

SECRET

A. D. I. (K) Report No. 405/1945

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G.A.F. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR - IV.

The Dieppe Raid - 19th August 1942.

PRELIMINARY SIGNALS SITUATION.

1. One of the P/W was posted to Referat B at Asnieres (Paris) in April 1942 to study R.A.F. Army Co-operation Command traffic. There were very few units subordinated to this command, of which the following were known to the G.A.F.:-

- (a) Close reconnaissance Wings Nos.32 to 37 and 39.
- (b) Transport Wing No.38.
- (c) Special units under South Farnborough.
- (d) Army Co-operation Units, etc.

Referat B worked in co-operation with the Army Signals Intelligence (NaaSt 5, St. Germain) on the evaluation of combined Force exercise traffic. In a relatively short time the following facts were elicited:-

(i) In army exercises, fairly strong forces of Fighter Command and No.2 Group of Bomber Command besides the weak Army Co-operation Command forces took part. It was thus clear that no new Army Co-operation air support forces would be created for the invasion, but that units of Fighter Command and No.2 Bomber Group would be used.

(ii) Combined Air-Army tactics were revealed in all detail, such as:

- (a) Functions and radio communications of the Army-Air Support Controls (AASC).
- (b) Functions and radio communications of air support links and tentacles.
- (c) Channels and construction of signals.
- (d) Abbreviations.
- (e) Frequency bands.

(f) The form of grid used (the modified system).

(iii) From Plain Language messages numerous unit names and locations were established, such as 38 Wing with 295 and 297 squadrons, etc. There were many useful Plain Language messages, especially in the umpire networks.

2. The importance of the above-named traffic was soon recognised and a company (9/3) made responsible for dealing with it. The depth of the traffic was vast, for in certain months no fewer than 100 exercises took place. The following exercises yielded considerable intelligence:-

- (a) Exercise "Tiger" in S.E. England, spring 1942.
- (b) Exercise "Limber" in E. England, slightly later.
- (c) Exercise "Dryshot" in W. Scotland shortly before Dieppe.

3. The interception of requests for air support from tentacles were considered of particular importance, as they gave good indications of intentions and thus provided warnings. These requests took the following form:-

- (a) Many tanks at V1987 (description of target).
- (b) 1 Squadron fighter bombers (type of support desired).
- (c) ASP (as soon as possible).
- (d) Not M. of river (to prevent bombing our forces).
- (e) Heavy A.A. (defence anticipated).
- (f) 1240 (T.O.O.).

4. When the Dieppe landing came the G.A.F. Signals Intelligence had excellent intelligence documents at its disposal, which proved of considerable value.

THE DIEPPE RAID.

5. The embarkation preparations and approach of the landing fleet were not picked up by the G.A.F. Signals Intelligence service; on the other hand, the Air Force and Army traffic which was transmitted immediately upon landing was picked up at once. The following factors were in favour of the G.A.F. signals intelligence:-

(i) The Kompanie responsible for the interception of landing traffic (9/3) was well placed at Deauville with direct landlines to the fighter authorities and to the army unit responsible for opposing a landing.

(ii) The Dieppe traffic was passed chiefly on naval frequencies, which were on full cover in order to match movements of Allied convoys for the benefit of the G.A.F.

(iii) 9/3 had already achieved considerable experience and efficiency as a result of their work on exercises in the U.K.

(iv) Through close contact with the Army the meanings of Allied cover-words such as "Green Peter, Red Peter etc." for the sections and 'Hindenburg, Bismarck etc.' for German strongpoints were quickly established.

(v) The German communications channels were insufficient for the supplying of messages both to combat units and higher staffs and so the G.A.F. fed the G.A.F. and Army units only, whereas the signals intelligence fed the higher staffs.

6. Upon the landing being made the following types of traffic were intercepted:-

- (i) H.Q. ships and Portsmouth base or Command.
- (ii) Units put ashore and H.Q. ships.
- (iii) Purely naval traffic.
- (iv) R/T and W/T traffic of flying formations.

7. The most productive of the above was No.2 for from that traffic the course of the raid could be followed with its initial partial successes, its increasing difficulties and finally the withdrawal. Towards midday requests for air support from the Allied Army units put ashore became more and more urgent.

8. Details of R.A.F. intentions were repeatedly given by the in the following form:-

"2 squadrons fighters and 1 squadron bombers will attack 'Bismarck' at 12 o'clock.

9. These messages were passed immediately to G.A.F. Fighter Control and resulted in many British aircraft being shot down. The opinion that KR messages could be sent in plain language shortly before an operation, as no countermeasures would be possible within such limited time, was definitely refuted at Dieppe.

EVALUATION OF EXPERIENCES AT DIEPPE.

10. The Signals Intelligence gained great praise as a result of Dieppe. It was also given undesirable publicity so that intercepted messages appeared verbatim in the press and were even mentioned by GOERING in a speech. The result was that the radio security of Allied exercises in the U.K. was tightened up. The effect on the G.A.F. Signals Intelligence was as follows:-

- (i) Rapid development of the landlines communication.
- (ii) Setting up of new radio links as alternatives to the landlines in case of interruption of the latter.

- (iii) Development of the D/F base, which had proved inadequate.
- (iv) Increased cover on exercises in the U.K. and more listening personnel working on the expected invasion.

A.D.I.(K) and
U.S. Air Interrogation.
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