposal to create an American I.S. apart from the normal diplomatic intelligence, on the lines of the Allied I.S. (This before Dec 41)

Changes in the German Command on the Eastern front: the dismissal of Feldmarschall von Bock and of (?) Guderian (concerning the latter - this occurred several times during the war, but also his re-engagement).

Records of conversations between Hitler and von Brauchitsch shortly after the temporary set-back near Moscow (Moskau) in autumn 41. Hitler urged Brauchitsch on to a final effort to capture the city, while the other (von Brauchitsch) objected that this was impossible.

The supply of carbons to the GIS dried up in consequence of an accident. A woman agent of Ast STUTTGART (name and particulars unknown to Sources) had been detained or was under observation by the Swiss police. In order to uncover her contacts, the latter rounded up members of a card party attended by her husband and, as chance would have it, NAFRAVNIK. The latter apparently lost his nerve under interrogation and unwittingly revealed the leakage at the American Legation, till then a well kept secret. During the subsequent proceedings KNUETTEL, NAFRAVNIK and FUERST were charged with espionage against SWITZERLAND and were sentenced to 18 or 20 years' imprisonment (except one who was awarded 15 years). KNUETTEL escaped from prison, but did not dare to cross the frontier into GERMANY, as he was "wanted" there for the revelations made while under interrogation by the Swiss police, and was eventually re-arrested.

After the a/m channel had been closed, and an approach to the Swiss authorities entailed no risk, it was hoped at the Abwehr in BERLIN that the German Foreign Office would undertake steps to ensure that the flow of information from Swiss army sources to the Allied I.S. should cease, especially as the GIS received no such treatment. The Foreign Office was however disinclined to take any official steps, but left it to the KO to do what it could. PESCATORE believes (he was not in SWITZERLAND at the time) that the German Military Attache in BERNE submitted to a Swiss authority, probably the General Staff, extracts from the filched material compromising Swiss official sources, in the hope of discouraging the continuation of the service. PESCATORE understands that the only practical result of this move was the transfer

Major WAIBEL from his post as head of the "German Branch" of the Offensive Intelligence Section of the Swiss General Staff to another appointment in which he served as LO to the British and American I.S.

The supply of carbons to the GIS dried up in consequence of an accident. A woman agent of Ast (Abwehrstelle) Stuttgart (Sonja) (name and particulars unknown to Sources) had been detained or was under observation by the Swiss police. In order to uncover her contacts, the latter rounded up members of a card party attended by her husband and, as chance would have it, Napravnik. The latter apparently lost his nerve under interrogation and unwittingly revealed the leakage at the American Legation, till then a well kept secret. During the subsequent proceedings Knuettel, Napravnik and Fuerst were charged with espionage against Switzerland and were sentenced to 18 or 20 years' imprisonment (except one who was awarded 15 years). Knuettel escaped from prison, but did not dare to cross the frontier into Germany, as he was "wanted" there for the revelations made while under interrogation by the Swiss police, and was eventually re-arrested.

After the a/m channel had been closed, and an approach to the Swiss authorities entailed no risk, it was hoped at the Abwehr in Berlin that the German Foreign Office would undertake steps to ensure that the flow of information from the Swiss army sources to the Allied I.S. should cease, especially as the GIS received no such treatment. The Foreign Office was however disinclined to take any official steps (AOB, generally their existed a strong animosity between the diplomates of the German AA and the German intelligence services; even sometimes culminating in real battles not in favour of German interests), but left it to the KO to do what it could. Pescatore believes (he was not (yet) in Switzerland at the time) (he arrived on 1 Jan 44, but was engaged at the Abwehr in Berlin; and therefore quite well informed) that the Germany Military Attaché in Bern submitted to the Swiss authority, probably the General Staff, extracts from the filched material compromising Swiss official sources, in the hope of discouraging the continuation of the service. Pescatore understands that the only practical result of this move was the transfer of Major Waibel from his post as head of the "German Branch" of the Offensive Intelligence Section of the Swiss General Staff to another appointment in which he served as Liaison Officer to the British and American I.S.

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(iii) American I.S. Staff and Activities.

