Page initiated 28 January 2019
Status: 20 February 2019
1 + 2 + 2a
The Nordpol affair, as well as the related Englandspiel,
were probably the most successful
counter espionage affairs
on the German side.
Its British counter-part was S.O.E.
What makes it all so intriguing, is, the fact that it lasted for nearly two years!
You will encounter a most dramatic story; very sad and a real drama,
as > 50 persons had been involved and with a very few exceptions, they lost their lives ultimately.
You will be confronted with genuine British document sections, which are being selected by my choice out of the bulk of paper materials available.
Such endeavour is only fruitful, when we are in the position to take notice
of the main 'entities' involved.
Before starting our Survey, I would like to point at the fact, that I previously (before 7 February 2019), I did suppose that the famous telegram once sent to S.O.E. on 1st April 1944, could only have been addressed on behalf of Schreieder, but he, in his post-war book : Englandspiel, on page 281, he quotes:
in Dutch language: De vijand brak het spel niet af; daarom moesten wij het wel doen. Giskes stuurde dan ook op 1 April een radiogram, dat als volgt luidde:
“Aan de heren Blunt, Bingham en Co.,
Wij zijn ons ervan bewust, dat u sedert enige tijd zonder onze hulp in Nederland zaken doet. Daar wij gedurende ruime tijd uw vertegenwoordiger zijn geweest, vinden wij dit heel onbillijk. Maar dat sluit niet uit, dat, als u mocht besluiten, ons op grote schaal te komen bezoeken, wij u de zelfde gastvrije ontvangst zullen bereiden, als uw agenten.”*
Equally can be found in Guy Liddell's war-time diaries 1942-1945; on page 251
Therefore. I would like to stress, that when otherwise being noticed, you should understand the foregoing text lines. Thus: that it was Giskes who arranged this telegram (radiogram)
We should confront ourselves with:
Huntemann, Giskes assistant
Schreieder the "Kriminaldirektor" of the Sipo
who 'invented' the name Englandspiel
and he actually was the executive of the German Police operations
Maybe concluding with an abstract of the final British
RSS report of 1945.
Before hand: Britain gained upmost from wireless (W/T) intercepts, but just this aspect might have been the braking point; as in Holland, the Germans possessed an excellent telephone network and almost all crucial communications went through wires instead of wireless!
This may be considered as the main reason why these events have been so disastrous!
I choose first to digest Obstlt. Herman Joseph Giskes' file series
KV 2/961 - 962 and 963
Not foreseeable, was the fact that it would cover too many pages at once, and I have therefore decided, to divide this file into two chapters.
of which we today will have
Obstlt. Hermann Joseph Giskes
Leiter Abwehr III F of Ast-Niederlande (1941 - 1943)
Photo taken during his interrogation in Camp 020 (May/June 1945)
KV 2/961 - 962 Part I (31-1-2019)
The next file is the second part of the previous document. In some respect it gives to me the impression, that everything around has been collected in a box and ultimately made it a file. But, it also contains some unexpected aspects. His file is most interesting as he dealt with it at a practical level, but still operating in between Giskes' circles and the daily operational practice.
KV 2/962 - 2-KV 963 Part II NEW (11-2-2019)
The third part of this quite comprehensive contribution, is on:
Huntemann Gerhard Gottfried Eduard:
Uffz. Gerhard Gottfried Eduard Huntemann
Considering, for example, a Dutch dissertation on Nordpol and Englandspiel (2003)(J.P.M.H. Wolters), its scope is rather narrow, albeit that when going into details it is done solid; but just outside it, it provides hardly anything! Therefore providing all the efforts, a quite meagre understanding of what happened in the Netherlands on the same time.
KV 2/967 Part I NEW (11-2-2019)
Huntemann, although he was an Uffz. (N.C.O.) in the quite small organisation of III F, he did almost the daily operational work on behalf of its Leiter Major/Obstlt. Giskes. He therefore is an excellent source of information; because he really dealt with most people concerned.
However, the latter contribution covers only the file sections 1 - 3. In my perception, the most intriguing section is number 4 (to be covered within Part II, as it considers the names of all those Huntemann could add what he knew about a person. Maybe for historians the most fruitful source of information.
I went through Huntemann's which after all proved to be a bit different than was expected. I have therefore considered only what really matters.
KV 2/967-4 Huntemann part II NEW (18-2-2019)
In my perception, he should be considered as the most relevant person of the Nordpol Affairs and the Englandspiel, on the German side.
Schreieder, Kriminaldirektor of the SD, and Hermann Joseph Giskes on behalf of the Abwehr (military Intelligence).
The Englandspiel and Nordpol affairs, was on the German side unprecedented successful, mainly due to their mutual understanding.
In contrast to what often was practiced, Schreieder was against violence versus those being captured.
In my perception, please remember: what have played a major role, in contrast elsewhere, was the existence in Holland of a wide, and good functioning, telephone system; preventing the application of wireless communications.
Otherwise, the course of history concerning Nordpol affairs and Englandspiel would have had a short operational life, but it lasted from about 12 March 1942 until, at least, autumn 1943.
We should not forget: that about 50 men have been murdered in the Mauthausen Concentration Camp!
Nationaal Archief/Collectie Spaarnestad (do not copy without permission of Spaarnestad Photo!)
Joseph Schreieder on trial in Holland, in the 1940s
Ultimately considered: not guilty.
In this Drama, one female became engaged, and she was:
Born in 1911 and she passed away in 1987
Most about her is dealt within Giskes' interrogations.
But Schreieder had to take care of her after all; and she had luck, because she survived.
In contrast to foregoing interrogation reports, I have considered more facets of Schreieder's file, because his details are so rare.
After the war, the Dutch Parliamentary Enquête Commission 1940-1945 dealt with this complex rather comprehensively, but it is, of course, genuinely issued in Dutch language.
KV 2/1332 Joseph Schreieder NEW (18-2'19)
However, my comment is, that he could have dealt with this complex in a wider way, but he might have been limited due to his uncertain status (future); and, likely, by the British narrow scope on this real S.O.E. disaster.
Deo volente, next - I should have to work on the RSS Final Report
To be continued in due course
By Arthur O. Bauer