BERNE

DULLES

For a long time this emissary's role was in doubt. GISEVIUS thought that his mission was confined to political and economic matters, but this view was later contradicted by a signal from WASHINGTON to BERNE saying that Allan W. DULLES was to be ostensibly enrolled as special assistant to the American Minister "on behalf of the DONOVAN Committee". As it was known that this committee was concerned with espionage it seemed to follow that DULLES himself had an espionage mission, and that his political interests lay rather along the lines of subversion (*Zersetzung*) than intelligence. This however was speculation only. The exact division of function between him and the American Military Attache, General LEGGE, was never cleared up. DULLES was assisted by members of the Prevent Buying Association (see below).

DULLES used to mix a good deal with German business men visiting SWITZERLAND. As the war progressed he came to be swamped with a flow of these men who were thought to be no doubt feeling their way to securing immunity for their plants from air bombardment or otherwise safeguarding the future of their business interests. Source state that they had no doubt DULLES derived a large amount of information from these channels.

(iii) American I.S. Staff and Activities.

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3. MEISNER was stubborn and uncooperative. He denied all personal contact with Colonel MASSON; said the latter was in touch only with SCHELLENBERG, but through whom he pretended not to know. When taxed with having appealed to MASSON just before the expulsion (which forced us to change our plans overnight and use Chiasso instead of Annemasse), he explained that he had General von HORN, the Military Attache intercede. MASSON replied that the Americans would be fair, that the French Colonels at Loerrach and Bregenz would also be generous but he would not recommend either of those passages. MEISNER also denied having any other important Swiss sources. He did not disguise his dislike for the S.D. When the S.D. took over in Switzerland in May, 1944, he said he refused to accept their leadership; it was only the inability of Berlin to replace the Abwehr personnel that permitted him to remain in Switzerland. He spoke with contempt of Hans DAUFELD, S.D. head for Switzerland, formerly in Lausanne, who was expelled in March 1945, and he went out of his way to say that DAUFELD was living in or near Bad Toelz, in Southern Bavaria. On the other hand, he insisted that SONNENHOHL was not a member of the S.D. but simply from the Foreign office. On the subject of Professor BERBER he quoted

3. Meisner was stubborn and uncooperative. He denied all personal contact with Colonel Masson; said the latter was in touch only with Schellenberg (Leiter Amt VI/Amt Mil), but through whom he pretended not to know. When taxed with having appealed to Masson just before the expulsion (which forced us to change our plans overnight and use Chiasso instead of Annemasse), he explained that he had General von Horn, the Military Attaché intercede. Masson replied that the Americans would be fair, that the French Colonels at Loerrach and Bregenz would also be generous but he would not recommend either those passages. Meisner also denied having any other important Swiss sources. He did not disguise his dislike for the S.D. When S.D. took over in Switzerland in May, 1944, (AOB, **this actually is incorrect, Abwehr/KO was taken over by Amt Mil/Amt VI and certainly not by the S.D. Amt IV!**) When the ~~S.D.~~ took over in Switzerland in May, 1944, he said he refused to accept their leadership; it was only the inability of Berlin to replace the Abwehr personnel that permitted him to remain in Switzerland. He spoke with contempt of Hans Daufeld was living in or near Bad Toelz (Tölz), in Southern Bavaria. On the other hand, he insisted that Sonnenhohl was not a member of the S.D. but simply from the Foreign Office. On the subject of Prof. Berber he quoted ...

5. Willy PIERT joined the Abwehr in 1940 as an interpreter. He came to Switzerland in that capacity in 1943 to work for PHILIP, von PESCATORE's predecessor. At first he was reluctant to discuss his agents, but was finally persuaded that being Swiss, in Switzerland, they could come to no harm. He then gave these six names, all of them low level agents:-

Willy Piert joined the Abwehr in 1940 as an interpreter. He came to Switzerland in that capacity in 1943 to work for Philipp, von Pescatore's predecessor. At first he was reluctant to discuss his agents, but was finally persuaded that being Swiss, in Switzerland, they could come to no harm (AOB, **I am not so sure about the "fair" attitudes of the current interrogators**). He then gave six names, all of them low level agents,:-